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ABSTRACT 
An Economic Exploration of Prevention Versus Response in Animal Related 
Bioterrorism Decision Making. (December 2004) 
Levan Elbakidze, B.S., University of Nevada, Reno 
M.S., University of Nevada, Reno 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Bruce McCarl 
 
 
 Animal disease outbreaks either through deliberate terroristic act or accidental 
introductions present a serious economic problem. This work concentrates on the 
economics of choosing strategies to mitigate possible agricultural terrorism and 
accidental introduction events largely in the animal disease management setting.  General 
economic issues and the economic literature related to agricultural terrorism broadly and 
animal disease concerns specifically are reviewed.  Basic economic aspects, such as the 
economic consequences of outbreaks, costs and benefits of various mitigation strategies, 
and stochastic characteristics of the problem are discussed.   
A conceptual economic model is formulated to depict the animal disease outbreak 
related decision making process.  The key element of this framework is the choice 
between ex ante versus ex post mitigation strategies.  The decision of investing in 
preventative and/or responsive strategies prior to the occurrence of an event versus 
relying on response and recovery actions after an outbreak event needs careful 
consideration.  Comparative statics investigations reveal that factors that affect this 
decision are event probability, and severity, as well as costs, benefits, and effectiveness of 
various mitigation strategies.            
A relatively simplified empirical case study is done analyzing the economic 
tradeoffs between and optimum levels of ex ante detection, as a form of prevention, and 
ex post slaughter, as a form of response. The setting chosen involves Foot and Mouth 
Disease management.  Empirical investigation is done on the conditions under which it is 
economically more advantageous to invest in ex ante detection as opposed to relying just 
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on ex post response.  Results show that investment in ex ante activities becomes more 
advantageous as the probability and severity of an agricultural terrorism event increases, 
response effectiveness decreases, and costs of surveillance decrease.  Also spread rate is 
found to play a key role in determining optimal combination of ex ante and ex post 
strategies with more done ex ante the faster the disease spread.   
 Finally, an economic framework is posed for future work given availability of a 
more detailed epidemiologic model.  Access to such a model will allow for incorporation 
of wider spectrum of strategies including numerous possibilities for prevention, detection, 
response and market recovery facilitation.  The framework allows more localized options, 
multiple possible events and incorporation of risk aversion among other features.  
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 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The dawn of September 11, 2001 began as a typical Tuesday morning for most 
New Yorkers, Washingtonians and Americans.  However, early morning of that day 
proved to be unlike any other morning in the history.  Unsuspecting citizens were 
shocked and terrified by terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  
A big question mark was raised in many minds regarding national security and the 
American way of life.  Most instantly upgraded their assessment of the extent of 
vulnerability that the nation faced.  September 11, 2001 proved that, in spite of 
enormous expenses on national defense, uninterrupted prosperity was far from secure 
against deliberate terroristic acts.  It became clear that military forces alone were not 
sufficient to ensure peace and stability.  The subsequent mail borne anthrax attacks 
reinforced these feelings. The potential spread of biological/chemical lethal agents 
became more of a perceived threat.  Since those days government agencies, firms and 
individuals have directed increased attention to safeguarding infrastructure, businesses, 
and institutions.   
One large area of vulnerability is the U.S. agriculture and the consequent food 
supply.  In 2002, agriculture accounted for $250 billion in gross domestic product and 
employed nearly 1.6 million people (BEA, 2004). Agricultural vitality is essential for 
human welfare and the economy. Agriculturally related contamination events could have 
large consequences for consumers, producers and international trade as seen during 
recent mad cow and Avain flu events as they influenced conditions in the US, Canada, 
UK, and Asia.   
Such vulnerabilities lead many to believe that policy, program and business 
practice adjustments are needed to secure and protect agriculture. Food and water 
contamination have been identified by some as a relatively easy way to distribute 
chemical and biological agents (Khan et al. 2001).  As a reaction substantial funds are 
____________ 
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spent on hazardous biological and chemical agents related training and detection in order 
to prevent deliberate food contamination.  In 2003, an increase of $28 million relative to 
2002, was proposed to allow for more inspectors, improve FSIS' (Food Safety and 
Inspection Service) information technology infrastructure, and conduct epidemiologic 
surveys and risk prevention activities (Veneman, 2002). 
This dissertation views agricultural terrorism reviewing the literature, developing 
a conceptual economic model and conducting a case study to see the types of insights 
that can be gained. 
1.1 Basic Economic Issues of Bio-Security Actions 
Agricultural terrorism related decision making involves several economic issues.  
Economic welfare in the form of lost consumers' and producers' surpluses, plus the 
government costs of ex ante prevention and ex post response strategies are at the 
forefront of the economic issues.  Another substantial issue relates to the stochastic 
nature of events and the balance between ex ante prevention investments versus ex post 
event management decisions.  In other words, an economic question regarding 
mitigation of possible agricultural terrorism involves the appropriate combination of 
investments involving prevention actions, intelligence gathering and response facility 
installation in comparison with post event expenditures on response and recovery in the 
face of uncertain probabilities of event occurrence.   
The economic efficiency of possible agricultural terrorism related mitigation 
options needs to be evaluated individually and in combination in order to design 
effective mitigation strategies.  Some of the agricultural terrorism mitigation activities 
are: reducing access to chemical and biological materials; increasing security measures 
at production, processing and distribution facilities; employee screening; using 
antimicrobial drugs and vaccination; enhancing sanitary standards at production, 
transportation, storage and retail facilities; and establishing and/or improving detection, 
surveillance and tracing procedures.  Examples of such activities in an animal 
management/disease setting are animal inspection/disease detection, infected animal 
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slaughter, and vulnerable animal vaccination.  Each of these measures has direct and 
possibly indirect costs, which need to be considered before a strategy is adopted. 
From an economic standpoint, a criterion that can be employed in determining 
the optimal combination of agricultural terrorism mitigation strategies is based on net 
welfare or cost benefit analysis.  On the margin, preventative activities are economically 
justified only as long as benefits from their implementation outweigh their costs.  
The stochastic nature of terrorism events plays a significant role in forming an 
optimal combination of mitigation strategies.  The likelihood of terrorist events, the 
severity of events and the cost of actions will influence whether it is more beneficial to 
invest in prevention activities or to wait and respond with control and repair measures in 
case of an outbreak.  At low probabilities of agricultural sabotage, substantial investment 
in prevention, as well as surveillance and detection, will not look as attractive as in the 
case of high probability of agricultural contamination.   
1.2 Purpose and Objectives of the Study 
The general purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the economic design of 
counter animal disease related agricultural terrorism or accidental introduction caused 
outbreak management strategies.  More specifically, an investigation will be done on 
how the characteristics of outbreak events and characteristics of mitigation options 
influence the economically optimal choice of policy and management strategies 
addressing those events.  Emphasis will be placed on the amount of use of ex ante pre 
event alternatives versus ex post after event alternatives as influenced by potential event 
characteristics.  This will be examined through the development of a general model that 
conceptualizes the situation and then through an empirical case study that illuminates 
some of the issues.   
The case study will be done in the context of actions related to the introduction of 
FMD (Foot and Mouth Disease).  Consideration is given to regional scale policy options 
to counteract the potential or realized event.  Specifically, the study will compare and 
evaluate relative economic attractiveness of various preventive and responsive strategies 
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in a case study setting.  Disease outbreak will be considered in a stochastic environment.   
Specific items examined will include:  
identifying and examining the optimal economic amount of ex ante 
prevention, and detection relative to the amount of ex post 
response and recovery strategies used in addressing events as the 
characteristics of events change; and  
developing a framework that would allow policy and sectoral decision 
makers to examine tradeoffs between the ex ante costs of 
prevention/detection with more infrequent costs of outbreak 
management.   
1.3 Scope of the Study 
Although possible threats to food supply in the U.S. are numerous, this study will 
concentrate on the abstract general case and a specific simplified empirical case study.  
The case study will mainly revolve around introduction of FMD in Texas as an example 
of possible agricultural terrorism act but will use a simplistic set of management actions.  
FMD poses a serious threat to livestock and other related industries.  It has been 
documented that even unintentional outbreaks of diseases such as FMD can cause 
serious damages to the economy.  For example, a recent FMD outbreak had major 
consequences for the UK economy (Thompson et al., 2003).   
The case study region is Texas.  This area was chosen because of geographic 
proximity, data availability and economic importance.  In 2002, Texas had roughly 14 
percent of total U.S. cattle (NASS, 2002).  Cattle are found on more than 150,000 Texas 
farms and ranches.  Sales of cattle and calves comprise the largest portion of State's 
agricultural cash receipts.  Examining the repercussions of an ABS event, as well as the 
options for prevention, detection and response in a region such as Texas is likely to 
generate insights relevant to ABS actions for assuring stability of livestock markets.  
Additionally, examining prevention, detection, response and recovery strategies on a 
local basis rather than a national level provides a manageable problem while still 
permitting development of an understanding of economic components of decision 
support tools.  The basic features of the economic approaches in this study are expected 
to be applicable in broader settings.   
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1.4 Methodology 
Empirically I rely on a conceptual framework developed in this dissertation for 
investigating prevention and response strategies for FMD mitigation.  First, the 
framework will be developed based on theory and problem characteristics then 
investigated analytically in a comparative statics setting.  Second, the framework is 
empirically applied in a simplified case study setting and used to numerically investigate   
the optimal amount of ex ante detection, as a form of prevention strategy, and ex post 
slaughter, as a form of response strategy.  Subsequently, more advanced framework is 
described, which is mainly presented as a model for use in future research given access 
to a detailed epidemiologic model. 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter one provides an introduction to the 
problem and discusses the goals of the study.  Chapter two will provide a literature 
review on the economic issues related to agricultural biosecurity.  Chapter three 
discusses a model that was developed as a part of this work to examine optimal 
prevention, detection, response and recovery levels under various threat levels, disease 
spread, response effectiveness and cost characteristics.  Conditions for optimality will be 
derived and comparative statics results are developed and discussed.  Chapter four will 
empirically specify and employ a version of the model in a simplified FMD case study 
setting.  Sensitivity analysis will be performed to evaluate the results under different 
scenarios.  Chapter five will introduce a more advanced conceptual model for evaluating 
various mitigation strategies based on availability of an epidemiologic animal disease 
spread mode.  A simplified empirical application of a hypothetical epidemiologic FMD 
mitigation model, which provides a set of prevention, response and recovery measures, 
will be demonstrated.  Costs of a potential FMD outbreak will be minimized based on 
various mitigation combinations and the potential for inclusion of risk aversion into 
decision making will be demonstrated empirically using hypothetical event scenarios 
and mitigation strategies.    
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2 THE ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURAL BIO-SECURITY:  
AN INTERPRETIVE LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Definitions 
Using deliberately contaminated food to cause poisoning has occurred for 
hundreds of years.  However, using a food supply system to cause massive disruption 
and destruction is a relatively new concept.  Consequently, there is no internationally 
accepted standard definition of agricultural or food terrorism. 
One way that food terrorism has been defined is “an act or threat of deliberate 
contamination of food for human consumption with chemical, biological or radionuclear 
agents for the purpose of causing injury or death to civilian populations and/or disrupting 
social, economic or political stability”(WHO, 2002).  In this definition, chemical agents 
refer to manufactured or natural toxins, biological agents refer to infectious or non-
infectious pathogenic organisms, including viruses, bacteria and parasites, and 
radionuclear agents are defined as radioactive chemicals capable of causing injury when 
present at excessive amounts.  Clearly the objective of food terrorism act is to cause 
widespread injuries, inducing terror and panic, and disrupt social order (Sobel and 
Swerdlow, 2002).  
Agricultural adulteration can have diverse implications.  While food 
contamination at a local restaurant can affect the customers of that particular restaurant, 
sabotage at centralized food processing or distribution facilities could affect a wide 
range of the population, even in diverse regions.  Thus, food borne diseases caused by 
intentional or unintentional contamination, could be characterized by the number of 
exposed people. Disease bandwidth refers to the extent of the impact caused by the food 
borne disease (Khan et. al. 2001). In other words, the more people are likely to be 
affected, the broader the bandwidth of the food borne disease.   
In the context of bio-security, risk refers to the probability or probability 
distribution of agricultural contamination.  Introduction of non-indigenous species may 
or may not result in undesirable agricultural contamination.  Shogren (2000) argues that 
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the odds of calamity are low, but with increased trade and easy mobility the risks of 
invasion by detrimental species are going up.  
The most desirable option to combat deliberate agricultural contamination, as 
well as accidental contamination is prevention.  Prevention has been defined as 
preventing agricultural sabotage during production, processing, distribution and 
preparation (WHO 2002).  Establishing new and enhancing existing food safety 
programs are key components of the counter terrorism agenda.  Prevention includes 
activities such as restricting access to chemical, biological and nuclear agents, increasing 
security measures such as monitoring at agricultural harvesting, production, processing, 
manufacturing, storage, transport, retail distribution and food service facilities.      
It is nearly impossible to prevent every possible incident of deliberate or 
accidental agricultural contamination.  In those unfortunate cases where suspected or 
adulterated food has reached the consumer, emergency response systems have been 
activated.  Potential response activities include, but are limited to, verification and 
assessment of threat; identification, tracing and removal of contaminated food; and 
management of consequences including aiding the affected population. 
2.2 Economic Aspects of Agricultural Bio Security 
 From an economic perspective, a major consequence of agricultural terrorism is 
that it would cause disruptions in agricultural commodity and related markets either 
because of the events itself or because of potentially expensive and intrusive 
preventative actions (Henson and Mazzocchi, 2002).  Several economic issues are 
related to agricultural market sabotage.  Economic damages of agricultural 
contamination, in the forms of lost consumer and producer surpluses, and costs of 
prevention, control and repair strategies are at the forefront of economic issues.  In broad 
terms, economic investigation of agricultural biosequrity research involves 
quantification of economic damages; evaluation of economic effectiveness of available 
prevention and response options and policies; and consideration of stochastic nature of 
terrorism.  Later in this work I will concentrate on economic analysis related to 
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prevention versus event management dimensions under the stochastic nature of the 
problem at hand.  
2.2.1 Quantifying Economic Damages  
Estimating the economic damages caused by either intentional or unintentional 
agricultural contamination gets rather difficult due to complex nature of agricultural 
markets (Atkinson, 1999).  Issues such as identifying affected parties (Paarlberg et al. 
2003; Evans, 2003) and calculating the economic values of damages to those parties, 
such as reduced sales (Smith et al. 1988, Burton and Young 1996), and assessing the 
impact time line, are some of the complications related to event damage estimation.  Due 
to highly integrated nature of the agricultural economy, the consequences of agricultural 
contamination at any given point along the supply chain could be manifested in other 
sectors of the economy.  For example, major economic losses from recent FMD outbreak 
in the UK came from losses in tourism industry (Mangen and Burrell, 2003).  
To estimate potential economic losses from agricultural contamination in the 
form of infectious animal disease spread, biophysical information is necessary in order 
to evaluate the extent of physical damages.  For example, in case of prospective animal 
disease related events some level of epidemiological insight is necessary to simulate the 
scope of an event (Jalvingh et al. 1999, Ferguson et al. 2001) and consequently evaluate 
the economic costs.  In other words, the spread rate of an infectious disease will 
determine the severity of economic damages and influence the appropriate combination 
of prevention and response actions.  
2.2.2 Policy Responses to Terrorism 
Policy design and cost estimation entails designing a set of possible effective 
ABS strategies (Khan et al. 2001), realizing the necessary extent of such activities 
(Garner and Lack 1995, Ferguson et al. 2001), and calculating the associated monetary 
and possible non-market costs of those activities. In addition, anti-terrorism policies 
need to be designed in a way that incorporates the possible moves from all involved 
parties such as targeted segments of society, government policy makers, and terrorists of 
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various descent using approaches such as those provided by game theory (Sandler and 
Acre, 2003). 
Four broad categories of response polices to agricultural terrorism are prevention, 
detection, control/repair and recovery management.  Prevention is perhaps the most 
desirable policy option when it comes to agricultural counter terrorism activities as it can 
prevent damages from occurring.  Some of the preventative policy options relate to 
adjusting farm level production activities such as employing antimicrobial livestock 
drugs (Mathews et al., 2001) and vaccination (Bates et al., February 2003 a,  
Schoenbaum and Disney 2003), reducing access to chemical, biological and radioactive 
materials, etc.  Others relate to processing and manufacturing procedures, storage and 
transportation facilities (Hennessy et al., 1996), retail distribution and food service 
facilities (Mermin and Griffin, 1999), and trade inspection (Levine et al., 1996, Mahon 
et al., 1997).  The basic purpose of prevention activities is to decrease the probabilities 
of intentional or unintentional agricultural contamination incidents.  However, 
prevention costs are incurred whether or not events occur and thus can be costly 
especially for extremely unlikely events.  Generally, it is safe to say that desirable global 
prevention is unattainable at a reasonable cost.     
Detection, which could be used as a part of a prevention strategy (Bates et al. 
September 2003; Akhtar and White, 2003), could facilitate avoidance of deliberate 
agricultural contamination by eliminating possible venues of agricultural terrorism.  
Surveillance and detection systems could be designed to identify and remove all affected 
commodities from the market before a large scale event can occur.  Tracking (Diseny et 
al., 2001) can be an integral part of the detection mechanism.  Tracing systems could 
allow the authorities to identify the sources of outbreaks and remove affected animals.  
Cost is again a factor as detection costs can be encountered whether or not an event is 
present.   
Response, control, repair and recovery (Bates et al. September 2003; Bates et al.,  
February 2003 b; Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003) are the least desirable options as they 
are only activated if an event has occurred.  Nevertheless they are indispensable parts of 
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a total strategy for ABS event planning.  Essentially such policies are intended to 
minimize the economic damages caused by encountered agricultural contamination 
event.  This process entails stopping the spread of a possibly infectious contamination 
and minimizing the bandwidth of the sabotage.  Recovery measures could involve 
eliminating the sabotage sources, restoring or replacing the lost food branches along the 
food supply chain, and rebuilding consumer confidence.  Recovery deals with the 
aftermath of an event and the ways consumers are informed about the safety of the food 
supply in a way such that demand recovers.  Recovery also deals with the management 
of potentially contaminated resources in a manner so as to minimize the likelihood of 
future outbreaks from for example soil resident residuals left over after the outbreak. 
2.2.3 Prevention as a Public Good 
The economic dimensions of a preventative strategy carry some of the 
characteristics of public goods.  Specifically, if some of the livestock producers in a 
given area vaccinate, then it will decrease the probability of infection for not only those 
farms that vaccinated but also for those that did not.  Therefore, some farmers may 
choose to not adopt preventative strategies and instead hope to “free ride” at the expense 
of those who adopt such strategies.  Anti-terrorism strategies carrying such 
characteristics have been analyzed as “interdependent security” problem under airline 
safety scenarios (Heal and Kunreuther, 2004).  Under such contexts, mitigation actions 
adopted by one entity influence security levels of other entities.  In case of agricultural 
bio-security, it needs to be noted that farmers that choose not to prevent cannot be 
excluded from benefiting from the decreased infection probabilities due to prevention 
activities of their neighbors.  These benefits could also be argued to be non-rival.  
Specifically, enjoying decreased probability of infection spread by one farmer does not 
reduce corresponding benefits enjoyed by another farmer in the same vicinity.   These 
characteristics could classify some prevention and response actions as public goods 
which are known to be under produced by free markets (Hanley et al.  1997).  This has 
been demonstrated in terms of retaliation against terrorism where due to free riding less 
retaliation has been observed than socially optimal (Dwight, 1988).    
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2.2.4 Mitigation of Agricultural Terrorism  
Some of the preventative and control activities at agricultural level involve: 
reducing access to chemical and biological materials, increasing security measures at 
central production, processing and distribution facilities (Ryan et al. 1987), employee 
screening (WHO, 2002), using antimicrobial drugs and vaccination (Schoembaum and 
Disney, 2003), enhancing and updating sanitary standards at production, transportation 
(Hennessy et al., 1996), storage and retail facilities, and establishing and/or improving 
detection, surveillance and tracing (Disney, 2001) procedures.  However, in this 
research, the attention will be concentrated on surveillance and detection, slaughter, and 
vaccination.  Each of these measures has direct and possibly indirect costs, which need 
to be considered before a strategy is adopted. 
A critical question related to response to agricultural terrorism is one of 
determining the optimal mix of ex ante prevention/detection/tracing investment (APDTI) 
and ex post control/repair/management  (XCRM) strategies.  From an economic stand 
point, the choice of the strategy needs to account for both economic costs of damages 
that could be brought by agricultural contamination and the ex ante costs of preventing 
the incident (Berentsen et al. 1992).  In other words, a chosen APDTI strategy needs to 
pass benefit costs analysis, where the benefits correspond to avoided economic damages 
of agricultural sabotage weighted by the probability of the event while costs correspond 
to both monetary expenses and non-monetary losses related to executing the strategy.  
Similarly, XCRM strategies also need to satisfy benefit-cost criteria.  In this case 
benefits entail an anticipated welfare increase from the total situation including the 
investment costs of the APDTI actions that aim to prevent, rapidly detect and manage 
agricultural sabotage events and the XCRM events that are directed toward repairing the 
damaged markets.  Costs of such policies would correspond to expenses associated with 
implementing the strategy.   
2.2.5 Stochastic Considerations  
The choice of optimal mix of prevention and control/repair strategies is heavily 
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affected by the stochastic characteristics of the issue.  The sabotage probability values 
and severity of event consequences will influence whether it is more beneficial to invest 
in prevention activities or is it better to wait and respond with control and repair 
measures in the case of an outbreak.  At low probabilities of agricultural sabotage 
substantial investment in prevention, as well as surveillance and detection, will not be as 
attractive as in the case of high probability of agricultural contamination.  The 
probability of agricultural contamination can be argued to be actually affected by 
prevention, surveillance and detection strategies (Shogren, 2000).  For example, a timely 
detection and destruction of infected animals will reduce the chances of regional spread 
of the infection, and thus will decrease the probability of outbreak occurring in the 
region. In other words, high levels of prevention, detection and surveillance will 
decrease the probability of a successful agricultural terrorism act.  However, further in 
this analysis I will assume that prevention and response strategies do not affect the 
probabilities of planned agricultural sabotage but rather influence the severity of the 
attack.  That is the probability of facing an attempt to sabotage agricultural markets 
could be viewed to be independent of implemented preventative activities.  This is in 
part motivated by uncertainty of prevention effectiveness.  The relationship between the 
terrorists’ intention to attack and prevention measures is not clear.  Therefore, 
throughout most of this work I basically assume that if they intend to attack they will 
find a way to do so even with prevention and other measures in place. However, 
bandwidth of the attack, and therefore, the severity of it, is directly affected by 
preventative and response measures.  For example, vaccinating the animals before the 
attack does not decrease the probability of an attack but may decrease the number of 
infected animals in case of an attack and decrease the probability that a specific farm or 
a farming community will be infected.  Similarly, surveillance and detection activities 
could be argued to decrease event severity, which could be represented by a probability 
of a given farm getting infected in case of an attack.  Low levels of surveillance and 
detection, and consequent inability to detect and eliminate the threat in a timely fashion, 
could result in a severe event having high probability of a given farm getting infected.  
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On the other hand, high levels of surveillance and detection could allow decreasing the 
probability of a given farm getting infected. 
2.3 Economic Implications of Agricultural Sabotage 
ABS events can have numerous and diverse consequences, which makes 
exhaustive estimation of associated economic losses rather difficult. An exhaustive 
estimate of the economic costs would include effects on  
1. producer profits  
2. consumer welfare,  
3. death 
4. lost jobs,  
5. lessened consumer demand now and in the future 
6. market price effects 
7. costs of prevention activities  
8. costs of responding to the incidents, such as costs of complying with enhanced 
regulations, clean up, medical treatment, etc.   
Currently, most of the existing estimates reflect certain components of total costs 
of agricultural contamination.  For example, medical costs and lost wages due to food 
borne salmonellosis, only one of many food borne infections, have been estimated to be 
more than $1 billion/year (CDC, 2003).  Non-native species, such as plant pathogens and 
livestock pests could cause considerable economic losses.  Plant pathogens cause crop 
losses equivalent to approximately $33 billion, while livestock losses due to pests are 
estimated to be approximately $9 billion per year (Pinmentel et al., 2000).  However, 
plant pathogens could cause additional economic losses in the form of damages to non-
crop plants.  Livestock pests could harm consumer welfare through increased livestock 
prices due to decreased production.   
The most obvious economic effects of agricultural food contamination are 
changes in market prices for the affected commodities.  For example the prices at retail, 
wholesale and producer levels in UK are estimated to have fallen by 1.7, 2.25 and 3.0 
pence/kg, respectively over the 1990s due to BSE occurrence (Loyd et al., 2001).  This 
implies that the economic consequences of agricultural contamination will vary along 
the supply chain in terms of magnitude.  In addition, to examine the price effects of 
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agricultural contamination, one would need to decompose this price effect into supply 
and demand effects, combination of which makes up the prices and their changes in the 
market.  For example it was estimated that the long run effect of BSE outbreak in the 
UK in 1990 was 4.5% reduction of consumer expenditures on beef (Burton and Young, 
1996).  Clearly, there also were changes in supply environment due to stricter 
regulations, not related to BSE, which also influenced the market price of beef products, 
consequently influencing demand for beef products.      
Due to the 2001 FMD outbreak in the UK the losses to the agricultural industry 
were projected to be anywhere from $720 million to $2.304 billion.  Expected tourism 
losses were even higher (Mangen and Barrell, 2003).  Schoenbaum and Disney (2003) 
estimated that net changes in consumer and producer surplus due to a hypothetical FMD 
outbreak in the United States would amount to $789.9 million annually.  However, their 
estimate was based on the assumption that the consumer demand would not be affected 
by the outbreak.  Taking consumer response into account could potentially alter the 
estimate. The list of economic impacts could be quite lengthy but it is unlikely that every 
conceivable consequence could be accounted for. 
2.3.1 Producers 
Outbreaks of diseases through introduction of non-indigenous species affect 
producers and consumers through changes in agricultural product prices, costs of 
production and availability of goods.  From a producer’s standpoint, agricultural 
contamination implies a ban or at least a substantial reduction in sales of the infected 
commodities.  As a consequence, the producers could suffer significant economic losses, 
unless compensated by the government.  As a result of 1982 milk contamination in Oahu 
(Hawaii), 36.2 million pounds of milk were recalled.  Smith et al. (1988) calculated sales 
losses due to contamination and subsequent milk bans to be 41.7 million pounds by 
calculating difference between the projected sales without incident and estimates of 
actual sales.  In 1996, contaminated radish sprouts served in school lunches led to an 
outbreak of Eschria coli 0157:H7 infection in Sakai City, Japan.  The outbreak caused 
meat and fish sales to decline by 40-60 percent.  In addition, consumers also responded 
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by purchasing 40-60 percent fewer restaurant meals (Mermin and Griffin, 1999), thus 
leading to losses in restaurant industry income.  The director of the school lunch 
program in Sakai City committed suicide after the outbreak, which portrays serious 
social consequences of food contamination.      
Agricultural sabotage, such as introduction of animal diseases, could cause a 
significant decline in agricultural productivity.  Although mortality is high among young 
animals infected with FMD (Ferguson et al., 2001), most animals recover from the 
infection, but subsequently exhibit permanently reduced weight gain and/or milk yield.  
Infected animals are usually quarantined and killed as part of prevention efforts, 
reducing supplies of livestock products and on farm income.  These actions result in 
substantial monetary losses for farmers who incurred costs associated with production of 
livestock, which can not be sold due to illness.  Compensation is an important part of 
any policy scheme as otherwise farmers have an incentive to hide their animals which 
can lead to a longer period of infection.  In 2001 about £1.1 has been paid to UK 
producers to compensate for some of their losses.  61% of this amount was 
compensation for slaughter of animals (DEFRA, 2002).  
The 1996 outbreak of BSE in UK affected beef producers in general by 
decreasing demand and turning their beef into unmarketable products that had to be 
disposed of.  The announcement in March 1996 about possible link between BSE and 
it’s human version was followed by an immediate drop of 40 percent in sales of beef 
products.  First year losses alone were estimated to be around $1.07-$1.4 billion 
(Mathews and Buzby, 2001).  Between one half and two thirds of total losses from BSE 
were attributed to fall in the value of the meat production.  The remainder of the losses 
resulted from the costs associated with various public schemes, compliance costs of new 
legislative requirements, and production adjustment costs. However, beef farmers were 
about 90% compensated for BSE induced revenue losses (Atkinson, 1999). 
2.3.2 Supply Chain Effects 
Most of the time, production reductions due to disease outbreaks affect the 
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vertical chain of entities on the supply side of the market.  For example, in the case of 
the BSE outbreak in the UK, there were losers as well as winners within the cattle sector.  
Specialist beef finishers suffered from the joint effect of higher calf prices and lower 
finished cattle prices.  On the other hand, dairy farmers saw improved prices for their 
calves and cull cows (Atkinson, 1999).   Cattle slaughterers, processors, manufacturers 
and renderers were also among the affected parties.  Mainly, the extent of the effect 
depended on the ability of a party to substitute alternative meat products such as pork, 
poultry and lamb. Degree of substitutability varies depending on business type.  For 
example, it is easier for a butcher to switch from beef to pork than it is for rancher to 
switch from cattle to swine.   
Impacts of an outbreak of a food borne disease stretch beyond the immediate 
markets for the contaminated or suspected commodity.  For example, due to UK 
government’s announcement of a possible link between BSE and human health various 
types of firms in the beef and related sectors were impacted.  Processors of beef, dairy 
products, animal feed, and pet food were negatively affected.  On the other hand, 
manufacturers of other meats were positively affected by the announcement (Henson and 
Mazzocchi, 2002).     
Food borne disease outbreak could also affect industries other than agriculture 
and food.  For example, effects of BSE and FMD probably spilled over to clothing, 
furniture and other leather commodity markets.  Highly contagious diseases also result in 
public scares, which affect industries such as tourism.  Of the total estimated costs of 
£7.6-8.5 billion, £3,1 billion was borne by the public sector, farmers  and related 
industries, while £4.5-5.3 billion was estimated to be lost in the tourism and leisure 
industries (Mangen, and Barrell, 2003) 
2.3.2.1  Distribution of Welfare Change  
Welfare effects for producers are usually estimated in terms of changes in 
producer surplus or net income.  For an outbreak of a food borne disease and/or for 
introduction of non-indigenous species, the effects on producer welfare could be 
 
 17 
measured by the change in producer surplus caused by the outbreak.  Figure 2 illustrates 
a situation with a hypothetical outbreak.  As a result of an outbreak supply decreased 
from S0 to S1, while demand could decrease to D1 or even D2, consequently increasing or 
decreasing the price.  However, for illustrative purposes, suppose demand for 
uncontaminated food items did not change (the direction of resultant price change is not 
important for the main argument, which is that not all producers are affected in the same 
manner).  Then the change in producer surplus would be A1A0PoP1.  However, this 
measure of change in aggregate producer welfare does not reflect the income distribution 
consequences.  Not all producers of a commodity will be affected in the same manner 
(Paarlberg et al. 2003).  Producers whose output had to be taken out of the market are 
affected differently from those whose product survived the outbreak and remained in the 
market.  For producers whose product remained in the market, welfare change could be 
measured as area to the left of their supply and between the initial and new price (Figure 
3a).  Consequently these producers could be better off or worse off depending on the 
direction of price change.  On the other hand, for the producers of a banned commodity, 
welfare is measured by losses in sales revenues, equal to 0P0CQ0 (Figure 3b).  Therefore, 
for cases such as FMD outbreaks, where not all of a given commodity supply is banned 
from the market, it may be more appropriate to decompose the effects on producers into 
two parts; the effect on producers who are directly affected by contamination, and the 
effect on producers whose products are not contaminated. 
2.3.3 Consumption 
A major consequence of agricultural terrorism is the effects of food scares on the 
demand for agricultural products.  Essentially, consumer demand for commodities 
related to a contamination incident falls.  Figure 4 shows the effect of decreased 
consumer demand caused by a food scare.  In this figure, for simplicities case, supply is 
held constant.  As a result of a food scare event the prices of products decrease and so do 
the quantities.  This has a deteriorating effect on consumer surplus. 
Usually, detected contamination of agricultural commodities results in bans of 
infected or suspected products.  Consumers are affected by decreased availability of and 
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increased prices for safe food products.  At the same time, demand for a commodity, a 
certain brand of which has been contaminated typically decreases (Smith et al., 1998; 
Smith et al., 1988; Torok et al. 1997; Henson and Mazzocchi, 2002; Burton and Young, 
1996).  This implies change of consumer preferences at least in the short run.  Although 
in the long run preferences are likely to return to pre-incident state, it is possible that 
some changes will occur permanently.  
The actual effects of a “food scare” that result from agricultural sabotage in part 
depend on consumer perceptions, which could deem some commodities to be riskier 
then others.  For example, sales of beef products in Great Britain decreased by 40% 
immediately after the announcement made by the British government in 1996 regarding 
a possible link between BSE and it’s human version, nvCJD.  Household beef 
consumption decreased by 26% relative to the previous year.  However, this decrease 
was uneven for different cuts of beef.  Beef products such as burgers and mince 
experienced substantially larger decreases in consumption than better cuts, such as high 
quality steaks (Atkinson, 1999).  
Outbreaks of certain food borne diseases could affect the restaurant industry.  
Demand for eating out is likely to decrease in times of elevated public concerns 
regarding food safety, regardless of the type of commodity that was contaminated.  
Consider the case of E. Coli outbreak in Japan in 1996 where white radish sprouts served 
at school lunches were contaminated.  As a result sales of fish, meat, and all restaurant 
meals decreased by 40 to 60 percent (Mermin and Griffin, 1999). 
As in a case of advertisement, publicity of food borne disease affects the demand 
in a dynamic manner.  The demand for an infected commodity changes most notably in 
the short run, while over the long run the effects of “food scare” may decrease or even 
dissipate.  This process applies not only to a commodity with possible infection but also 
to related goods.  For example, Burton and Young (1996) argue that the maximum short 
run effect of BSE on the demand for beef, pork, lamb and poultry in Great Britain was a 
6% reduction in the beef and veal share, which occurred in the summer of 1990 when 
there was a maximum number of published news articles on BSE (735).  In the long run, 
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over the sample period (1961-1993), BSE has decreased the expenditure share of beef by 
4.5 percent, while other meats gained in share (Burton and Young, 1996).   
2.3.3.1 Distribution of Welfare Change 
Measuring the effects of agricultural disease outbreaks on consumer welfare is 
complicated by asymmetry in possible consumer responses.  After contaminated items 
have been removed from the market, consumers could behave in different manners.  One 
group of consumers could be relatively confident about safety of food commodities that 
are available in the market, while another hypersensitive (Paarlberg et al., 2003) group, 
might no longer consume the commodity.  It has been shown that food-safety 
knowledge, attitudes and behavior vary depending on sociodemographic characteristics 
of population subgroups (Nayga, 1996).  If, as a result of an outbreak, the price for the 
commodity decreased, then the group that is still consuming a given commodity 
experiences increased welfare, while those who completely stopped purchasing suffer 
welfare loss.  If the price increased then both groups experience welfare losses, although 
to different extents.  The proportion of hypersensitive consumers will affect the overall 
sign of consumer welfare change.  Paarlberg et al. (2003) estimate that for a potential 
FMD outbreak in the US, if the proportion of hypersensitive consumers is less than 7%, 
then overall consumer welfare increases due to decreased beef prices.  However, if the 
proportion of hypersensitive consumers is greater than 7% then overall consumers lose 
even with a decreased price for beef.  Therefore, it is important to find out how the 
consumers would react to a potential food contamination in order to estimate welfare 
effects.   
2.3.4 Role of Information Media Coverage 
The effect of food contamination on consumers essentially manifests itself 
through information passed on to the consumers.  Publicized food contamination creates 
“food scares”, which have the opposite effect of advertising.  The result is that the 
demand for contaminated or a suspected commodity of brand “A” decreases 
substantially or disappears.  However, the demand for the same commodity of an 
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uncontaminated brand “B” may decrease, increase, or stay approximately the same.  
Hence, depending on the level of “food scare” and degree of substitutability, the price 
for brand “B” may increase, decrease or stay roughly unchanged.   
The extent to which consumers adjust their behavior largely depends on media 
coverage (Nayga, 1996).  Moreover, the information passed on to the consumers will 
have different effects on consumer behavior depending on the source of information.  
Sources perceived to have external reasons for asserting that consumers face low risk are 
likely to have a greater propensity to be discounted.  Credibility and trust are two key 
concepts that determine consumer response to a given information source. Outbreaks of 
food borne diseases could affect consumer attitudes toward various sources of 
information.  For example, consumer trust in opinions of family and friends, rather than 
experts, increased immediately after the 1996 BSE outbreak in the UK (Smith et al., 
1998).   
When it comes to food contamination, the media has two fundamental roles 
Nayga et al. (2004).  One is to inform the public of available details about the incident, 
such as disease type, affected commodity and brands, contagiousness, precaution and 
treatment specifics etc.  Obviously, the extent and content of information passed on to 
the population will affect purchasing behavior of consumers.  Second is to facilitate 
restoration of lost consumer confidence.  Nayga et al. (2004) show that availability of 
scientific information on food safety leads to positive effects on consumer perceptions 
and buying decisions.  In the context of intentional food contamination this entails 
informing the population about safety of unaffected products and about containment of 
disease.  The effectiveness of this coverage will play a significant role in the restoration 
of consumer confidence.  In 1982, 80% of milk produced in Oahu (Hawaii) was 
contaminated due to heptaclor contamination.  Smith et al. (1988) evaluated the effects 
of media announcements on the demand of milk in Hawaii during the sixteen months 
following the contamination incident.  The model incorporated two types of media 
coverage. Negative coverage dealt with the recall of contaminated milk, while positive 
coverage reassured the population that unrecalled milk was safe for consumption.  It was 
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concluded that the effect of negative coverage dominated the effects of positive 
coverage.  In other words, positive media announcements that followed negative 
announcements failed to fully restore consumer confidence lost due to media coverage 
of contamination incidents. 
Media coverage of animal disease outbreaks will play a significant role in 
determining the response of consumers.  Essentially media coverage is argued to alter 
public perceptions regarding food safety.  However, it was found (Piggott and Marsh, 
2004) that subsistence level demand for beef would decline by 0.144% in response to 
10% increase in the beef safety index, measured by the number of publications that 
appear in news paper and magazines regarding beef safety.  This estimate implies a 
decline of 0.024 pounds of quarterly beef consumption per person as a result of 10% 
increase in the beef safety index.  Similarly there would be 0.25% decline in subsistence 
consumption of poultry as a result of 10% increase in poultry safety index.  This implies 
a decline of 0.039 pounds of quarterly poultry consumption as a result of 10% increase 
in poultry safety publicity.  Subsistence consumption of pork would decline by 0.13% as 
a result of 10% increase of pork safety publicity.  Consumer response to food safety 
issues were found to be statistically significant but economically small especially 
relative to price effects and other health issues related to meat consumption such as 
health information.  
2.3.5 Trade 
Contamination of agricultural commodities could have devastating effects on 
trade. Businesses could potentially be forced into bankruptcy or greatly damaged 
because sabotage of agricultural production could result in abolishment of exports of a 
wide range of products related to infected or suspected commodities.  For instance, in 
1989 four outbreaks of staphylococcal food poisoning in the US were associated with 
eating mushrooms canned in China (Levine et al., 1996).  The incident affected 99 
people who ate at a university cafeteria, hospital cafeteria, pizzeria and at a restaurant, 
18 of which were hospitalized.  Investigations of mushroom plants in China by FDA (US 
Food and Drug Administration) investigators and consultants found several reasons for 
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mushroom contamination, including widespread sanitation deficiencies at the processing 
facilities.  In response, US FDA restricted imports of all mushrooms produced in China, 
which was approximately 50 million pounds annually.  In 1989 all Chilean grapes were 
recalled from US and Canadian markets due to cyanide contamination.  As a result, 
several hundred growers and shippers went bankrupt (WHO, 2002). 
Due to the announcement of the British government regarding BSE in March 
1996, the European Union imposed a ban on all UK beef exports worldwide.  As a 
result, UK lost all of its beef exports which in 1995 were 300,000 tons, worth about 600 
million pounds sterling, plus 70 million pounds sterling in live calves.  At the same time, 
the price of beef cattle fell by 25%.  In addition, furniture and other leather commodity 
markets were affected (Atkinson, 1999).  
2.4 Background on Terrorism towards Agriculture 
The basic goal of terrorism acts is to inflict fear and economic disruption.  
Agricultural sabotage related events represent a serious threat to public health and to the 
economy, although up to now such events have not been very common compared to 
other forms of terrorism.  Therefore, in the next two subsections I compare agricultural 
sabotage to other forms of terrorism and discuss various options that are available for 
terrorists to inflict fear and chaos through agricultural avenues.    
2.4.1 Agricultural Sabotage vs. Other Forms of Terrorist Threats 
Terrorist threats can take a wide variety of forms.  Possibilities include hijacking 
airplanes, planting explosives in populated areas such as shopping malls or public 
transportation systems, attacking vital infrastructure facilities such as nuclear power 
plants or hydroelectric dams, contaminating water supplies, spreading lethal biological, 
nuclear or chemical agents through air or water, food adulteration, etc.  In fact it has 
been demonstrated that if certain modes of terrorism acts become too expensive, for 
example due to various preventative measures, terrorists are likely to switch to 
alternative modes of terrorism (Enders et al. 1990; Enders and Sandler 1993).  
Agricultural contamination is one of the possibilities, which needs to be investigated in 
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order to prevent and, if necessary, respond to such an act of terrorism.                
On one hand, agricultural sabotage, such as tampering with food supply might be 
easier to prevent and mitigate than other means of terrorism such as attacks through air 
or water.  Food safety in developed countries is enforced in both government and private 
sectors.  Infrastructures already exist to deal with food safety regulations and 
enforcement.  Therefore, to account for increased probability of intentional 
contamination, these safety measures may only need to be enhanced rather than 
instituted.  This aspect makes mitigation of agricultural adulteration a relatively easier 
task than fighting terrorism in military, transportation, or other areas.   Moreover, the 
diversity of our food supply reduces the chances that the entire food supply will be 
adulterated.  On the other hand, food is very vulnerable to intentional contamination.  
Centralized and widespread distribution of some agricultural commodities makes 
massive amounts of people susceptible to individual potential acts of agricultural 
terrorism. Overall, the complexity of agricultural distribution channels and often massive 
consumption of certain commodities makes agricultural adulteration mitigation a rather 
complex task.   
2.4.2 Potential Agents for Agricultural Contamination 
Securing the U.S. or any other country’s food supply depends on numerous 
factors.  These factors include economic, political, and international aspects to climatic 
conditions.  Crop and animal diseases have always been a concern of producers as well 
as consumers. Conceptually, agricultural sabotage could be materialized through 
introduction of non-indigenous (non-native) species of plants, mammals, microbes, and 
other biological units, which could disrupt agricultural commodity markets (Pinmentel et 
al., 2000).  In fact, introduction of non-indigenous species into agricultural production 
could bring substantial costs to society, even if they pose no serious threat to human 
health.  For example, Field Bindweed is estimated to cause over $40 million in crop 
damages in Kansas alone annually (Shogren, 2000).   
Food borne diseases cause approximately 76 million illnesses, 325,000 
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hospitalizations, and 5000 deaths annually in the United States (Mead et al., 1999).  The 
threats to food supply are distinct and numerous.  Recognizing possible agents that could 
cause such turmoil is essential in order to analyze the effects and prevention options of 
these threats.  Today there are more than 250 documented food borne diseases (CDC, 
2003).  These illnesses could generally be grouped into four major categories based on 
causation type.  First are bacteria such as Campylobacter, Salmonella, E. coli O157:H7, 
etc.  Second are viruses, such as a group of viruses known as Calicivirus, or Norwalk-
like virus, and FMD.  Third are parasites such as Giardia and Cyclospora.  Fourth, 
natural or artificial chemicals such as mushroom toxins and heavy metals.  Known 
pathogens cause 38.6 million illnesses, of which 5.2 million are due to bacteria, 2.5 
million due to parasites, and 30.9 million due to viruses (Mead et al., 1999).  In terms of 
public health and safety, the CDC has prepared a list of highest priority categories of 
agents, which include those agents which are easily disseminated, cause high mortality 
and morbidity, can produce social disruption, and need special actions for public health 
preparedness (Sobel and Swerdlow, 2002).  This list contains a wide range of agents 
such as Clostiridium botulinum  neurotoxin, the most lethal substance known to man 
(which results in death from respiratory arrest if untreated ), Shigella spp, which can 
cause death rates of up to 20% among admitted patients without appropriate treatment, E 
coli, which is a highly infectious organism, B anthracis, Samonella serotypes, Vibrio 
cholerae, hepitatis A, Cryptosporidium, etc.  Operationally any member of these 
categories could be used for intentional food contamination purposes.  
Some of the most widely publicized agricultural contamination cases are FMD 
and BSE Outbreaks in UK.  Prevention practices such as vaccination and plant treatment 
have been in place for a long time.  In fact certain forms of diseases such as FMD and 
BSE in cattle have been almost completely eradicated by successful prevention 
practices.  However, current situation demands extra caution when it comes to food 
safety.  BSE has serious implications on human health.  Cruetzfield_Jacob Disease 
(nvCJD), a human variant of BSE, is known to have caused 100 deaths worldwide.  
Unlike BSE, FMD is not usually fatal to livestock or humans, and consumption of the 
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meat from infected animals is not considered a food safety issue (Ferguson et al., 2001).  
However, FMD is more contagious and easier to spread than BSE, which primarily 
spreads from consuming diseased meat.  The spread and variability of FMD outbreaks 
depend on spatial distribution, size, and species composition of farms (Keiling et al., 
2001).  There have been around 40 documented cases of FMD in humans worldwide 
(Mathews and Buzby, 2001).  The US has been free of FMD since 1929 (McCauley et 
al., 1979).   
2.5 Avenues of Agricultural Terrorism  
In order to mitigate possible agricultural terrorism acts one needs to consider a 
variety of possible scenarios.  Reviewing past agricultural and/or food contamination 
incidents could contribute to identification of vulnerable segments in the agricultural 
industry.  Of particular importance are points of concentration including centralized 
processing and distribution channels, which, if sabotaged, could pose threats to market 
stability and potentially result in a disease outbreak with significant bandwidth.  It is also 
important to consider international sources of contamination. 
2.5.1 Intentional Contamination  
Throughout history there have been documented instances of terrorism through 
food supply with the purpose of causing injury and/or inducing terror on civilian 
populations. Food adulteration could originate anywhere along the food supply chain, 
starting from a farm and ending at a restaurant, food store or even a laboratory.  For 
example, in 1996 a laboratory worker deliberately contaminated food to be consumed by 
co-workers with Shegella dysenteria type 2 and caused 12 people to become ill (WHO, 
2002).  Although this case does not represent a terrorist event of national significance, it 
portrays a possibility of intentional contamination of food supply.  The only difference 
between this case and a agricultural terrorism event on a national level is the scale of the 
event, as, as defined earlier, bandwidth.  A more serious case of food adulteration 
occurred in 1984 when members of a religious cult deliberately contaminated salad bars 
in ten restaurants with the salmonella serotype typhinurium in Dalles, Oregon.  This 
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resulted in 751 people becoming ill, which caused serious strains on local medical 
resources and nationwide fear of recurrence (Torok et al. 1997; FSIS, 2003).  The 
authorities responded to the outbreak by closing all salad bars in the town.  It took 
approximately one year of investigative work to link the outbreak to the religious 
commune, which operated a clinical laboratory where open containers carrying serotype 
typhinurium were found.  It was inferred that the bacteria were spread by the customers 
mainly on salad bars and also in liquid coffee creamer in some restaurants.  This case 
demonstrates how vulnerable the society is to intentional contamination of food.  It is 
unlikely that any regulation could have prevented this outbreak.  It would probably be 
unreasonable to suggest screening of customers at all restaurants where they sell self-
serving food items.  However, this incident does suggest using enhanced screening 
procedures when it comes to access to biological or chemical agents, such as those that 
were used in this incident.  
Intentional food contamination could be originated at any level of food supply 
chain of nearly any agricultural commodity.  However, vulnerability varies along the 
supply chain.  Supply points which are most accessible to public are most vulnerable.  
Unfortunately, as the above examples demonstrate, supply points such as cafeterias and 
restaurants are difficult to safeguard against intentional food adulteration.    
2.5.2 Unintentional Contamination 
Naturally occurring agricultural introduction of non-indigenous species, which 
result in food borne disease outbreaks, demonstrate our potential vulnerability to 
biological and chemical terrorism directed towards food supply.  Theoretically, a 
terrorist organization could sabotage the food supply after assessing the disease 
bandwidth and investigating the points of vulnerability along the farm to table supply 
chain.  Hence, it is advisable to identify and examine the most vulnerable foods and 
processes that could be used for intentional food contamination.     
To get an idea of possible vulnerable segments and areas along the farm to table 
food supply chain (figure 5), many documented cases of unintentional outbreaks of food 
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borne diseases could be considered.  For example, in 1985 there was an outbreak of S. 
typhimurium infection caused by contamination of pasteurized milk at a diary plant in 
the U.S. affecting 170,000 people (Ryan et al., 1987).  The contamination was allegedly 
caused by unintentional mixing of contaminated milk with pasteurized milk.  In 
September and October of 1994 Salmonella enteritidis gastroenteritis developed in 
224,000 persons in the United States after they ate Schwan's ice cream.  It was found 
that the outbreak was caused by contamination of pasteurized ice cream premix during 
transport in tanker trailers that had previously carried nonpasteurized liquid eggs 
containing Salmonella enteritidis.  Consequently it was induced that food products, 
which did not require re-pasteurization should be transported in designated containers 
(Hennessy et al., 1996).  Hepitatis “A” was responsible for almost half of the outbreaks 
of liver disease in Shanghai, China, affecting 292,301 people in 1988.  It turned out that 
raw shellfish, such as clams, were responsible for causing outbreaks of hepatitis A 
(Halliday et al., 1991).  The conclusion was drawn that it was necessary to enforce strict 
regulations related to harvesting and distribution of shellfish in order to ensure 
healthiness of marketed clams.  In addition, it was suggested that residential effluent 
drainage into catching areas should be regulated.  In 1996 in Sakai City, Japan, 7000 
children became ill with Eschria coli 0157:H7 infection from contaminated radish 
sprouts served in school lunches, resulting in numerous deaths (Mermin and Griffin, 
1999).  Numerous outbreaks of Influenza Flu were responsible for a number of deaths 
and dozens of hospitalizations since 1996 in Hong Kong.  During the outbreak in 1996 
1.5 million chickens were killed to eliminate the source of the outbreak (CDC, 2004).  
2.5.3 Biological Invasive Species 
More than 50,000 species of animals, plants and microbes have been either 
accidentally or intentionally introduced into the U.S. in the past 100 years (Pinmentel, 
2002).  In the past 40 years the rates of biotic invasions have increased significantly due 
to population growth, rapid movement of people, alteration of the environment, and 
increased trade among nations.  Some of these non-indigenous species have caused 
substantial economic losses in agriculture, forestry, the environment and other segments 
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of the U.S. economy.   
Alien plants, such as purple loosestrife, aquatic weeds, crop weeds, etc. are 
estimated to cause approximately $34,662 million in annual costs (Pinmentel, 2002).  
Non-indigenous mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and fish cause about $40 billion 
in annual costs.  Imported arthropods, such as crop pests, forest pests, imported fire ants, 
and others cause $20 billion in annual costs.  Imported microbes such as plant pathogens 
cause $41 billion in annual costs.  Non-indigenous livestock diseases are responsible for 
$9 billion in annual costs (Pinmentel, 2002).   Generally, economic costs of biological 
invasions include impacts on production, price and market effects, trade, food security 
and nutrition, human health and the environment, and financial costs impacts (Evans, 
2003).  
2.5.3.1 Foot and Mouth Disease 
One of the most widely publicized case of unintentional agricultural 
contamination was the recent FMD outbreak in the UK.  Between February 20th and 
September 30th 2001 there was a total of 2026 cases of FMD confirmed in Great Britain 
(Scudamore, 2002).  Total losses from this outbreak were estimated to be £7.6-8.5 
billion (Mangen and Barrell, 2003).  FMD could be spread though air, transport vehicles, 
artificial insemination, milk related transmission, direct contact, and by wildlife such as 
birds, dogs, cats, and rodents.  An additional complication with FMD is that the infected 
animals do not show the signs of the disease for a couple of weeks but they are 
contagious (Garner and Lack, 1995).  This means the infected animals are spreading the 
disease before they are diagnosed and removed from the heard.  Variations in weather, 
regional geography, farming practices, and farm-level variability in bio-security could 
all introduce spatial and temporal heterogeneity into transmission patterns.  However, it 
is speculated that the most likely origin of the outbreak in the UK was contaminated 
meat products, which were used as feed for pigs (Scudamore, 2002).  The most likely 
method of accidental introduction of FMD into the United States is from contaminated 
animal products, frozen semen, or animal feed imported from areas of the world, which 
have the disease (McCauley et al., 1979).  In terms of agricultural terrorism these 
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possible methods of FMD introduction point to vulnerable segments of agricultural 
sector which require increased attention in light of increased biosecurity awareness.  
FMD outbreak in Great Britain spread into neighboring countries such as 
Netherlands, France and Ireland.  It was inferred (Bouma et al. 2003) that the most likely 
route of infection in the Netherlands was the importation of Irish veal-calves via an 
FMD infected staging point in France.  As a result, in Netherlands alone 26 outbreaks 
were detected and 260,000 animals were killed, 1800 farms were vaccinated and 
subsequently depopulated.  
Based on the FMD outbreak in Great Britain, farms 0.5,1 and 1.5 km. away from 
a single farm affected by FMD have probabilities 0.26, 0.06, and 0.02 respectively of 
becoming infected (Ferguson et al., 2001).  Farms 3-5 km away from an infected piggery 
have probability 0.0153 of being infected due to wind borne and local spread within 3 
days of detecting clinical signs of the FMD outbreak (Sanson, 1993).  Probabilities of 
infection spread for sheep and cattle farms are assumed to be approximately one tenth of 
the levels for pigs.  The evolution of the epidemic depends in part on the distribution of 
times between the four key events: 1) infection of a farm, 2) the report of a suspected 
infection, 3) confirmation of disease, and 4) slaughter of the animals on the infected 
farms (Garner and Lack, 1995; Ferguson et al., 2001).  Large farms are considered to be 
more susceptible to the disease.  Cattle are more susceptible to the disease than sheep 
(McCauley et al., 1979; Ferguson et al., 2001).   
2.5.4 Centralized Distribution Channels 
In recent years, centralized production, processing and distribution of agricultural 
products have been increasing features of US food supply.  This development has 
increased the risk of large outbreaks of food borne diseases (Sobel and Swerdlow, 2002; 
Khan et al., 2001). 
Centralized production, processing and distribution of agricultural commodities 
present serious threats when it comes to agricultural contamination.  The 1996 outbreak 
of E. Coli in Japan was shown to have occurred due to contaminated white radish 
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sprouts, which was served to school children through the lunch program (Mermin and 
Griffin, 1999).  Over 7,000 people where affected by the outbreak.  As a result of intense 
public anxiety restaurants and hotels throughout Japan experienced a decrease in their 
businesses.  Sales of fish, meat, and restaurant meals decreased by 40 to 60 percent.  
This case demonstrates the potential dangers of centralized food distribution.  In the case 
of centralized food distribution channels, such as school lunches, many people tend to be 
affected because the same meals are served to many schools.  This demonstrates the 
need for upgrading the food safety measures at facilities related to centralized food 
production, processing and distribution, especially those that are more vulnerable to 
intentional contamination and those with lower or outdated food safety criteria.   
However, centralized food production and distribution also has certain 
advantages.  For example, improvements in operations of a large producer might be 
easier instituted than simultaneous improvements in smaller producers that would lead to 
equivalent improvements in food safety.  Raw consumption of certain foods implies the 
need for control measures directed at farms and other production establishments because 
consumers can do little to protect themselves.           
2.5.5 International Sources of Contamination    
Most countries have established food safety infrastructures, which could be 
adjusted or expanded to reflect higher alert for acts of food supply sabotage.  However, 
the diversity in the food supply system makes prevention extremely difficult especially 
when taking into account international sources.  Many developing countries have less 
developed food safety infrastructures and are more vulnerable to intentional food 
contamination.  Agricultural contamination in foreign countries, intentional or 
unintentional, poses threats to domestic food markets due to modern global network of 
international trade.  Food commodities that have been intentionally or unintentionally 
contaminated and imported to the U.S could have substantial health effects. 
For example, in 1995 there was an outbreak of Salmonella detected in 17 states 
in the US and in Finland (Mahon et al., 1997).  A total of more than 242 cases were 
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documented out of a possible 5000-24000 cases considering underreporting.  It was 
established that the infection among American and Finish patients was caused by 
consumption of contaminated alfalfa sprouts, which were produced by different growers.  
However, contaminated alfalfa sprouts were grown from the seed that came from a 
common seed shipper in the Netherlands.  Hence it was concluded that seeds which were 
contaminated before shipment were the cause of the outbreak.  To prevent future similar 
outbreaks the suggestion was made to enhance decontamination of seeds before 
shipping.  This could be achieved by soaking the seeds in chlorine bleach at high 
concentrations.      
In another example, outbreaks of cyclosporiasis, with 1465 cases reported by 20 
states in  North America in 1996, were linked to consumption of Guatemalan raspberries 
(Herwaldt et al.,1997).  It was established that as few as five Guatemalan farms could 
have accounted for the 25 of the 29 events where raspberries were served and for which 
a single exporter could be traced. 
The 1996 outbreak of E. Coli in Japan due to contaminated white radish sprout 
was attributed to contaminated seeds imported from the U.S. (Mermin and Griffin, 
1999).  In response to this outbreak the Japanise national institute of health has placed 
one physician at the Division of Emerging Diseases at the World Health Organization 
and one physician at the Epidemic Intelligence Service at the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  The 
reason for those placements was to gain experience in communicable disease control and 
outbreak investigation. 
2.6 Prevention 
Deliberate food contamination incidents via massive disruption of food 
processing, storage, transportation or distribution, could seriously damage economic 
stability.  Therefore, it is important to initiate and/or enhance preventative measures, 
which would provide increased security to the food supply of the economy.  Clearly, 
food supply of a gigantic economy such as the U.S. is difficult, if not nearly impossible, 
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to completely safeguard against any possible assault.  Nevertheless, eliminating as many 
conceivable venues of disaster as possible is necessary to decrease the vulnerability of 
the economy.  Along the farm to table food supply chain (Figure 5.) measures such as 
tracing systems and recalls, monitoring and examination of product qualities, reducing 
access to chemical, biological and nuclear materials, and other actions can be used to 
prevent agricultural and food sabotage (FSIS 2003; Khan et al., 2001).  
Deliberate food contamination using chemical, biological or nuclear agents is a 
relatively new threat to national security.  The key to preventing food adulteration is to 
enhance existing food safety measures, and to establish new food safety measures based 
on vulnerability assessments.  Hence, the most vulnerable commodities and their 
production and supply processes need to be identified.  For example, prevention 
measures should be enhanced at the most readily accessible agricultural and food 
processes, foods that are most vulnerable to undetected contamination, commodities that 
are most widely distributed, and the least supervised agricultural and food production 
areas and processes (WHO, 2003).  
It is also important to increase security measures at central production, 
processing and distribution facilities.  The control and screening of access to certain 
areas, chemical and biological agents, raw products, equipment, and other key factors in 
the food supply chain, needs to be enhanced based on the vulnerability assessment.     
2.6.1 Agricultural Production 
Ensuring the safety and security of food supply starts at the farm level of the food 
supply chain.  Some of the areas of critical importance at this level are monitoring and 
control of farm animals, feed and feed ingredients, seeds, pesticides, irrigation water, 
and harvesting practices, such as open air drying, etc.  Different agricultural production 
processes will require different prevention methods.   
2.6.1.1 Prevention of Contagious Animal Diseases  
Enhanced monitoring and quality control measures might have detected 
contaminated meat and consequently prevented the massive FMD outbreak, which 
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paralyzed beef farming in the UK.  Enhanced monitoring and quality control measures 
might have also prevented an outbreak of Salmonella in the US and Finland caused by 
contaminated seeds exported from The Netherlands (Mahon et al., 1997).  Many more 
areas could probably be identified.  However, since analysis of all possible threats is 
probably impossible, emphasis could be placed on the most vulnerable points and on 
determining deviations from normal characteristics. 
Outbreaks of farms animal diseases such as FMD have been shown to have 
devastating consequences (Bouma et al., 2003; Burton and Young, 1996; Ferguson, et 
al., 2001; MaCauley et al., 1979).  Allegedly, the most likely origin of FMD outbreak in 
the UK was contaminated meat products, which were used as feed for pigs (Scudamore, 
2002).  Therefore, close feed inspection on a regular basis may be essential for 
prevention of an outbreak of FMD or similar diseases.  In terms of designing regional 
mitigation policies for outbreaks of infectious diseases, such as FMD, estimates of 
spatial distribution, size, species composition of farms (Keiling et al., 2001), and contact 
rates (Nielen, et al., 1996) between farms need to be developed. 
2.6.1.2 Anti-microbial Livestock Drugs and Vaccination 
Anti-microbial drug (antibiotic) use on farms has been surrounded by 
controversy since the practice began in the 1940s (Mathews at el., 2001).  Anti-microbial 
drugs are designed to kill disease-causing microorganisms such as bacteria and fungi.  
However, at low levels these drugs are also used to promote livestock growth.  This type 
of drug application raises some issues. The problem is that there are scientific 
uncertainties about implications of using anti-microbial drugs as growth promoters. 
There are different opinions within the government about the risks to public health posed 
by using anti-microbial drugs in farm animals.  First, livestock drug residues may remain 
in final products and cause human illness.  Second, microorganisms, such as bacteria 
may be developing resistance to anti-microbial drugs.  In a related case, an outbreak of 
an anti-microbial resistant salmonellosis attributed to pasteurized milk in Illinois in 1985 
affected about 170,000 to 200,000 people (Ryan et al., 1987).  It was considered that 
since many people who drank the contaminated milk would not have become ill if they 
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had not been exposed to anti-microbial drugs, the anti-microbial resistance of the disease 
may have increased the size of the outbreak.  It was also considered that the use of anti-
microbial drugs in dairy farms could lead to the emergence of resistant strains of 
bacteria.  However, it is uncertain what levels of drugs are sufficient to cause drug 
resistance.  It is also uncertain whether bacterial drug resistance would decline if low-
level use of anti-microbial drugs were stopped.   
Vaccines for diseases such as FMD are available.  However, vaccination presents 
it’s own set of problems.  For example, the European Union (EU) is against general 
vaccination because it would damage its export markets.  The reason is that carrying 
“Disease free” status is extremely important for participants in international trade.  
Disease free countries such as the US have strict measures against diseased imports.  
Standard detection tests look for antibodies against FMD as a sign of infection 
(McCauley et al., 1979; Mathews and Buzby, 2001; Mathews et al., 2001; 
www.economist.com, 2001).  These are the same antibodies that vaccination produces.  
Therefore, vaccinated animals are excluded from trade.  In addition, vaccination 
provides protection for only six to twelve months.  Hence, repeated vaccination, which is 
not cheap, is required to fight the disease.  In addition, while vaccinated animals may 
appear to be healthy, they may still be carriers of the infection.  This means that 
vaccinated animal could transmit the virus to other, healthy animal, thus leading to more 
vaccination costs.   
Another problem with vaccination is that most vaccines are effective only against 
certain strains of a given disease.  This makes it difficult to protect the production from 
disease occurrence.  For example, there are at least 7 immunologically distinct types of 
FMD, each with 3 to 29 different subtypes.  A vaccine against one virus type does not 
necessarily protect against another virus type (McCauley et al., 1979).  So even if it was 
decided to vaccinate against FMD, which target virus type and subtype should be 
vaccinated against first?  Perhaps the answer depends on relative probabilities of 
occurrence, and damages.  The type and subtype that is most likely to occur and most 
destructive should be vaccinated against first.  Hence, quantities of proper vaccines to 
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stock prior to the outbreak are investment decisions that would have to be made ex ante.  
Most studies that compare various vaccination regimes to various slaughter 
systems as preventative and responsive strategies respectively found vaccination 
strategies to be economically inferior to slaughter strategies (Berentsen et al. 1992, 
Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003).  However, Bates et al. (July 2003) found that ring 
vaccination would be economically more effective than slaughter strategy if it was 
possible to differentiate vaccinated and FMD infected animals.  In a similar study Bates 
et al. (February 2003 a, b) find that pre-emptive slaughter of high risk herds and 
vaccination of all animals within a specified distance of an infected herd decrease the 
duration of an epidemic compared with baseline eradication strategy. 
2.6.1.3 Surveillance and Detection 
Effective response to a food borne disease outbreak depends on timely detection 
of a contamination incident.  Surveillance systems, including epidemiological 
investigations, could be used to identify the agent and contaminated food and eliminate 
the effected commodity from the market.  The objectives, as well as the procedures, of 
epidemiological investigation would be similar whether the contamination was 
intentional or unintentional.  In either case, the steps would involve identification of the 
causative agent as well as the manner of contamination and transmission.  
Detection of an outbreak of food borne disease depends on the ability of public 
health officials to identify increased cases of a particular illness by observing multiple 
patients with a specific clinical syndrome. Laboratories and epidemiological 
investigations could provide vital information to be applied in surveillance systems.  For 
example, the CDC in collaboration with the state health departments maintains a 
surveillance system for cases of botulism.  The State Department of Health is notified 
when a clinician faces a botulism case and requests an antitoxin treatment.  State health 
departments in turn conduct an investigation to detect additional patients, and identify 
and eradicate the contaminated food supply (Sobel and Swerdlow, 2002).  PulseNet is a 
network of public health laboratories that generate unique DNA patterns for food borne 
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pathogens.  Detection of pathogens with identical patterns signals the possibility of an 
outbreak.  Similarly, the salmonella outbreak detection algorithm is designed to detect 
increases in salmonella serotypes reported to the CDC.  A state epidemiologist is alerted 
if the number of reported cases exceeds the expected number.  However, these passive 
surveillance systems tend to underreport the incidents because not all ill patients seek 
medical care, not all clinicians test for every food borne pathogen, and not all 
laboratories report individual cases to health officials.  For example, around 20 to 100 
cases of salmonellosis are unreported for each reported case (Khan et al., 2001).  
FoodNet conducts active surveillance of diagnosed cases of ten enteric bacterial as well 
as parasitic infections and of haemolytic-uraemic syndrome.   
2.6.1.3.1 Farm Animal Surveillance and Detection  
Most of the studies that investigate FMD mitigation options concentrate on 
vaccination and slaughter.  Less attention has been devoted to surveillance and detection 
systems, which would allow for timely and more effective response measures.  Although 
some attention has been raised towards surveillance systems (Bates et al. September 
2003; Akhtar and White, 2003), no empirical investigation has been performed, to the 
best of my knowledge, on the merit of such policies relative to vaccination and 
slaughter.   
One of the possible surveillance and detection systems could be to conduct 
periodic screening of animals.  This practice would assist in avoiding massive outbreaks 
of infectious diseases such as FMD.  Regular screening and testing of farm animals 
directed towards evaluating animal health could assist in preventing a successful 
intentional spread of FMD or similar disease.  Earlier detection through periodic testing 
would allow for timelier implementation of response strategies such as slaughter, 
disposal, cleaning and disinfection.  Latent period of FMD infected animal is around one 
week (Garner and Lack, 1995), which means that frequent testing of animals could 
detect FMD carriers before the clinical signs of the disease appear.  Hence, frequent 
animal testing could decrease the time of unobstructed spread of the disease.  Therefore 
periodic testing of animals could decrease the magnitude and associated costs of needed 
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response actions as well as the value of lost agricultural product.  Moreover, screening 
and testing of animals could be conducted by either a regional veterinarian or employees 
of cattle operations provided adequate training in testing procedures.      
2.6.1.4 Farm Level Decision Making 
Adoption of enhanced food safety measures at the farm level depends on private 
implications of such strategy.  From the farmer’s perspective, the attractiveness of the 
preventative measures against possible food terrorism acts depends on the impacts of 
such measures on profitability and risk in the short run and in the long run.  Hence, the 
strategy will be adopted either because of profitability and associated risks, or because of 
imposed constraints (McCarl, 1981).  Some of the issues related to farm level adoption 
of prevention strategies are: 
1. How is farmer welfare affected by various prevention strategies?  That is, 
what are the effects on profits and profit variation? How are the farmer’s 
welfare dimensions, such as profitability and risk aversion, valued when it 
comes to choosing between strategies that have various degrees of prevention 
measures?  Are there other dimensions of welfare affected by the strategy, 
and if so, to what degree?  
2. Which one of the preventative strategies is most appropriate from a social 
welfare maximization standpoint?  What are the dimensions of social welfare 
affected by “food terrorism and it’s preventative measures?  For example, 
what is the relative importance of having a low probability of an outbreak of 
a food borne disease?  What is the probability level of a “food terrorism act” 
at which the society is willing to bare additional costs to prevent food 
tampering.  Obviously at low probability of food contamination the society is 
not too concerned about it to be paying for extra costs of prevention 
measures.  However, at some higher probability level, paying premiums for 
avoiding an outbreak of food borne disease becomes a reasonable move.  
3. How could a food terrorism prevention policy be designed so that a socially 
optimal strategy is also most optimal from a farmer’s perspective? Are 
subsidies and/or taxes going to be needed to encourage adoption of certain 
strategies rather than others?  How effective would regulative strategies be in 
upgrading safety measures at farms? 
4. Finally, what are the strategies that could be employed for preventing acts of 
food terrorism at the farm level?  For example some of the options are, 
tamper resistant or tamper evident seeds and animal feed, increased 
monitoring of facilities, restricted access to vulnerable materials and areas, 
employee screening, animal vaccination, etc.  How are these and other 
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options ranked in terms of importance in prevention of food terrorism 
incidents? 
2.6.1.5 Prevention as a Production Factor 
It has been argued that prevention practices, often in the literature referred to as 
damage control, differ from production inputs in a way that needs to be reflected in 
optimal strategy selection.  First, damage control agents, such as pesticides, antibiotics 
and immunization, do not generally enhance productivity directly as do standard 
production inputs.  Damage control agents are meant to facilitate prevention of negative 
outcomes such as pest and/or disease outbreaks, fires, frosts, etc.  This characteristic of 
prevention options needs to be reflected in modeling of strategies for preventing possible 
agricultural sabotage incidents.  Second, direct production inputs could interact with 
damage control agents and, thus may affect effectiveness of damage control.  For 
example, fertilizer stimulates the growth of weeds, thus changing the effectiveness of 
herbicides.  Contrary to the first point, it has been argued that damage control inputs 
could affect output mean as well as variance.  Variance effects are, in part, determined 
by the interaction between damage control input and stochastic element in the 
abatement, or damage control, function (Saha et al.,1997).      
2.6.1.6 Risk Considerations 
At the farm level, risks of agricultural contamination are dealt with in two ways, 
mitigation and adaptation (Shogren, 2000).  Mitigation essentially refers to actions that 
prevent or contribute to prevention of agricultural contamination. For example, 
enhancing feed inspections would reduce the chances of introducing non-indigenous 
species such as FMD or BSE infected livestock.  Adaptation refers to activities, which 
will reduce the impact of a contamination incident if realized. For example, a farmer 
may choose to diversify a portfolio of produced commodities in order to decrease his/her 
risks of facing adverse impacts in case a given commodity gets contaminated.  This 
behavior would represent adaptation to the possibility of an agricultural contamination.   
Mitigation activities, such as applying sunscreen in order to reduce the risks of 
skin cancer, endogenously influence the probability of an adverse outcome.  For 
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example, the farmer may choose to vaccinate cattle to reduce the chances of disease 
occurrence.  Hence, the probability of agricultural contamination is in part determined 
by preventative activities, which are determined endogenously.  Adaptation activities, 
such as adjusting crop mix, on the other hand, affect the magnitude of adverse outcomes 
if realized.  Hence, mitigation and adaptation activities affect both odds and severity of 
adverse outcomes such as agricultural terrorism.  Therefore, economic, as well as natural 
science, models of risk assessment need to consider the role of prevention and adaptation 
strategies as antecedents of the risk of agricultural contamination.         
2.6.1.7 Risk Aversion and Insurance   
Prevention and response actions affect not only expected returns but also the 
variance of returns across states of nature.  Risk adverse decision makers are usually 
more likely to invest in prevention and response strategies, and diversify their portfolio 
to reduce vulnerability towards high variance of returns.  As risk adverse decision 
makers, farmers often rely on insurance programs to decrease variability of their profits 
caused by agricultural sabotage, climatic conditions or other stochastic conditions.  
Optimum design of such programs and farmers’ behavior under risk with and set of 
options including insurance have previously been investigated (Coble at al., 1996; 
Knight and Coble 1997; Makki and Somwaru, 2001).  It was found that participation of 
farmers in crop insurance programs is influenced by such factors as level of risk, 
expected indemnity payments from the contract, cost of Insurance, premium subsidy 
(Makki and Somwaru 2001), competing risk management options (Sherrick et al., 2004) 
and demographic differences. 
If applied to the case of agricultural terrorism similar principles would apply.  
Agricultural terrorism insurance, as an option to reduce vulnerability of farmer income, 
is likely to be adopted under similar conditions as regular crop insurance.  In other words 
factors such as insurance costs, indemnity payments, risk premium, and effectiveness 
and costs of alternative mitigation options will play significant roles in insurance 
adoption.   
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2.6.1.8 Preventative Slaughter 
Slaughter of animals in a region not yet infected by a highly infectious disease 
could be considered a preventative measure.  By slaughtering the animals under risk of 
exposure to the disease the likely number of diseased animals would be reduce, thus we 
would reduce the spread of the disease.  Fore example, in 1997-98 outbreak of classical 
swine fever (CSF) in Netherlands preventative slaughter involved 26 farms within 1 km 
radius of the first two detected farms (Mangen and Burrell, 2003).  Moreover preemptive 
slaughter in case of an outbreak allows the producers to market their animals before they 
are possibly infected and become unmarketable. 
2.6.1.9 Farmer Spillovers 
Many of the preventative strategies involve secondary effects that are not usually 
considered in private decision making of a given farmer.  When a farmer applies 
pesticides the benefits accrue not only to him but also to adjacent farmers (McCarl, 
1981).  In a similar fashion, the benefits of preventing an outbreak of a contagious 
disease in plants or animals to various degrees accrue to farms within certain proximity.  
Hence, even the farmers that would not adopt prevention strategies could benefit from 
prevention measures executed by neighboring farmers.  This introduces a “free rider” 
problem of a public good, where private decision making will result in under-
employment of preventative strategies (Hanley at al., 1997). Consequently, for each 
prevention strategy, the extent of a “spillover” effect needs to be investigated and taken 
into account for proper policy design purposes.  Proper policy would reflect true benefits 
and costs, which include spillover effects of adopting preventative measures, such as 
vaccination. 
2.6.2 Processing and Manufacturing Procedures 
The key to preventing food sabotage is to upgrade production processes and 
quality control measures at central production facilities. For example, in the outbreak of 
antimicrobial resistant salmonellosis attributed to pasteurized milk, which affected more 
than 168,000 people in Illinois in 1985, one of the possible reasons of the outbreak could 
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have been the unusual sequence of operations at the plant where the outbreak originated.   
Pasteurization at this plant was an early step in processing, which was followed by 
careful post-pasteurization handling of milk during separation, blending, and other steps 
to prevent contamination of the milk.  However, a few millimeters of contaminated milk 
mixed with pasteurized milk in later stages could have caused the outbreak (Ryan et al., 
1987). 
There has been some advancement made in this respect.  For example, recent 
declines in salmonellosis campylobacteriosis coincide with changes in meat and poultry 
slaughtering practices at processing facilities mandated by the Pathogen Reduction and 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) rule of the USDA (Khan et al., 
2001). 
2.6.3 Storage and Transport 
Food borne disease could clearly originate from food contamination at storage or 
transportation facilities.  Obvious options to enhance prevention measures at these 
facilities are to install monitoring systems, reduce access to vulnerable areas and lethal 
materials, screen personnel that have access to vulnerable areas and lethal materials, and 
monitor sanitary compliance of storage areas and transportation means.  Although there 
are no documented cases of deliberate contamination at storage or transportation 
facilities, lessons could be learned from unintentional contamination cases.  For instance, 
the 1994 Salmonella outbreak, which developed in 224,000 persons in the United States, 
was traced to eating Schwan's ice cream.  Contamination of Schwan’s ice cream was 
caused by contamination of pasteurized ice cream premix, which was transported in 
tanker trailers that had previously carried nonpasteurized liquid eggs containing 
Salmonella enteritidis.  Consequently it was concluded that food products, which did not 
require re-pasteurization should be transported in designated containers (Hennessy et al., 
1996). 
2.6.4 Retail Distribution and Food Service 
Food sabotage at distribution outlets or food service points such as restaurants is 
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likely to go undetected before contaminated produce reaches consumer’s plates.  Unlike 
earlier stages along the farm to table food supply chain, products sold at retail 
distribution points and restaurants do not go through any additional inspection or 
processing, other than cooking, which rarely involves testing for chemical or nuclear 
agents.  Therefore, measures that would facilitate prevention of food adulteration should 
be initialized or enhanced.  Relying on tamper-resistant or tamper-evident seals, which 
have been used for some food items and for pharmaceuticals is one way to improve food 
safety at distribution outlets.  Monitoring and surveillance of such facilities as retail or 
wholesale distribution points and restaurants may help to prevent deliberate food 
contamination.  For example, surveillance systems might have prevented intentional 
restaurant salad bar contamination that occurred in The Dalles, Oregon in 1984 infecting 
751 people (Torok et al., 1997). 
2.6.5 Trade Inspection 
Due to the global nature of modern economy it is easy to conceive the possibility 
of agricultural sabotage, which could originate in remote countries and regions. In fact, 
there are numerous documented cases of unintentional contamination of agricultural 
commodities (Mermin and Griffin, 1999; Levine et al., 1996; Mahon et al., 1997; 
Herwaldt et al.,1997), which were manifested through international trade.  Therefore, the 
importance of enhancing inspection of imported agricultural commodities cannot be 
overemphasized.  Clearly, commodities that fail to meet international safety criteria 
should be excluded from trade.   
Trade restrictions that arise due to detection of contaminated commodities are 
readily accepted.  However, it is often difficult to determine whether a given barrier 
reflects a health concern or is a form of disguised protectionism.  Under current trading 
rules nations are allowed to use trade barriers to protect human, animal and plant health, 
but such barriers cannot be used as disguised protectionism.  Before the Uruguay Round 
of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), the U.S. did not import any cattle, 
sheep, swine, and some other forms of meat from countries that were not FMD free.  
After the Uruguay Round, imports from disease-free regions of a country could be 
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allowed even if the disease may have occurred in other regions of the exporting country 
(Paarlberg and Lee, 1998).     
2.7 Tracking 
Effective mitigation of a food borne disease outbreak depends not only on 
detection of the outbreak, but also on identification of the sources of original 
contamination.  Timely determination of the source of contamination can greatly 
facilitate rapid removal of all contaminated products along the food processing chain.  
Tracing systems, which allow for comprehensive market recalls, are critical in 
responding to food contamination, whether intentional or unintentional.  This issue is 
especially relevant for agricultural production systems (WHO, 2002), where raw 
products produced on small farms are often combined to form larger shipments.  With no 
tracing system in place it is difficult to identify the producer of a contaminated product.  
Therefore, it is difficult to narrow and recall only potentially contaminated products 
along the food supply chain.     
In the case of animal diseases, such as FMD or BSE, the benefits of tracking 
mechanisms, such as ear tags, include limiting the spread of the disease, faster trace back 
of infected animals, reducing production losses due to the disease, reducing the costs of 
government control, reducing trade losses, and boosting consumer confidence (Disney et 
at., 2001).  The objective of tracing systems is to find all farms linked to infected areas, 
and prevent any further disease dissemination from infected locations.   
2.8 Response and Control 
Response involves actions which are implemented after the event of agricultural 
sabotage has taken place and are intended to minimize the impact of contamination.  
These activities may include stopping the spread of and eradicating an outbreak of a 
possibly infectious contamination.  Given that the agent, the carrier and the original 
source of contamination have been identified, it is necessary to remove all infected 
commodities from the reach of consumers and the public in general.   This requires 
establishing regulations that address marketability of suspected commodities, destruction 
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of infected commodities, containment of the disease, accesses to vital facility, etc.   
For instance in response to the 2000 FMD outbreak in England, in addition to the 
policy of slaughtering animals on infected farms, further control measures were 
introduced, such as a ban on all animal movements, closure of markets, and restricted 
public use of footpaths across agricultural land (Ferguson et al., 2001).  Generally the 
options to control disease transmission among animals include mass vaccination, 
slaughtering and decreasing mixing rate.  Likewise, Jalvingh et al. (1999) categorize the 
control mechanisms for the spread of classical swine fever in The Netherlands in 1997-
98 into diagnosis of infected farms, depopulation of infected farms, movement control, 
tracing, and pre-emptive slaughter.     
Effectiveness of response depends on surveillance, preparedness and 
communication levels (WHO, 2002).  The better the surveillance and communication, 
the more prompt is the detection of an outbreak which will lead to timelier, more 
effective response measures.  On the other hand, better preparation levels should lead to 
more effective response measures such as medical treatments, identifying the sources of 
an outbreak, banning contaminated products, etc. 
2.8.1 Movement Ban and Transportation 
An immediate response to infectious agricultural contamination is to ban 
movement of contagious commodities across regions.  The purpose of movement bans is 
obviously to stop or at least slow down the spread of infection.  In case of an outbreak of 
a disease such as FMD it is necessary to ban movement in and out or the general area of 
the outbreak.  For example, in the Netherlands after detecting FMD infected animals the 
immediate regulative response was a 72h movement ban in the whole country for all 
transports of livestock, poultry and conveyances for transporting these animals (Bouma 
et al., 2003).  This strategy will reduce the mixing of animals and thus will reduce the 
likelihood of healthy animals getting infected by diseased animals at staging points, sale 
barns, and other livestock facilities.  It also decreases movement in and out of infected 
areas, thus reducing the spread of the disease. 
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  Transporting infected animals from one region to another is the surest way of 
spreading the disease.  Therefore, it is vital to regulate animal movement as a response to 
FMD outbreak to slow down the spread of the disease.  For example, During 1997-98 
outbreak of classical swine fever in Netherlands all transportation was banned within a 
quarantine zone of 10km for at least 42 days (Mangen, and Barrell, 2003).  However 
implementation of transportation ban necessitates depiction of animal movement system 
in the region.  Both heterogeneity of animal movement related to specific farms and the 
dynamics of flow of animals between farms are to be taken into account when 
examining the animal transportation system (Bigras-Poulin, et al., 2004).  In addition, a 
highly contagious disease such as FMD could be also spread by public vehicles moving 
from infected to uninfected regions.     
2.8.2 Slaughter and Vaccination 
In the case of a highly contagious disease such as a FMD outbreak, it is essential 
to stop the spread of and eradicate the disease as quickly as possible. Vaccination and 
slaughter have been the most common responses to highly infectious animal disease 
outbreaks.  Ferguson et al. (2001) call for cost-benefit analysis of mass vaccination 
options versus slaughtering based control of infrequent outbreaks.  Schoenbaum and 
Disney (2003) investigated the effectiveness of four slaughter and three vaccination 
strategies under varying conditions of herd sizes and rates of disease spread in the U.S.  
The slaughtering options included slaughtering only infected herds, slaughtering herds 
with direct contact with the infected herd in the 14 days prior to the detection of the 
infection, slaughtering herds within 3km distance of infected herd, and slaughtering 
herds with both direct and indirect contact with the infected herd.  Vaccination options 
included no vaccination, vaccinating all herds within 10 kilometers of the infected herds 
after 2 herd infections were detected, and vaccinating all herds within 10 kilometers of 
the infected herds after 50 herd infections were detected.  The choice of the best 
mitigation strategy depended on herd demographics and the rate of contact among herds.  
Generally, ring slaughter (3 km) was more costly than other slaughter strategies.  Ring 
vaccination was more costly than controlling with slaughter alone.  However, early ring 
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vaccination decreased the duration of outbreaks.   
Garner and Lack (1995) investigated the effectiveness of four control options for 
FMD, involving “stamping out”, where no vaccination is applied but animals in contact 
farms are slaughtered and destroyed (Berentsen et al., 1992), dangerous-contact 
slaughter, and early or late ring vaccination in three different regions of Australia.  They 
found that if FMD is likely to spread rapidly then slaughter of dangerous contact and 
infected herds reduced the economic impact of the FMD outbreak.  Early ring 
vaccination turned out to reduce the size and duration of an outbreak, but was 
uneconomic when compared to stamping-out alone.  Keiling, et al. (2001) found that 
both ring slaughtering and ring vaccination are effective if implemented rigorously, 
although ring slaughtering is more effective.  Neighborhood slaughtering is found to be 
more effective than neighborhood vaccination.  They also argue that spatial distribution, 
size, and species composition of farms all influence the pattern and regional variability 
of outbreaks. 
Morris et al. (2001) found that delaying the slaughter of animals at the infected 
farms beyond 24 hours would have slightly increased the size of the FMD epidemic in 
Great Britain in 2001.  Failure to carry out pre-emptive slaughter of animals at the 
susceptible farms would substantially increase the size of the epidemic.  Vaccination of 
up to three of the most outbreak dense areas, in addition to an adopted control policy, 
such as slaughter, would slightly decrease the number of infected farms.  However, 
relying solely on vaccination and disregarding other control policies would significantly 
increase the size of an outbreak. 
Although slaughtering option has been shown to be most affective in most 
circumstances for eliminating the disease (Schoenbaum and Disney 2003; Garner and 
Lack 1995; Keiling et al., 2001; Morris et al., 2001; Berentsen et al., 1992), it is possible 
that the farmers may choose not to slaughter their animals unless given monetary 
incentives in the form of compensation/subsidy.  Therefore it is relevant to investigate 
what type of compensation will need to be provided to prompt preemptive slaughter of 
healthy animals in case of an FMD outbreak?    
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2.8.3 Communications 
Rapid and effective response to an unintentional, and especially to an intentional 
massive food contamination incident, requires prompt communication between health 
care providers, public health officials at various levels and government agencies.  
Currently the CDC has a 24-hour capacity to respond to reports of food borne disease 
emergencies (CDC, 2003).  The CDC can contact all state epidemiologists and directors 
of public health laboratories regarding surveillance issues and outbreaks. 
Intense media coverage of food adulteration is to be expected.  Accurate 
information is to be delivered regarding the nature of the incident, suspected and/or 
affected food commodities, possible measures to prevent exposure, and applicable 
immediate treatment actions in case of exposure.      
2.9 Decision Support Tools 
Level of preparedness is to a great extent determined by the availability of 
decision support tools.  Such tools include procedures to detect infected agricultural 
segments, such as farms, protect uninfected segments from exposure to the virus, and to 
manage response and control strategies.  Decisions made during the first couple of 
weeks of an outbreak are likely to be crucial in reducing the size and length of an 
infectious disease outbreak.  Decision support tools, such as EpiMAN, developed in 
New Zealand for response and control of potential FMD outbreaks, could be used for 
detection of an outbreak, management of infected farms, movement control measures, 
and cleaning and disinfection measures (Morris, et al., 2002; Sanson, 1993).  Decision 
support tools could allow the choosing of a portfolio of response and prevention actions, 
including examinations of the fixed costs and irreversibility dimensions of certain 
actions (McCarl, 2003).   
2.10  Preparedness and Training 
Preparedness plans are developed and implemented before the incident occurs.  
To a great extent preparedness depends on surveillance, detection tracking mechanisms.  
In addition, preparedness includes clear formalization and delegation of responsibilities 
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prior to the event of bio-terrorist alert. Law enforcement and public health authorities 
need to have guidelines developed for the effective response to take place. For example, 
some of the components of preparedness are, ability of detection, linkage between 
relevant government agencies, training, and vulnerability assessment as discussed in the 
Guidelines for Establishing and Strengthening Prevention and Response Systems (WHO, 
2002). 
Simulated exercises organized by various governmental agencies have been used 
to test preparedness (Sobel and Swerdlow, 2002).  The exercises allow one to assess 
rapidity of detection and notification, evaluate the adequacy of existing resources for 
doing epidemiological investigations, establish time to collect, analyze, and disseminate 
data, evaluate the adequacy of available medical resources, and to practice collaboration 
between parties involved in response activities.       
2.11 Medical Response  
Medical response is a critical component of food borne disease outbreak 
mitigation.  Whether the contamination is intentional or unintentional, medical response 
steps in terms of treatment of casualties is approximately the same.  Depending on the 
agent and number of casualties, medical personnel and supplies may need to be 
transported to the outbreak site. 
2.12 Existing Prevention and Response Costs Estimates  
McCauley et al. (1979), who evaluated the economic consequences of a potential 
outbreak of FMD in the US, assume a $0.30 cost of production per dose of vaccine in the 
U.S. in 1976 dollars.  They also estimate by using budgeting that it would cost $152,160 
to test 1 million doses of FMD vaccines.  Transportation costs are assumed to be around 
$10 per 1,000 pounds for 1,400 miles.  Storage costs were estimated to be $0.72 per 
hundred pounds for unloading and reloading, plus $0.52 per 100 pounds per month for 
refrigerated storage.  They also report calculated costs of vaccination teams, costs of 
district offices, costs of state offices, costs of emergency programs, and costs of vaccine 
evaluation teams.  Costs of a one-year surveillance program, conducted by replacing 
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vaccination teams with evaluation teams, that would follow the completion of a 
vaccination program were estimated to be $34,197,872 for 37,895,000 livestock heads.  
When it comes to slaughter programs they assume that 0.5 percent of cattle, swine and 
sheep will be slaughtered due to infection or exposure.   Costs of depopulation were 
estimated to be $79, $48, $27, $24, $24 per head for dairy cattle, feedlot cattle, beef 
heard, swine and sheep respectively.  Indemnification costs were $190, $80, and $37.5 
per head for cattle, swine, and sheep respectively. 
Schoenbaum and Disney (2003) derived slaughter, surveillance and vaccination 
costs from 1998 NIMBY test exercises.  Slaughter costs include costs of appraisal, 
euthanasia, carcass disposal and cleaning/disinfection.  Surveillance costs include costs 
of testing per herd and costs per surveillance visit.  Vaccination costs are given in terms 
of costs per herd.  All of their estimates are broken down in terms of three herd 
categories, small (<100), medium (100-450), and large (>450), her sizes.   
2.13 Prevention of and Response to Food Sabotage on International Level 
Bioterrorism is of concern at both the national and international levels.  Security 
and safety of the food supply is vital not only for the U.S. economy but also for the 
welfare of any other country and for the prosperity of the global economy as a whole.  It 
has been shown that there could be a serious contagion effect present from terrorism in a 
multi country region (Drakos and Kutan, 2003).  Therefore, there is a need for regional 
cooperation against terrorism by creating multinational organizations facilitate anti-
terrorism measures on international level.  Moreover, much like retaliation against 
terrorism (Dwight, 1988), response and prevention could be analyzed in a game theoretic 
framework, with countries as players who could free ride from public benefits of 
terrorism mitigation, to justify cooperative prevention and response to agricultural 
terrorism.   
Although vulnerability of food supply varies across the countries it is clear that 
similar basic principals of preventing, and if necessary responding to, food supply 
adulteration should apply in different countries.  Moreover, given the global nature of 
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today’s economies, both prevention and response measures have to be internationally 
coordinated.  The authorities of participating countries have to fight bioterrorism in the 
ways that are compatible and complementary to one another.  International cooperation 
is needed to prevent possible sabotage of exported food.  There are numerous 
documented unintentional incidents of international food contamination.  For example, 
the 1989 cyanide contamination of Chilean grapes exported to the U.S. and Canada 
(WHO, 2002), the 1995 salmonella outbreak in the US and Finland due to contaminated 
alfalfa sprouts seeds obtained from The Netherlands (Mahon et al. 1997), the 1996 
outbreak of cyclosporiasis in the North America due to contaminated raspberries 
imported from Guatemala (Herwaldt et al., 1997) and many more.   
International initiatives need to be developed to enhance food inspection and, if 
necessary, response activities to prevent and respond to food terrorism.  Figure 6 shows 
the proposed linkages (WHO, 2002) between national and international food safety 
systems to facilitate detection and response to food terrorism incidents.  Instituting 
and/or improving these linkages will allow for prompter exchange of relevant 
information, which will facilitate rapid removal of unsafe food from the markets.  This 
figure illustrates how food safety-related institutions need to be interrelated not only on 
national but also on international levels.  
Prompt response, that would minimize the damages sabotage event, is important 
on both national and international levels.  International organizations such as WHO 
could provide response guidelines for particular food contamination incidents at national 
levels.  Detailed procedures directed towards increasing counter terrorism awareness and 
strategies are outlined in Specific Measures for consideration by the Food Industry 
(WHO, 2002). At international levels WHO could be viewed as an organizational unit 
when it comes to communication and launching international response.   As such, 
WHO’s functions would include, but not be limited to, implementation of International 
Health Regulations, coordination of worldwide disease and food safety surveillance 
networks, coordination of international response to communicable diseases, and 
provision of technical assistance for national preparedness and response. 
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Measures to prevent international food adulteration incidents could be beyond 
the resources of many member countries.  International cooperation is essential in order 
to assist many developing countries to implement and/or enhance food safety programs.  
Hence, international guidelines and recommendations for fighting food terrorism need to 
be established to increase the effectiveness of battling bioterrorism. World Health 
Organization (WHO, 2002) has prepared international guidelines and technical 
information on recommended food supply safety measures primarily intended for policy 
makers in national governments who are responsible for food safety issues. 
2.14 Regulatory Background 
The primary agencies involved in detection and epidemiological investigation of 
both intentional and unintentional food borne disease outbreaks include local and state 
health epidemiological departments, local and state public health laboratories, the 
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, the Association of Public Health 
Laboratories, and the CDC (Sobel and Swerdlow, 2002).  In addition, the US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) along with 
state departments of agriculture and food safety divisions have the authority to regulate 
food supply.  
2.14.1 Increased Political Awareness   
Intentional contamination of food/agricultural commodities is one of the most 
viable scenarios of terrorist attacks (Khan et al., 2001) in the United States.  Dramatic 
economic consequences of food scares call for appropriate measures to prevent and 
mitigate possible food contamination events.  The task force members of Council for 
Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST, 2004) recommend development of 
strategic approaches that will identify critical points within the food chain at which 
effective prevention and response strategies will have the greatest impact on decreasing 
public health hazards.  This implies the need for investigations and studies of possible 
scenarios of intentional as well as unintentional agricultural contamination.  In fact 
recent plan proposed by president Bush calls for significantly increased spending on 
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homeland security research projects financed by U.S. department of Agriculture 
(Arnone, M., 2004).  Under this plan, grants for research to protect American agriculture 
from terrorism and foreign diseases, such as Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in cattle, 
would increase by 275 percent, to $30-million.   
2.14.2 Bioterrorism Act of 2002 
On July 12th 2002 President Bush signed into law the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (OLPA, 2004), usually referred to 
as Bioterrorism Act of 2002.  Title III of this document deals with protecting the safety 
and security of the food and drug supply in the U.S.  The goal of this document is to 
facilitate development of crisis communication and education strategy with respect to 
bioterrorist threats to food supply.  The document promotes strategies that “address 
threat assessments; technologies and procedures for securing food processing and 
manufacturing facilities and modes of transportation; response and notification 
procedures; and risk communications to the public”.   
Subtitle A of title III concentrates on regulating imported food supplies.  Section 
302 discusses measures for protection against food adulteration.  The measures include 
increasing inspections for detecting adulteration of food, providing for research on the 
development of tests and sampling methodologies, assessments of the threat of 
intentional food adulteration, and improvements of information management systems.  
The remaining sections address such critical issues as debarment for repeated or serious 
food import violations, registration of food facilities, maintenance and inspection of food 
records, authority to mark articles which are refused admission into the U.S., 
surveillance and information grants, etc.         
Subtitle C of title III elaborates on upgrading agricultural security.  Several issues 
of critical importance are discussed. 
• High priority is assigned to enhancing and expanding the capacity of the 
Food Safety Inspection Service to conduct activities, such as increasing 
inspections at international points of origin and ports of entry, developing 
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strategies for dealing with international outbreaks of animal and plant 
diseases, and implementing automated record keeping system.   
• Attention is also directed towards increasing security at colleges and 
universities, which have programs in food and agricultural sciences.  Under 
this Act qualified universities may be awarded one-time grants of up to 
$50,000 to enhance security standards at their facilities.   
• The subtitle also states that the Secretary of agriculture may award grants to 
associations of food producers for the development and implementation of 
educational programs to enhance biosecurity measures on farms.  Under this 
provision individual associations are eligible to receive one-time grants of up 
to $100,000.   
• Support for research and development is also given high importance.  Close 
partnerships with higher education and research institutions are recognized to 
be critical to increase biosecurity and food safety in the U.S.  Such close ties 
with the intelligence community promise advanced researches related to 
vulnerability analysis, incident response, detection and prevention 
technologies, as well as effective planning and training activities.  For fiscal 
year 2002 it was authorized to allocate $190,000,000 for research, 
development and outreach programs related to enhancement of biosecurity 
measures in the U.S.   
• Finally the penalties for those individuals who violate the provisions are 
discussed.  The penalties are instituted to be commensurate with the 
economic and health damages caused by violations.       
2.14.3 The Role of Food Safety and Inspection Service 
The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is a public health regulatory 
agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which has ensured wholesomeness of 
meat, poultry and egg products for almost 100 years.  This agency employs more than 
7600 inspectors and veterinarians in more than 6000 locations such as meat, egg, and 
poultry plants and ports of entry (FSIS, 2003).  FSIS works in cooperation with Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Defense (DOD), the 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and with state and local health 
organizations to prevent the entry of intentionally or naturally contaminated products in 
the food supply.        
In response to September 11, 2001, FSIS has taken numerous steps to increase 
the security of the U.S. food supply.  The most notable action was creation of the Food 
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Biosecurity Action Team.  This team is responsible for improving food safety and 
security.  The tasks of this team include: 1) assessing potential vulnerabilities along the 
farm-to-table chain (figure 6); 2) increasing FSIS cooperation with law enforcement 
agencies; 3) enhancing security measures at all FSIS laboratories; 4) expanding the 
capacities of the agency’s laboratories to test for additional food safety hazards and 
biological and chemical agents; 5) providing guidelines on increasing food safety and 
security to the industry.   
FSIS has also taken on major projects and initiatives to protect America’s meat, 
poultry and egg supply from intentional or unintentional contamination.  FSIS has 
established the Office of Food Security and Emergency Preparedness (OFSEP), which is 
to prevent, and if necessary, coordinate a response to any intentional food supply 
contamination.  In order to prevent using food as a terrorist weapon, FSIS has prepared a 
food security plan 2003-2007, which identifies specific goals and responsibilities related 
to prevention activities.  FSIS has also prepared and distributed Security Guidelines for 
Food Processors in order to assist the plants that produce meat, egg and poultry products 
to improve their biosecurity procedures.  Imports inspections have been intensified by 
adding 20 new inspectors at port cities around the nation to assist traditional FSIS import 
inspectors assigned to the 146 import Houses around the country.  FSIS has completed 
food supply vulnerability, which identifies the most susceptible products, agents and 
sites for intentional contamination of domestically produced meat, poultry and egg 
products.   In addition, FSIS has enhanced capacity and security of the laboratories, and 
began educating and training of all employees on food security issues.            
2.15 Summary 
Security of agricultural markets is a major concern in the policy-making arena 
especially during current elevated terrorism awareness.  Even though agriculture is not 
usually thought of as a possible venue for terrorism, a number of documented incidents 
demonstrate the feasibility of such events.  Collectively the documented incidents of 
intentional as well as unintentional agricultural contamination point out vulnerable 
segments along the food supply chain.  Agricultural contamination could cause wide 
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range of implications, from minor discomfort of several people to massive infections 
and/or disruptions of markets in several industries and trade.  Recent spread of FMD in 
Great Britain is the most notable example of how Agricultural Contamination could 
cause serious economic damages in a number of industries.  Both, producers and 
consumers bear the consequences of agricultural contamination.  Precise effects depend 
on distribution of those effects within producers and within consumers.   
The most desirable option of counter sabotage efforts is prevention.  Prevention 
practices could be adopted at any vulnerable segment along a food supply chain.  Clearly 
priority should be assigned to the most vulnerable segments within agricultural 
production, processing and manufacturing, storage and transport, retail and distribution, 
and trade.  However, adoption of preventative measures depends on private incentives of 
producers, distributors, and retailers.  The private incentives include consideration of 
both, mean and variance of net returns, which are affected by marginal costs and 
effectiveness of prevention strategies.  
Response to agricultural sabotage and control of a spread of infectious diseases 
such as FMD to great extent depend on effective surveillance, detection and tracking of 
contaminated products.  Investing in surveillance, detection and tracking systems will 
improve the preparedness in case agricultural terrorism incident occurs.  Response and 
control, as well as prevention, strategies need to be developed by considering multiple 
scenarios and options in the decision support systems.   
In order to safeguard the economy from the possible devastating effects of 
agricultural sabotage, decision support tools need to be developed.  The points discussed 
in this review of related literature should provide the grounds for developing the support 
tools.  These tools will facilitate determination of the optimal level of prevention and 
response measures and are the subject of further investigations.          
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3 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURAL TERRORISM 
There are three major economic issues related to agricultural terrorism.  The first 
involves evaluation of vulnerability of the agricultural industry to terrorism.  The second 
pertains to formulation of economically optimal policies that could reduce vulnerability.  
The third involves how economic research could assist in formulating such policies.  
3.1 Vulnerability of Agricultural Industry 
As discussed in the literature review section, the vulnerability of the agricultural 
industry to terrorism can involve both intentional and unintentional contamination.  
Numerous unintentional cases have occurred and illustrate possible susceptible segments 
of food supply chain which could potentially be used as points of sabotage.  Some of 
those examples are, milk contamination (Ryan et al., 1987), salmonella infection from 
ice cream (Hennessy et al., 1996), seafood contamination (Halliday et al., 1991), E Coli 
infection from radish sprouts (Mermin and Griffin, 1999), and animal born diseases such 
as Avian Influenza (CDC, 2004) FMD and BSE and introduction of other non-
indigenous species which could be harmful to agricultural industry (Pinmentel, 2002).   
A few intentional cases of food adulteration have occurred.  For example, intentional 
contamination of food consumed by coworkers (WHO, 2002), and intentional 
contamination of restaurant food (Torok et al., 1997).   
The above cited cases demonstrate the diversity of vulnerable points along the 
food supply chain.  Generally, a vulnerable point is one that is characterized by low 
investments in prevention and preinstalled response measures towards possible sabotage 
and points where such events could cause significant economic damages.     
The diversity of vulnerable points indicates that the possibilities for agricultural 
terrorism are countless or close to it.  This suggests that agricultural industry is highly 
vulnerable to terrorism act.  The consequences of such an incident could potentially be 
devastating due to highly inter-regional nature of agricultural markets.  The 
contamination in the form of infectious disease could easily spread to remote regions and 
cause a massive outbreak even though it may have originated in on a local basis.   
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3.2 Formulation of Economic Mitigation Policies 
The fundamental economic problem related to formulation of policies to mitigate 
agricultural terrorism is to come up with a policy that will yield the most favorable 
benefit-cost ratio.  In other words, the policy needs to be such that the benefits from 
implementing it will outweigh the costs of putting it in operation.   
3.2.1 Conceivable Mitigation Policy Components 
A counter terrorism policy in the agricultural industry could involve strategies 
that could be composed of multiple activities that prevent the event or allow for effective 
response.  Below I provide an overview of actions that could be considered as 
components of such strategies, specifically when it comes to animal diseases. 
3.2.1.1 Vaccination 
Farm animal diseases, can in cases be remedied by preventative vaccination.  The 
role of and relative effectiveness of vaccination needs to be investigated in order to form 
a policy against agricultural terrorism in form of intentional disease spread.  
Vaccines against some diseases like FMD are available, although many are not 
currently applied on US farms and ranches. In the case of FMD vaccination is not 
currently practical as one cannot differentiate between a vaccinated and an infected 
animal.  Thus vaccinated animals are eventually destroyed.  However, I discuss this as a 
representative of the more general preventative vaccination action.   
Vaccination can be viewed as both prevention and a response measures.  As an ex 
ante prevention measure, vaccination could be used to preclude the occurrence of a 
disease outbreak.  Vaccines also could be manufactured and stocked for ex post use.  In 
this sense, the decision is whether or not to vaccinate the animals or stock the vaccines 
prior to introduction of the disease in consideration of the probability levels of disease 
introduction.  If vaccinated preventatively, then even if the disease is introduced into the 
region, there will be lessened and perhaps insignificant losses due to the introduction.  If 
not vaccinated preventatively, then there is a risk that if the disease is introduced into the 
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region it will cause damage, and if it widely spreads throughout the region, there may be 
significant losses.   
As a response measure, vaccination could be used ex post to stop the spread of the 
disease under the scenario where infected animal(s) have been detected.  Timely 
response by vaccinating herds within certain radius of infected herd could prevent 
further spread of the disease.   However, if the vaccines are not available then they 
cannot be used ex post.  
Both, prevention and response vaccination have corresponding uncertainties.  As 
a prevention measure, it is unclear under what circumstances to start applying 
preventative vaccination.  It is unclear when the threat of an outbreak is serious enough 
to justify the expenses associated with carrying out massive preventative vaccination.  
As an ex post response measure it is unclear how extensive vaccination should be in case 
of outbreak detection.  In other words, the radius of vaccination or number of 
animals/herds sufficient to contain the outbreak needs to be established.  
3.2.1.2 Slaughter 
Slaughtering of animals is considered to be one of the most effective response 
measures in terms of containing the spread of a disease such as FMD (Schoenbaum and 
Disney, 2003; Garner and Lack, 1995; Morris et al., 2001).  Under such a strategy, 
animals are preemptively slaughtered when infected animals are found in the region.  
Slaughter in a ring around the infection points reduces the chances of direct or indirect 
animal contact, thus decreasing infection spread.  The question under such strategy is 
how big the slaughtering ring should be around the epicenter of an outbreak to be 
sufficient to stop the infection from spreading.  While the goal of slaughtering strategy is 
to stop the disease from spreading, it is also desired to minimize the costs of such 
strategy.  The costs could involve slaughtering and disposal expenses in addition to lost 
capital in the form of culled livestock.  The extent of slaughtering may depend on the 
characteristics of the area around the outbreak.  For example, regions with high human 
population densities, high animal concentrations, numerous roads, etc. have more 
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favorable environments for infection spread than do regions with lower human 
populations, smaller animal concentrations, and less roads.  Therefore, the region with 
more favorable conditions for disease spread would optimally apply more intensive 
response measures.  In case of slaughtering as a response measure, this implies 
slaughtering animals in a larger ring around the center of an outbreak.   
3.2.1.3 Movement Ban 
One of the possible responses to outbreaks of highly contagious diseases such as 
FMD is to stop the transport of livestock in the general area of an outbreak.  This 
strategy will reduce the mixing of healthy and sick animals at staging points, sale barns, 
feedlots, and other cattle facilities. This will reduce the likelihood of healthy animals 
making contact with infected animals.  In addition, general movement bans in and out of 
the infection zone will reduce the likelihood of transporting the disease to neighboring 
regions via humans and vehicles.  However, lengthy movement bans will result in 
economic disruption.   
3.2.1.4 Surveillance and Detection 
A category of strategies that can be used ex ante or ex post involves surveillance 
and detection systems.  Ex ante investment in surveillance implies initiating new or 
enhancing existing monitoring operations or investing in equipment that can be used 
post event.   In case of FMD regular monitoring would allow early detection of the 
disease, before the symptoms even show.  Early detection is essential for successful 
containment of the disease spread because by the time the animals show the symptoms 
of infection the disease may have already spread to surrounding neighborhoods.  
Therefore, diagnosing the infection before the signs show up could reduce the spread of 
the disease and decrease the outbreak response costs necessary to stop the infection 
spread.   
One of the tasks of the broader project under which this project is being 
conducted is to identify possible cost effective surveillance and detection methods that 
fit the cattle industry in Texas.  One of the possibilities is to perform some ex ante 
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actions.  These include increasing the number of regional veterinary laboratories, which 
would conduct frequent tests of random samples of animals in the region.  However, this 
would entail significant expenses for buildings, supplies and employees.  Another 
possibility is to educate and require livestock operators to conduct tests to detect FMD 
infection and report the results to the regional veterinary clinic.  Surveillance and 
detection mechanisms could be applied at sale barns and other points of livestock 
distribution.  Detection, which will allow isolation and elimination of infected animals 
before they are mixed into healthy herds is key to preventing and/or stopping the spread 
of the disease.  Tracing systems could be used to improve the effectiveness of 
surveillance and detection procedures.  Methods such as ear tags will allow tracing back 
any livestock animal that has entered the production chain.  This will expedite the 
identification of outbreak origins and paths allowing isolation and elimination of all 
animals in direct and indirect contact. 
3.2.1.5 Monitoring Imports 
Another option is to monitor imports of live animals, animal products, feed 
ingredients, and other related commodities.  Currently Department of Agriculture’s Plant 
and Animal Inspection Service are responsible for enforcing the laws that protect the 
U.S. from agricultural pests and diseases by conducting inspections at ports of entry.  
For example, under the Plant Protection Act and the Animal Health Protection Act, 
agriculture inspectors have the authority to conduct warrantless searches of any person 
or vehicle entering the United States.  Inspection of imports needs to be carried out at all 
points of entry (Wasem et al., 2004).  However, different points of entry could be 
characterized by different levels of possible infected animal trade.  Therefore, different 
extents of monitoring could be and in cases is employed at different points of entry.  For 
example, live cattle being imported from Mexico are dipped in an insecticide bath prior 
to entry into the United States to prevent entry of exotic ticks. At the northern border, 
imports of cattle and beef products currently are prohibited due to BSE (mad cow 
disease) restrictions (Wasem et al., 2004).  Setting up more elaborate inspection practices 
at the points of entry where products from South America enter the region than at the 
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points of entry where Canadian products enter the region may be argued to be 
appropriate.   
Enhancing inspection processes at points of entry would involve hiring 
personnel, acquiring equipment, etc.  Costs (Wasem et al., 2004) associated with 
implementing this strategy (McCauley et al., 1979) will need to be compared to 
associated marginal benefits.  This essentially means figuring out the probability level of 
an outbreak originating from foreign imports, then determining those for which spending 
resources on inspection and thus preventing the entry of infected products would be 
justified.  At lower probability levels spending on monitoring imports may be 
economically inefficient while at higher probabilities the spending could be 
economically justified.   
3.2.1.6 Monitoring Travel 
In case of a highly contagious disease, such as FMD, the spread could originate 
not only from animal related products but also from other sources such as travelers from 
regions with endemic FMD.  To prevent entry of diseases through such venues the 
inspection at the customs of airports and other facilities of international travel may be 
established and/or enhanced.  Currently there is a formal voluntary procedure in place at 
the airport customs that identifies individuals that have visited farms in foreign 
countries.  However, this procedure is inadequate for preventing intentional introduction 
of disease into the U.S.  Therefore, enhancing monitoring exercises at customs could be 
used to reduce the chances of successful agricultural sabotage.       
3.2.1.7 Tracing 
Response strategies such as isolating and eliminating infected animals and 
animals that may have been in contact with the diseased may be more effective in 
presence of tracing mechanisms.  Timely removal of infected or suspicious animals from 
the market is essential for containing highly infectious diseases such as FMD.  Tracing 
mechanisms would allow tracking individual animal units through the points of 
processing and transportation.  This would allow authorities to halt operations at 
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facilities where the infected animal(s) have been traced through.  Tracing mechanisms 
would also assist in identifying the point of origin of the outbreak, which may lead to 
some clues about the source of the outbreak in case of agricultural terrorism event.  An 
example of tracing mechanisms is use of an ear tagging system for cattle.  However, the 
problem with such a system is that unless the animals are officially sold in the market 
they may not have tags and thus no record of past origin and movement.   
3.2.1.8 Recovery Activities 
Recovery measures mainly entail restoring, at least partially, the lost demand and 
production capabilities for the commodities and production systems that are affected by 
agricultural terrorism event.  Such activities could include additional testing of products 
to demonstrate product safety, education of the public regarding characteristics of the 
threat, upgrading equipment and procedures, land decontamination etc.  To evaluate the 
effects of such programs on consumer demand at the time of agricultural terrorism event 
some form of demand analysis needs to be conducted.  For productive capacity one 
needs to do a cost benefit analysis of potential actions. 
3.2.2 Benefits 
Economic benefits from agricultural terrorism mitigation policies correspond to 
avoided losses that would have occurred if the policy was not designed and activated.  
Hence, appraising the precise benefits of such policy is complicated since the damages 
are usually not known unless the event has happened before.  Since agricultural 
terrorism has not occurred very many times, to the best of my knowledge, it is hard to 
talk about the extent of damages under agricultural sabotage.          
In cases where some information is available on the effect of particular sabotage 
scenario on supply and demand of affected commodities, it would be possible to 
approximate the damages by looking at lost consumers' and producers' surpluses.  
However, as discussed in the literature review section, agricultural contamination has 
different effects within producers as well as within consumers.  For example, producers 
of commodities that were not directly affected by the event may see their business 
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activity increase or decrease depending on the type of goods and services they provide.  
Similarly, some consumers will completely drop consumption of affected commodities 
while others may continue to consume unaffected brands of the commodity. 
Assuming that damages of particular agricultural terrorism incidents could 
somehow be approximated, through lost income for example, it is still unknown how 
likely the incident is to take place.  Therefore, economic benefits of agricultural 
terrorism mitigation policy need to be evaluated in terms of expected damages of such 
events under the absence of a mitigation policy.  However, estimating expected losses 
necessitates some intelligence on likelihood of agricultural terrorism event.  Since such 
information can be rare and or imperfect, scenarios of a range of threat levels will 
probably be needed to evaluate and compare benefits of various mitigation policies. 
3.2.3 Costs 
Estimation of costs of mitigation policies is relatively more straightforward than 
estimation of benefits because most policy implementation costs are likely to be either 
known with certainty or can be estimated.  In other words, the ex ante costs of 
implementing and operating the policy, regardless of whether the event occurs or not, are 
readily subject to estimation.  However, the ex post variable costs of implementing the 
policy depend on the extent and severity of the event, which could be hard to predict.  
Nevertheless, proportional costs of responding to the event could still be approximated 
in some scenarios.  For example, in case of FMD outbreak I can expect the approximate 
cost of slaughtering or vaccinating per animal.  
Costs of mitigation policies are likely to consist of two parts, ex ante and ex post 
costs.  Ex ante costs are known with certainty and are incurred regardless of whether or 
not the event takes place.  These costs are referred to as fixed costs since they are not 
dependent on the use of the mitigation policy.  For example, in case of FMD such costs 
could be associated with initiating surveillance programs that would operate whether the 
event occurs or not.  If contamination occurs such program would be used to prevent or 
respond to the event.  However, if the event does not occur than the program is idle. 
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Ex post costs are variable costs of mitigation policy depend on the state of nature.  
In other words, if the event occurs than certain response activities are enacted, which 
entail some costs.  However, if the event does not occur then response activities will not 
be enacted and no costs will be incurred.  For example, in case of FMD, responsive 
slaughter will take place only if the outbreak occurs.  Thus, if there is no FMD outbreak, 
then there will be no slaughter costs, if there is an FMD outbreak than there will be 
slaughter costs.   
It is not known whether the event is going to take place or not.  Therefore, 
expected variable costs will have to be calculated to evaluate cost effectiveness of 
mitigation policy.  However, event probability, which is necessary to calculate expected 
values, is unlikely to be known.  Therefore, scenarios with a range of probability levels 
will need to be considered. 
3.3 Analytic Conceptualization of the Economic Problem 
Following documents like the Homeland Security RFP for agricultural 
biosecurity centers, I will characterize agricultural terrorism mitigation policy actions 
into four general categories: prevention, detection, response and recovery.  Each is 
defined below. 
Prevention corresponds to activities which facilitate the avoidance of an 
agricultural sabotage event.  Such activities include control and surveillance at the 
boards of entry, preventative vaccination of animals, control of access to vulnerable 
points along the food supply chain, control of access to hazardous agricultural 
chemicals, etc.   
Detection entails implementing systems which would allow for timely discovery 
of an event and then rapid response heading off many of the damages.  This could be a 
crucial component under the scenarios where a highly contagious disease like FMD, 
which takes time to show clinical signs, is used to inflict terror.  Timely detection will 
allow for timely response actions and will limit the spread of the disease.  Detection 
activities can precede an event being routinely done all of the time.  They can also be 
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employed once an event has been discovered in an attempt to detect infected animals and 
prevent infection spread.   
Response actions correspond to activities employed after the event has taken 
place.  For example, in case of FMD, response actions could be responsive vaccination 
and slaughter of animals.  Response actions are intended to minimize the impact of the 
event.   
Recovery actions are undertaken after the event has taken place and correspond 
to measures that would allow to, at least partially, reinstate lost business.  An example of 
this could be activation of media campaign that would convey to the consumers the 
message that the threat has been eliminated and the products available on the market are 
safe for consumption.    
Figure 7 depicts the stochastic nature of the problem and shows the timeline of 
mitigation policy components.  In stage one, there is no event but the society has the 
opportunity to invest and initiate prevention and detection, and to invest in response 
capability.  These investments, earlier referred to as fixed costs, will be incurred 
regardless of whether the event takes place or not.  In the second stage, there is a 
probability of the event occurring (Pr) and a probability of it not occurring (1-Pr).  
Under the “no event” state of nature no response measures will be activated as no 
disease is detected.  The “Event” state of nature implies that an outbreak has occurred 
somewhere.  At this stage local authorities have the options to enhance detection, initiate 
response (by say, preemptively slaughtering animals or vaccinating), detect through 
detection systems initiated in the first stage, or recover by demonstrating that their 
products are safe.  At the third stage, the local businesses have Pr` probability of being 
infected or directly affected requiring response and then recovery and one minus this 
probability of not being directly effected but still having to deal with market recovery.  
This probability could be argued to be depended on preventative and responsive 
measures that were locally and/or nationally adopted in the second stage.         
The setup described above reflects a few major elements of the problem at hand.  
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One is irreversibility, meaning that if the event occurs and necessary investments have 
not been made in the first stage, these investments can no longer be made.  Similarly, if 
had invested in the first stage and no event occurred then the investment is a fixed cost 
and is not reversible.  Second, attributes of the response capability may be conditional on 
investments made in the first stage.  For example, in order to have the equipment to 
undertake surveillance systems that might detect and help stop the spread of the disease, 
there would be necessary investments in the first stage so second stage possibilities are 
dependent on first stage activities. Third, the set up reflects the tradeoffs between 
investment costs and event costs in the form of damages which occur infrequently.  
Fourth, profits of industry under consideration depend on the state on nature.  Clearly if 
the event occurs there will be costs associated with response measures which will 
decrease the profits.  Finally, given all of the above, the best mitigation strategy will 
depend on fixed investment costs, variable costs, probabilities and severity of the 
potential event.       
3.3.1 Formulation 
The model proposed here is based on maximizing the utility of an economic 
decision maker assumed to be an all knowing benevolent dictator who can manage the 
entire herd who faces the possibility of agricultural terrorism act.  An expected utility 
formulation of the decision given the opportunity to adopt prevention, response and 
recovery actions is given in equation (1).  Notice that in this formulation I categorize 
detection into the ex ante prevention group. 
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This formulation depicts the three-stage process incorporating recourse and 
irreversibility.  The choice variables here are d, r, s, and c.   
In the first stage I have the option to adopt prevention activities, which could be 
beneficial in the letter stages if the event occurs.  However, prevention activities can 
only have value and be utilized if they were employed in the first stage.  Notice that 
investment in prevention and detection is independent of state of nature, which implies 
that this decision is irreversible.  Response and recovery on the other hand are state 
dependent.  Both, recovery and response expenditures, r, take place only if the event 
occurs.  Clearly, if the event does not take place, than there is no need for response 
actions.   
Response actions are independent of the third stage state of nature.  In other 
words, response actions are assumed to be initiated as soon as the second stage state of 
nature is known, event or no event.  However, response actions are not dependent on 
whether the entity gets infected or not in the third stage but the impacts of the response 
and infection does influence the third stage.  Namely, some animals will be dead and 
some actions may need to be undertaken locally.   
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On the other hand the need for recovery activities is dependent on states of nature 
from all stages.  That is, recovery activities could be different depending on whether 
they are recovering from a direct hit by the event or just from the impact of the event on 
the market conditions.  If the entity is not directly affected by the event, then recovery 
corresponds to restoring consumer confidence in their products.  For example this could 
mean demonstrating product safety through extra testing.  If the entity is directly 
affected by the event then recovery would entail much more including rebuilding the 
herd and decontaminating facilities.  However, for the sake of simplicity, in this 
formulation it is assumed that if the entity is directly hit by the event then they suffer 
losses in terms of its capital value (K(a)).    
L(a,r,c,s,δ) is the monetary loss function given the event.  It is assumed to be a 
function of attributes of the entity.  For example, if the area under consideration has 
several big feedlots, and we are talking about the possibility of FMD outbreak, then the 
losses are likely to be large.  The loss function is assumed to be convex in r and c 
implying that as we adopt more response and recovery activities we will decrease the 
losses.  However, if too much recovery and/or response actions are adopted, losses may 
increase.  The loss function is also a function of random disease severity parameter, δ, 
which could represent for example disease spread rate in case of FMD outbreak.    
Notice that the utility function is assumed to be a function of site attributes (a), 
such as how big are cattle operations and whether or not there are ranching, breeding or 
feedlot operations in a region.  It could be argued that site attributes which affect the loss 
function could also play a role in utility level.  In the state of nature where event occurs 
and the entity gets hit net profits are lost capital (k(a)), minus surveillance expenditure 
(s), minus prevention expenditure (d).  Under state of nature where the event occurs but 
the entity escapes the attack net profits are returns (m) minus surveillance (s), minus 
response (r), minus recovery (c), minus prevention (d), minus indirect losses (L).  Under 
no event state of nature net profits are returns (m) minus prevention expenses (s).  
Denoting net profits as Y and assuming that marginal utility as a function of Y is 
indifferent of state of nature, which implicitly assumes risk neutrality with constant 
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marginal utility of income, I can show the following by taking the first order derivatives 
with respect to s, r, and c. 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) )5(011
)4(11
)3()1(
)2()1(
=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂−
−∂
∂=−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂
∂
∂−−−∂
∂⋅
∂
∂=−−+∂
∂
c
L
Y
UP
UU
rr
L
Y
U
Y
U
s
L
Y
UUU
s
P
Y
UUUU
d
P
ENEI
ENEI
NENEI
π
ππ
ππ
ππ
 
Using (2), (3) and (4) and denoting partial derivatives with subscripts it can be 
shown that  
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Equations (6), (7) and (8) give optimality conditions for spending on employing 
prevention, response and detection actions.  Equation (5) simply says that marginal 
decrease in losses as spending on recovery measures increases ( ).0≤∂∂ cL  is equal to 
normalized price of recovery measures at optimality.   
Since I assumed risk neutrality then equations (2,3,4, and 5) can be rewritten as 
follows after denoting K(a) as K  
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Using the implicit function theorem, I can examine the comparative statics 
implications of parameter variations in this formulation.  The effects of threat levels and 
severity of the event could be investigated.  Using equation (9) for prevention I can show                       
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The numerator of (13) is signed negative under the assumption that m and K are 
large enough.  The denominator’s sign is tied to the sign of Pdd.  In other words the sign 
of (13) depends on effectiveness of prevention activities, magnitude of losses, income 
and money spent on surveillance, response and recovery.     
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Notice that the value of this expression does not depend on probability of an attack but 
rather on conditional probability of being affected if the attack occurs.  The sign of the 
above expression is ambiguous and depends on the signs and relative magnitudes of its 
components.  For example it depends on the magnitude of costs of surveillance and 
detection, and on the magnitude of the effect of event severity on the effectiveness of 
detection in terms of effects on πs and Ls.   
 Similar results arise for surveillance activities relative to changes in probability 
of event occurrence.  Namely, 
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 Using the same approach I can show that  
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Similar to previous results the sign of equation 16 is ambiguous.  Relative 
magnitudes and signs of individual components determine overall sign of the equation.    
The effect of probability of agricultural terrorism, on adoption of response 
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activiti vities 
 be shown that 
es is trivially zero as apparent from equation 11.  By definition response acti
are only adopted if the event occurs.  
For recovery activities it could
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From equation (12) I can see that Lc=-1, therefore the numerator is negative.  The 
sign of
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n (1) could be rewritten as  
 the denominator depends on Lcc and so does the sign of the whole expression.  
For recovery activities such as restoring consumer confidence through publicity Lcc is 
likely to be positive.  Therefore, the sign of (17) is positive implying that as severity of
the event increases the optimal level of recovery activities also increases.   
3.3.2 Inclusion of Externalities and Non-Exclusiveness 
The formulation presented above assumes a single de
r that can compel all to cooperate and does not explicitly reflect public good 
characteristics or differential individual behavior under a choice of strategies.  
Specifically, strategies adopted by some entities will affect other entities in the 
example, if one entity adopts surveillance and thus prevents the spread of the disease 
when detected, it will reduce the probability of a neighboring entity being affected by the 
event even if no screening and detection was adopted by neighboring entity and would 
thus lower the incentives for all individuals to cooperate.  Similarly, if in case of a 
contamination event one entity adopts responsive slaughter it will reduce the chanc
that the neighboring entity will get infected.  Moreover extensive slaughter, as opposed
to moderate or no slaughter strategy, will have positive effect on consumer confidence.  
Therefore the entities that do not adopt strategies such as slaughter in case of outbreak 
will benefit from slaughter strategies adopted by others.   
To reflect these public good characteristics equatio
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where d, s, r, and c, are vectors composed of prevention, surveillance, response and 
recovery activities adopted by individual decision making entities represented by i. 
The corresponding first order conditions with respect to dj, rj, sj, and cj, are: 
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Similar to previous section, marginal utility of income (
Y
U j
∂
∂
) is assumed to be 
constant, corresponding risk neutral preferences.  As apparent from the above equations, 
optimality conditions under explicit consideration of positive externalities from 
mitigation strategies adopted by individual decision making units are different from 
those where externalities are not considered.  Specifically, in equations 19 through 22 
probabilities of infection for individual entities depend on actions carried out by other 
entities.  Similarly losses suffered by individual uninfected businesses in case of an 
outbreak are affected by what type of surveillance, response and recovery strategies 
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others adopt.  Hence, counter agricultural terrorism actions implemented by each entity 
will affect other entities without compensation.  This means that the costs of strategy 
implementation for a particular entity may not align with benefits brought by adoption of 
this strategy.  Therefore, strategies that provide external benefits will be underproduced 
by privately optimizing agents as normally found in investigations regarding public good 
(Hanley et al., 1997; Myles 1997).  This implies that taking positive externalities into 
account will improve the social efficiency of optimal combination of mitigation 
strategies adopted by individual decision makers.  External effects of prevention, 
surveillance, response, and recovery actions should be a part of regional decision making 
as opposed to forming policy based on the total cooperation assumption under the 
benevolent dictator formulation used above.  However, more thorough investigation of 
the effects of positive externalities of mitigation strategies is not the focus of this work 
and is held for the future investigations 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter I discussed basic economic issues related to mitigation of potential 
agricultural terrorism act.  The basic idea of forming optimal mitigation policy is to 
come up with a strategy that generates the largest benefit/cost ratio.  In this discussion, 
particular attention was given to stochastic nature of the problem.  A three-stage 
conceptual model was proposed and analyzed, from a perspective of a benevolent 
dictator decision maker, in terms of mitigation decisions considering possible states of 
nature.   
The conceptual setup was used to formulate an analytical model which 
maximized expected utility/profits given the choice of prevention response and reaction 
options to mitigate possible sabotage event.  This model was used to portray the overall 
picture of decision making process and to analyze the optimal conditions for adopting 
prevention and response strategies.  Using comparative statics I analyzed the effects of 
threat levels and event severity on adoption of prevention and response measures.   The 
major findings were that the effects of threat level and event severity on optimal levels 
of most mitigation options were ambiguous and depended on various factors such as 
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effectiveness and characteristics of mitigation options.  Response strategy was shown to 
be independent of threat level.  Recovery strategy is positively correlated with event 
severity and independent of threat level.  The effects found to be ambiguous in this 
chapter will be empirically investigated in the next chapter.  The effects of positive 
externalities created by mitigation strategies were also recognized.  However, the more 
in depth analysis of this issue is left for future research.  
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4 ECONOMIC DESIGN OF ANIMAL DISEASE MANAGEMENT      
SYSTEMS: TRADEOFFS BETWEEN DETECTION AND RESPONSE 
Today as the world becomes increasingly more interrelated and the likelihood of 
disruptive terrorist events increases, substantial attention is being paid to formation of 
animal disease management systems.  Such systems consist of 4 basic types of 
components:  
Prevention systems – systems where there are actions undertaken to try to 
intercept disease vectors before they are introduced.   
Detection systems – systems designed to screen animals to detect disease early 
and thus allow more rapid treatment and much lower spread than would 
otherwise be the case.  These systems can also be coupled with prevention 
activities to screen imported animals before they get in contact with 
uninfected domestic herds.  Depending on the point of view detection system 
could be viewed as a component of a prevention strategy because detection 
systems are set up prior to introduction of the disease and prevent massive 
outbreaks in case of disease introduction. 
Response systems – systems which involve actions to stop the spread and 
ultimately eradicate the disease and thus avoid further economic losses. 
Recovery systems – systems put in place to restore lost assets or demand shifts 
due to introduction of animal disease.  Since these actions are typically 
utilized after introduction of a disease they could be classified under response 
systems depending on the point of view.  
Collectively these systems entail a mixture of fixed and variable costs.  Most of 
the fixed costs involve ex ante investments in prevention, detection, and response 
capability systems that are incurred whether or not an outbreak occurs.  An economic 
issue that arises here entails designing the optimal mitigation system given a particular 
set of disease characteristics.  More importantly, given the difficulty of threat 
assessment, I will investigate how varying characteristics of the threat influence the 
optimal design of a threat management system.  Therefore, in this chapter I will 
a) address the economic framework pertinent to mitigation activities 
directed towards intentional/unintentional animal disease outbreaks.  
In particular, I will address the interrelationship between detection, as 
a form of prevention, and response activities   
b) set up and demonstrate a first order application of the framework in a 
case study setting,  
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c) investigate the effects of threat characteristics as well as effectiveness 
and costs of prevention and response options on the optimal mix of 
mitigation actions. 
 
In this investigation I will do a first order empirical evaluation of a broader set of 
FMD management alternatives examining surveillance systems and exploring the 
interaction between surveillance and response strategies.  Specifically, I examine in a 
simplified case study setting the conditions for desirability of enhanced detection 
systems considering various characteristics of a potential FMD outbreak, costs of 
program implementation, severity of the disease outbreak, and relative effectiveness of 
the surveillance and response strategies.         
4.1 Background on Disease Management Research and Design 
Analyzing the economic implications of animal health complications has become 
a prominent feature of policy-oriented research.  In recent years, the issue became even 
more pertinent as the fears of agricultural terrorism have grown due to increased 
incidents of terrorism acts.  From an epidemiologic point of view the goal is to prevent, 
stop and eradicate the disease as fast as possible or with fewest possible infection cases.  
From an economic point of view the objective is to minimize ex post economic losses 
that could be brought by a potential disease outbreak plus the cost of ex ante actions.  
This, in most cases, inherently implies a tradeoff between ex ante costs and the value of 
infection cases under an event.  In this section, I discuss methodological issues 
associated with economically efficient animal disease mitigation strategies and 
empirically examine interrelationships of various mitigation options.    
4.1.1 Detection Strategy vs. Slaughter Strategy 
I will investigate ex ante – ex post tradeoffs by considering a relatively simple 
case that entails detection, as a form of ex ante prevention policy, and slaughter as a 
form of ex post response policy.  Periodic testing of animals for FMD infection is chosen 
as a detection scheme.  The study will examine the optimal number of annual herd 
animal tests as determined by such factors as threat levels, disease spread characteristics, 
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response effectiveness, and costs of mitigation alternatives.  A major decision in this 
setting is associated with ex ante investment in the detection program.  Specifically, 
under what circumstances is it beneficial to invest in the detection program and thus 
intercept the disease spread in a timely manner, versus rely on response measure, which, 
unlike detection program, would be activated only if the outbreak occurs?  
4.1.2 Disease Spread 
The effectiveness of prevention and response strategies will greatly depend on 
characteristics of the disease spread.  Therefore, some kind of disease spread model 
needs to be established in order to get a perception about key aspects of effective 
prevention and response.  This would be best done with a detailed epidemiologic model 
but will be done herein using some equations from the literature.       
4.1.3 Data Requirements 
To conduct this analysis the following data need to be incorporated.  The 
scenarios with corresponding sabotage and farm infection probabilities need to be 
developed.  The analysis will require data that reflects the effectiveness of different 
prevention activities in terms of detecting the outbreak and successful responsive 
slaughter and vaccination.  Additionally, the cost coefficients associated with different 
prevention and response activities need to be acquired.  Resource endowments for 
prevention and response activities need to be recognized.  Prices of agricultural 
commodities under different states of nature and different prevention and response 
strategies need to be introduced.   
 Since availability of all the desired data is limited, I will set up a model that is 
somewhat abstract and is simplified but contains the relevant elements related to 
agricultural terrorism using the data I can access plus some expert opinion.   
4.1.4 Expected Results  
The empirical model proposed here is expected to cover but not exactly depict 
reality and hence will yield results that will be suggestive of the optimal mix of 
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prevention and response strategies.  Using hypothetical but realistic event occurrence 
scenarios will allow evaluation of the cost effectiveness of various prevention and 
response strategies.  The results will illustrate the relative desirability of prevention 
versus response strategies under different sabotage scenarios.     
Particular attention and caution needs to be exercised while interpreting the 
results of the model.  The findings will be conditional on particular scenarios analyzed 
and assumption employed in this research.  Hypothesized sabotage scenarios as well 
some of the parameters assumed in this investigation are likely to have wide range of 
possible values.  Therefore the findings should not be interpreted as numerically 
informative results, but rather as results indicative of possible changes in strategies.    
4.1.5 General Economic Issues 
The possibility of agricultural sabotage, such as spread of infectious animal 
diseases, presents several economic problems as discussed in Chapter 2.  Contamination 
related food scares can have devastating effects on the markets of not only directly 
affected agricultural commodities, but also other commodity markets.  In the case of 
infectious disease events, the tourism industry has been found to be highly vulnerable.  
Serious economic damages could also arise from loss of export markets.  Therefore, the 
policy composed of prevention, detection response and recovery actions needs to be 
devised and instituted in order to minimize the expected losses from agricultural 
sabotage.   
Formulation and implementation of mitigation strategies is on one hand based on 
the relative costs of strategy options.  Clearly, it is economically efficient to adopt the 
mix of strategies which will minimize the mitigation costs.  On the other hand, the 
strategy needs to be effective in prevention and/or physical removal of the disease, or 
other threats, from the supply chain.  On the cost side, different mitigation options have 
different characteristics.  Most prevention strategies, such as surveillance and detection 
systems, tracing, preventative vaccination, control of access to vulnerable points along 
the supply chain, involve a priory investment costs.  This means that the fixed costs 
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associated with these options will be incurred regardless of whether the outbreak occurs 
or not.   
Clearly at low probabilities of contamination, prevention strategies with 
significant investment costs are less desirable than under higher probabilities.  On the 
other hand response strategies such as ring vaccination, slaughter, disposal and 
disinfection, mostly rely on costs which are incurred if the contamination occurs.  
Response strategies will generally decrease the economic damages of contamination but 
will not eliminate them.  Therefore, the tradeoff of choosing between prevention and 
response strategies is whether or not one spends money upfront and protects themselves 
from potentially significant economic losses due to agricultural contamination or wait 
and see if the event occurs in which case they rely on response strategies.  In practice, it 
is likely that a combination of prevention and response strategies will be adopted as 
mitigation policy against agricultural terrorism.  However, the implication from the 
previous chapter is that the relative reliance on the strategies will depend on such 
elements as threat level, costs and effectiveness of prevention and response strategies, 
and severity of the event.    
4.1.6 An Analytical Framework 
The model used in this case study needs to capture the stochastic elements related 
to the possibility of agricultural sabotage such as intentional introduction of farm animal 
diseases.  The conceptual model in this chapter is similar to the formulation in the 
previous chapter but will be simplified to a two stage model.  Namely a two stage 
discrete stochastic model with recourse (Dantzig 1955, Cocks 1968, Boisvert and 
McCarl 1990, Ziari 1991) will be used.  The model in this chapter is based on the 
decisions of the region under a benevolent dictator instead of on decisions of individual 
members of the region.  I will also drop the third stage of the decision making process as 
recovery is not really going to be considered.   
Figure 1 illustrates the stages and related events and activities for the case study.  
In stage one there is no agricultural contamination in the region.  At this stage farmers 
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have the options to invest in surveillance and detection of animals, or do nothing.  In 
stage two there is a possibility of infectious disease outbreak in the region.  If there is an 
outbreak in the region then the farmers can respond by increasing or initiating 
vaccination, slaughtering uninfected cattle, or doing nothing.  At this stage farmers get 
compensated for slaughtering.  In case of a disease outbreak the severity of it in part will 
depend on the length of time that the outbreak is allowed to spread uninterrupted.  
Surveillance and detection systems could allow timely recognition and intervention to 
stop the spread.  Hence, more extensive surveillance systems such as periodic testing of 
animals will lessen or halt uninterrupted spread of the disease.  As response measures 
various slaughter and vaccination strategies could allow reduction of economic losses by 
removing susceptible units before infection.  Under the scenario where there is no 
outbreak in the region the farm operations continue as usual.  However, decisions made 
in the first stage will affect the profits, which consist of net revenues from animals 
vaccinated in the first stage and of revenues from not vaccinated animals.  
4.1.7 Empirical Approach 
Stochastic programming is a widely accepted tool to address uncertainties related 
to objective function coefficients, input-output coefficients and right hand sides of the 
constraints (Dantzig 1955, Cocks 1968, Boisvert and McCarl 1990, Ziari 1991).  Two 
major categories of stochastic programming are stochastic programming without 
recourse and stochastic programming with recourse.  Stochastic programming without 
recourse assumes that the decision maker plans now and discovers the results of the 
decision later.  These type of models do not provide adoptive solutions.  In other words, 
solutions received from such models are based on unconditional expected values.  On 
the other hand, stochastic programming with recourse allows some of the decisions to be 
modified at later stages of a process.  In other words, some decisions are made ex ante, 
followed by a stochastically determined state of nature, after which the decision maker is 
allowed to adjust the previous decisions (depending on context) and/or make new 
decisions depending on the realized state of nature.   Discrete stochastic programming 
with recourse considers sequential nature of resource endowments and allows for earlier 
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decisions and their consequences to affect later decisions.  In order to proceed with 
discrete stochastic programming, decision making stages need to be defined and ex ante 
information is needed about discrete probability distribution of stochastic coefficients 
and resource endowments across the stages.    
4.1.8 General Framework  
To examine the relationship between prevention, in the form of detection, and 
response measures I adopt the approach of minimizing the expected costs of possible 
agricultural sabotage and its mitigation.  Considered costs include the outbreak induced 
value of lost agricultural product and corresponding lost income, as well as costs of 
prevention and response actions.    
( )( )[ ]RCRDSGHPDCL rd ++= ,,  
Where, L is the costs of prevention and response strategies, plus losses from 
potential terrorist event.  Cd is costs of detection D, while Cr is costs of response R.  P is 
the probability of an outbreak.  S is the severity of an outbreak such as spread rate of a 
disease.  H(G) is a monetary damage function in the event of an outbreak.  G(S,D,R) is a 
physical damage function.  For example G could represent number of infected cows in 
case of an outbreak.   
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Hence, at the optimum marginal rate of substitution between prevention and 
response activities will equal to the ratio of expected marginal costs of response strategy 
and marginal costs of detection strategy.  This implies that optimal combination of 
prevention and response strategies directly depends on the event likelihood, or threat 
level.  
4.2 Scope of the Case Study 
The empirical work done in this study will be based on a possibility of a Foot and 
Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak in Texas where cattle farming comprises a significant 
portion of the agricultural industry.   Key features of FMD are that it is highly 
contagious and its outbreak could lead to significant economic losses.  Therefore, 
intentional introduction of FMD could be viewed as one of the possible venues of 
agricultural terrorism.  Moreover, investigation of FMD mitigation options is further 
justified by the possibility of unintentional FMD outbreak in today’s globally integrated 
markets,    
In 2002, Texas cattle operations amounted to roughly 14 percent of the total U.S. 
cattle operations (NASS, 2002).  Cattle are found on more than 150,000 Texas farms and 
ranches.  Sales of cattle and calves comprise the largest portion of state's agricultural 
cash receipts.  Examining the repercussions of market sabotage, as well as the options 
for prevention, detection and response in a region such as Texas is vital for assuring 
stability of regional as well as national markets for meat products.  Additionally, 
examining prevention, detection and response strategies on a local basis rather than a 
national level may prove to be more efficient in terms of understanding the regional 
economic issues and developing effective economic components of decision support 
tools.  Nevertheless, basic features of the economic approaches in this study are expected 
to be applicable in broader settings.  Therefore, generalization and utilization of this 
decision support system in other regions will not present serious complications. 
The study is conducted from the perspective of minimizing combined farmer 
losses due to possible FMD outbreak in Texas.  In 2003, Texas farms carried 13,600,000 
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head of cattle.  At an average price of $600 per head this amounts to $8,160,000.00 of 
statewide cattle value.  
4.2.1 FMD Mitigation 
Economic analysis of prevention and response strategies directed toward Foot 
and Mouth Disease (FMD) have been the topics of numerous studies (Bates et al. July 
2003; Bates et al. September 2003; Bates et al, July 2001; Garner and Lack, 1995; 
Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003; Berentsen et al., 1992; McCauley et al. 1979; Ferguson 
et al., 2001).  All of these studies mainly concentrate on vaccination and slaughter as the 
sole prevention and response FMD mitigation policies.  Most of the studies found 
slaughter policies to be superior to vaccination.  
Much less attention has been devoted to surveillance and detection systems, 
relative to that devoted to vaccination and slaughter, which would allow for timely and 
more effective response measures.  Although the importance of surveillance systems has 
been emphasized (Bates et al. September 2003; Akhtar and White 2003), no empirical 
investigation has been performed, to the best of my knowledge, on the merit of such 
policies relative to prevention, response, and recovery strategies such as vaccination and 
slaughter.   
4.2.1.1 Surveillance 
Current US programs to detect and prevent FMD rely on the recognition and 
reporting of clinical signs by a producer, animal care taker, meat inspector or 
veterinarian (Bates et al. September 2003).  Reliance on such an approach has two major 
problems.  First, detection based on visual observation of clinical signs implies that the 
disease could have been present and possibly spreading before the realization of its 
presence.  Second, clinical signs of FMD are indistinguishable from the signs of other 
diseases (Bates et al. February, 2003 a, b).  Therefore, more reliable methods for 
detection of FMD may be appropriate.  
Periodic screening systems could be viewed as a preventative or early detection 
policy and could assist in avoiding disease outbreaks or limiting the scope of outbreaks.  
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Regular screening (Fox and Hennessy, 1999) and testing of farm animals directed 
towards evaluating animal health would allow for early detection of possible disease 
outbreaks.  As a result, earlier detection would allow for earlier implementation of 
response strategies such as slaughter, disposal, cleaning and disinfection.  In case of 
FMD, the latent period of infected animal is around one week (Garner and Lack, 1995).   
It is possible that periodic testing of animals could detect FMD carriers before 
clinical signs appear.  This means that frequent animal testing could decrease the time of 
unobstructed spread of the disease, thus decreasing the magnitude and associated costs 
of needed response actions as well as the value of the lost agricultural products and 
subsequent effects on future production.  Screening and testing of animals could be 
conducted by either a regional veterinarian or employees of cattle operations provided 
adequate training in testing procedures. 
4.2.1.2 Response Activities 
Response actions to outbreak of FMD are mainly vaccination and slaughtering.  
Both vaccination and slaughter could be administered either based on various radiuses 
values around infected areas or based on animal contact.  Numerous studies have been 
reported regarding optimal response strategy (Bates et al. July 2003, Berentsen et al., 
1992; Ferguson et al., 2001; Garner and Lack, 1995; Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003;).  
Most of the studies found that slaughter policies were more beneficial than vaccinations 
strategies.  The main reason for this is that currently vaccinated animals can not be 
differentiated from FMD infected animals. Therefore, vaccinated animals are excluded 
from trade.  This means that although vaccination will contribute to slowing down the 
spread of the disease, vaccinated animals will ultimately have to be slaughtered in order 
to regain the FMD free status for trade purposes.  Hence direct slaughter instead of 
vaccination followed by slaughter could be less expensive.  On the other hand, mass 
slaughter could require significant efforts.  However, it would not be unreasonable to 
assume that there are enough resources to carry out slaughter policy.  For example 
Schoenbaum and Disney (2003) found that under such conditions slaughter of herds in 
direct contact with infected herds is the most effective strategy. 
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4.2.1.3 Model Formulation 
To investigate the relationship between surveillance and response mechanisms, I 
adopt a cost minimization approach similar to the one described above.  Total costs 
include expenses on surveillance and detection, costs of response strategies, and 
economic damages from potential outbreak.  Surveillance and detection costs encompass 
fixed costs of installing testing facilities and equipment along with the variable costs of 
administering tests that are incurred regardless of outbreak occurrence.  Response costs 
include costs associated with vaccination and slaughter including loss of cattle market 
values due to vaccination and slaughter.  Economic damages from potential outbreak 
include cattle values lost due to infection and earnings lost per infected cattle.  This can 
be expressed mathematically as follows.  Suppose an outbreak has probability P of 
occurrence, then total cost equals  
           ( ) [ ] )23()()(, RCRtDRHVPVTCNFTCYRNL ×+×××+×+×=
where L(N,R) is losses associated with prevention, response and occurrence of potential 
FMD outbreak.  N is a number of tests performed annually on cattle in the region.  R 
represents response activities in the state of nature where outbreak occurs.  Y is a binary 
variable representing investment in surveillance system.  Y=1 corresponds to the 
decision of investing in testing and screening facilities, while Y=0 corresponds to no 
investment in testing and screening systems.  Clearly, Y=0 implies that N=0.  CR costs 
of response activities, FTC is fixed testing costs while VTC is variable testing costs.  
The response effectiveness function, H(R), represents the proportion of animals lost in 
case of an outbreak under various levels of response actions (R).  D(t) is the disease 
spread function expressed in terms of days that the disease is allowed to spread before 
detection.   
The response effectiveness function, H(R), is hypothesized to be convex meaning 
that as the society employs more response actions, such as slaughtering, the damages 
from FMD outbreak will decrease.  However, too much of the response actions could 
increase the damages.  Therefore, I assumed a convex quadratic form for the damage 
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function (Figure 11).       
( ) )24()( 2321 RaRaaRH ++=   
The disease spread function D(t) represents the number of herds infected on any 
given day t after the initial infection in the region.  t is assumed to be a function of 
number of animal screenings conducted in a region per year.  This implies that D(t(N)) is 
a decreasing function of the number of screenings N (Fox and Hennessy, 1999).  In other 
words, increased number of screenings per year will decrease the time period for the 
disease to spread uninterrupted and therefore will decrease the potential number of 
infected herds.  I investigate two forms of disease spread, exponential and Reed-Frost 
(Carpenter et al. 2004).   
When, D(t) is assumed to have an exponential form as discussed in Anderson and 
May, 1991 the number of infected herds is assumed to be increasing exponentially over 
time after initial introduction of the disease (Figure 9, Figure 10). 
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By plugging (24) and (25) into (23) and manipulating first order conditions I can 
show that optimal number of screening per year is 
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where λ is a lagrange multiplier for the constraint reflecting investment in surveillance 
system when N>1.  It could be inferred from this equation that N is an increasing 
function of probability of disease outbreak, disease spread rate, and costs of response, 
and a decreasing function of VTC provided that VTC>λ.   
The second functional form of spread of animals such as FMD was based on the 
Reed-Frost equation (Carpenter et al. 2004).     
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Since TN is total number of herds in the area and is number of infected 
animals in day t, therefore  is number of susceptible herds at time 
period t*.  q is the probability of avoiding the adequate contact, necessary to transmit the 
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where  is number of adequate contacts a herd makes in time period t.   was assumed 
to have slow, 0.15, and fast 0.4 rates according to Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003.  CI is 
cumulative number of infectious herds in any time period during the outbreak.  Number 
of infectious herds is calculated using  to reflect the fact that FMD spreads 
for at least 7 days before showing clinical signs of infection at which point the diseased 
herds are assumed to be diagnosed and destroyed.  is number of infected herds in 
each of the time periods during the outbreak.   Therefore, the total number of infected 
herds at the time of screening (t*) will be given by .  This representation 
allows me to reflect the fact that in the early stages of FMD outbreak the disease will be 
spreading at the increasing rate.  However, as the number of infected herds increases, 
number of susceptible herds will decrease.  Therefore, at some point of FMD outbreak, 
number of infected herds will increase at a decreasing rate.  Figure 13 shows the spread 
of the disease under fast spread scenario.           
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4.2.1.4 Simple Inventory Problem 
This problem could also be viewed as a simple inventory problem (Buffa, 1973).  
In other words the decision on the number of annual tests to be made prior to realization 
of state of nature could be viewed as similar to the problem of optimal order size for a 
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business.  Cost minimizing order size depends on per order costs and costs of 
maintaining the inventory.  Corresponding situation in this context is depicted in figure 
8, where a is total costs of surveillance and detection program, b is expected damages of 
an outbreak, and c is the sum of a and b.  In our case cost minimizing number of annual 
tests is affected by testing costs and associated expected damage costs in case of an 
outbreak.  This graph illustrates cost minimizing number of annual tests for a given 
probability of an agricultural sabotage, or an outbreak of FMD.    
4.3 Empirical Specification for FMD Case 
In equations (23) and (24) R represents the level of response actions.  For 
empirical analysis this variable was normalized to1.  Schoenbaum and Disney (2003) 
estimate that the most effective response action against FMD outbreak in the US is 
slaughter of herds with clinical signs and herds in direct contact with the diagnosed 
herds.  This strategy according to their study leads to 17% reduction in number of 
slaughtered animals as compared to the strategy of slaughtering only the diagnosed 
herds.  In this analysis, I assume that the damage function is minimized at R=1, 
corresponding to the most effective response scenario according to Schoenbaum and 
Disney.  At R=1 the number of slaughtered animals is reduced by 17%. Therefore, if at 
R=0 the proportion of lost animals is 1, corresponding to losses under no response 
actions, than at R=1 the proportion of losses is 0.83 (Figure 11).   Based on this 
information, the response effectiveness function used in this analysis was H(R)=1-
0.34R+0.17R2.   
The product of disease spread D(t) and response effectiveness function H(R) is 
multiplied by the average loss value per infected herd (V).  This value was calculated as 
follows: 
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where, C is the costs of slaughter, disposal, cleaning and disinfection and was assumed 
to be $69 per head (Bates et al, February 2003 a).  NH is average number of cattle heads 
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per herd in Texas, which was found to be around 50 (Ernie Davis, Personal 
Communication, August 2004).  CV is an average market value per cattle head reported 
to be $610.00.  GI is gross income for Texas cattle and calves operations reported to be 
$6,829,800,000 in 2001 (Texas Department of Agriculture, 2001).  TN is number of 
cattle heads in Texas reported to be approximately 13,700,000 in 2001.  Thus, the value 
used for V was $58,876.  
The costs of testing include costs of surveillance per herd and costs of 
surveillance per visit corresponding to fixed and variable costs of screening and testing 
system.  Fixed testing costs (FTC) are estimated to be $42,915,000, which was 
calculated by multiplying per herd testing costs ($150) for operations of less than 100 
animal heads (Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003) and the number of cattle operations in TX 
(286,100).  The investment made in form of fixed costs is made in the first stage prior to 
the realization of the state of nature and is independent of the number of screenings 
employed.  Hence Y=1 corresponds to the decision of investing in testing and screening 
facilities, while Y=0 corresponds to no investment in testing and screening systems.  
Variable testing costs (VTC) are assumed to be $50 per visit per herd (Schoenbaum and 
Disney, 2003), under the scenario where an outside expertise is required to conduct the 
screenings at each farm.    Since N represents number of screenings in a region such as 
Texas, VTC represent variable costs that correspond to single testing of all the farms in 
the whole region.  Hence, for the whole Texas the costs per visit would be 
50*286100=$14,305,000.      
Cost of response (CR) corresponds to costs, which include expenses for appraisal 
($300 per herd), euthanasia ($5.5 per head), and carcass disposal ($12 per head) 
(Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003).  Thus costs of response were calculated to be $1175 
per herd.  Optimal number of herds slaughtered under response strategy in Schoenbaum 
and Disney (2003) was 37 herds.  Therefore costs or response strategy corresponding to 
R=1 are assumed to be 37*1175=$43475.  CR could also include costs of vaccination, 
the estimates of which range from $6 to $8.61 per head (McCuley et al. 1979; Bates et 
al. February 2003 a, Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003).  However, I rely on Schoenbaum 
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and Disney’s results, which show that the most effective response strategy did not 
involve vaccination.  I exclude it from response measures and assume that loss 
minimizing response activity corresponds to slaughter of infected herds and herds with 
direct contacts with the diagnosed infected animals.  This analysis essentially 
corresponds to the scenario under which vaccinated animals are ultimately slaughtered to 
avoid trade restrictions.  However, this may not be necessary after development of a 
vaccine which could be differentiated from FMD infection.  The model presented here 
could be adapted to such scenario.  
4.3.1 Parameterization of Disease Spread 
For the exponential spread specification under no prevention or response actions 
other than slaughter of only infected herds with clinical signs, I used fast (0.4) and slow 
(0.15) levels of disease spread based on direct and indirect daily contact rates per herd 
(Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003; Bates et al., 2001) to calculate appropriate disease 
spread coefficient (β).  Considering that the herd will spread the disease for 
approximately seven days before showing the clinical signs of disease at which point the 
herd is slaughtered and disposed of, I simulated daily numbers of infected herds (D) for 
the two levels of disease spread.  In other words, I start out with one infected herd and 
using slow and fast contact rates I simulated daily total number of infected herds (D).  
Using calculated data I regressed ln(D) on number of disease spread days to arrive at the 
estimates of β, which were statistically significant and equal 0.026 and 0.208 for slow 
and fast spread respectively.  Time of disease spread is represented in terms of length of 
periods between regional screenings of animals.  The less the number of screenings the 
longer the time intervals between the screenings, which would allow for more disease 
spread.  On the other hand, the more the number of screenings, the less the time intervals 
between the screenings.  Hence, there will be less opportunity for the disease to spread 
uninterrupted.  Functionally, time intervals between the animals tests are represented by 
365/(N+1), where N is the number of tests per year conducted in a given region, such as 
Texas.  N+1 represents the fact that even if there is no animal screening adopted in a 
region the disease will be detected from clinical signs.  However, if there is no animal 
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testing system set up in the region, then the disease will not be detected at any site before 
clinical sings appear and will spread significantly. 
Because of difficulties getting numerical solutions using the Reed-Frost 
formulation directly it was decided to approximate the disease spread using a logistic 
functional form (28).  The Reed-Frost formulation was used to simulate daily spread of 
FMD under slow and fast rates of spread.  Using equation (26) I simulated daily number 
of total infected herds since initial infection.  TN was 286100, k was 0.15 and 0.4 for 
slow and fast spreads respectively.     
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For fast disease spread, the logistic function gave an almost perfect fit to the 
Reed-Frost formulation with an R2 equal to 0.99, β1=512040, β2=-0.319 (Figure 13).  For 
slow disease spread I got β1=14554.2, β2=-0.012, R2=0.97 (Figure 12).  Letting 
t=(365/N+1), as in the case of exponential spread, and plugging (28) into (23) the 
optimal values for N were derived under various scenarios for Reed-Frost disease spread 
approximated by logistic function.  
4.4 Model Experimentation 
The model described above was constructed with a capability to conduct 
sensitivity analysis.  I varied a number of the parameters to evaluate the effects of 
changes in situation characteristics on the optimal number of annual screenings.  
Specifically, to evaluate the effects of threat characteristics I varied the likelihood of 
disease outbreak and the spread rate of the disease.  Probability of outbreak was varied 
from 0.001 to 0.9.  In addition, I evaluated the sensitivity of optimal number of animal 
testings as it is influenced by the costs of the testing activity.  This was accomplished by 
decreasing the variable testing costs by tenfold and hundredfold consecutively.  I also 
evaluated the implication of alterations in the effectiveness of the response strategy.  
Two levels of response effectiveness were examined.  One implied a 17 percent decrease 
in animal losses due to response actions compared to no response actions (Schoenbaum 
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and Disney, 2003).  The other implied a 30 percent decrease in animal losses due to 
more effective response actions.  I also considered the possibility that prevention 
activities could provide ancillary benefits by identifying for example other animal health 
problems.  Specifically, I decreased per herd fixed costs associated with instituting the 
surveillance systems.  The motivation behind this is that investments made in detection 
systems could bring other benefits that are not related to FMD detection.  Therefore 
those benefits could be used to offset some of the fixed investment costs.  Hence, I ran 
cases where I reduced fixed costs by $50 per herd.  Finally I investigated dependency of 
animal testing on post event recovery actions.  This was accomplished running a case 
where I decreased the losses of income per FMD infected animal by 30%.       
4.5 Results 
The goal of this work was to evaluate the effects of various conditions on the 
optimality of adopting ex ante versus ex post schemes to fight the possible spread of 
FMD.  The tradeoff was examined by varying the probability of events, disease spread 
rates, costs of surveillance and detection activities, effectiveness of response activities, 
and ancillary benefits of surveillance and detection activities.  The following sections 
summarize the results of my experiments.  
4.5.1 Higher Threats 
The first experiment done involved raising the probability of an event to see how 
the optimal mix of activities varied.  The hypothesis is the higher the event probability 
the more likely that ex ante prevention investments are to be made.  The probability was 
varied from 0.001 to 0.9.   
Both, exponential spread and Reed Frost spread formulations indicated that in 
case of a slow spread of FMD, detection actions were not economically desirable until 
the probability of outbreak was at least at high as 0.6 (Figure 14, Figure 16).  However, 
in case of fast spread then the optimal number of tests varied from 5 to 22 under 
exponential spread model, and from 0 to 29 under RF spread model (Figure 15, Figure 
17).  Overall, under both FMD spread formulations, increasing the probability of an 
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outbreak increased the use of surveillance systems. 
However, in the scenarios where surveillance systems are most expensive and 
response actions are more effective than in other scenarios, even extremely high 
probabilities of an outbreak did not trigger investment in detection systems.  This was 
the case for slow spread scenarios with full variable costs of detection and increased 
response effectiveness from 0.17 to 0.3.  Thus, I can conclude that investment in 
surveillance and detection systems is contingent on the context of the disease case.  
Factors such as threat level, relative costs and effectiveness of alternative mitigation 
options play a determining role. 
4.5.2 More Effective Response 
The second experiment involved enhancement of response effectiveness.  The 
hypothesis is that more effective response activities will increases reliance on response 
actions and decreases reliance on testing and screening.  To test this hypothesis and 
evaluate the magnitude of this effect I increased the effectiveness of response actions 
from 0.17 to 0.3.  The results indicate that increasing response effectiveness to 0.3 has a 
slight effect on the use of animal health testing.  In all cases, increasing response 
effectiveness either increases the event probability at which detection systems ought to 
be in place or decreases the number of annual animal health tests.  For example, in slow 
spread scenarios (Figure 14, Figure 16), for exponential as well as RF models, with 
tenfold decreased variable costs of testing, the event probability at which investment in 
detection systems is made increases from 0.6 to 0.8 due to increasing the effectives of 
response.  In fast spread scenarios, for both, exponential and RF spread models, 
increasing the effectiveness of response decreases the number of animal tests by one or 
two annually (Figure 15, Figure 17). 
4.5.3 Cheaper Surveillance 
As expected, decreasing the variable costs of testing and screening increases the 
worth of investing in such systems.  Specifically, if variable testing costs were decreased 
hundredfold, then the number of annual tests in case of slow disease spread goes from 0 
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to 6 under RF formulation (Figure 16).  Similar results arose for the exponential spread 
model (Figure 14).  In the case of fast disease spread, the results are more illustrative.  
Both exponential spread and RF spread formulations show noticeable differences in the 
number of annual tests (Figure 15, Figure 17).  When variable costs are decreased 100 
fold, corresponding to the scenario where testing is cheaply performed by farm 
employees, the number of annual tests increases from 13 to 23 at 0.2 probability of 
outbreak occurrence under RF formulation.  Similarly, under exponential spread 
formulation testing increases from 8 to 15 tests per year at 0.2 probability of outbreak 
occurrence.   
4.5.4 Event Severity or Speed of Disease Spread 
Next the effect of speed of disease spread was examined.  The hypothesis was 
that the higher the disease spread rate the more the optimal strategy would rely on 
detection systems.  Such results occur under both the exponential (Figure 14 and 15) and 
RF (Figure 16 and 17) formulations of disease spread.  Testing and screening becomes 
considerably more advantageous for fast spread than for slow spread.  In case of slow 
spreading disease, investment in detection systems is triggered only at high levels of 
outbreak likelihood.  However, in case of fast spreading disease investment in detection 
systems is made even under low levels of outbreak likelihood.       
4.5.5 Ancillary Benefits 
It was considered that there was a possibility of ancillary benefits emerging from 
investing in surveillance systems for detection of FMD in terms of other animal health 
and management activities. To examine this I ran the scenarios with the fixed costs of 
testing decreased by $50 per herd.  It was found that for fast spread scenarios, under both 
exponential and RF specification, such ancillary benefits associated with ex ante 
investment did not affect the number of annual animal tests.  This was a trivial result 
because number of tests is not affected by fixed costs.  Fixed costs are independent of 
number of tests.   
What is affected by fixed costs is whether or not there will be surveillance 
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program in place at all.  Under slow spread scenarios lowering fixed costs affected the 
outbreak probability at which it was optimal to start investing in surveillance systems.  
For example, under both, exponential and RF, spreads with minimal variable costs and 
response activity with 17 percent effectiveness, the probability at which it became 
advantageous to invest in surveillance programs decreased from 0.6 to 0.4.  Similar 
results were obtained in scenarios with increased response effectiveness and increased 
variable costs of testing.   
4.5.6 Herd Size 
Optimal number of annual animal tests was hypothesized to be affected by the 
average herd size.  Therefore, I changed the current average herd size of 50 to 400.  The 
result indicated that with larger average herd size surveillance and detection systems 
become more advantageous than with smaller herd sizes.  For example, with fast spread 
and minimal variable testing costs the optimal number of animal tests reached 39 per 
year.  This result was expected due to the effect of fixed costs of detection systems per 
herd.  The larger the herd size the less the average fixed costs per test.  Therefore, large 
herd size will decrease average costs per test.  This effect is known as economies of 
scale.       
4.5.7 Recovery Actions  
Animal surveillance intensity depends on the level of response as well as 
recovery activities.  Recovery activities, identified as the ones that are directed towards 
restoring consumer confidence, decrease the losses per infected animal by restoring back 
some of the lost demand.  To evaluate this effect, I decreased lost gross income per 
infected animal by 30%.  Since the results for slow disease spread gave a low number of 
animal tests, the results are presented for fast spreads in graphs 10 and 11.  In both of the 
exponential and RF spread formulation cases the number of tests decreased only slightly 
under such a recovery benefit.  Along the probability spectrum the number of tests 
decreased only by 1, if any, under both formulations.  This implies that cattle value 
losses avoided by detection are large enough to justify use of detection and surveillance 
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even under substantial recovery program.   
4.5.8 Economic Consequences 
Economic consequences of potential agricultural sabotage, in the form of FMD 
outbreak, and various mitigation strategies were calculated in terms of expected financial 
losses in the cattle industry.  Specifically, losses consisted of two parts, cattle values per 
head and average revenue per head.  The results are depicted in Figure 20 through Figure 
29. 
The two formulations of disease spread gave similar results.  Losses varied from 
around $60,000 to around $280,000,000 depending on probability of attack, spread rate, 
and mitigation strategy.  Under slow spreads (Figure 20 and 22) economic losses mainly 
depended on response effectiveness until certain level of outbreak probability was 
reached (around 0.6) because surveillance and detection was not found to be 
advantageous for lower probabilities.  Hence, the six curves of monetary losses collided 
into two depending on the effectiveness levels chosen in this work.  After probability of 
outbreak reached 0.6 surveillance and detection activities started to became 
advantageous under reduced costs of testing.  Hence the curves branched out depending 
the costs of surveillance and detection.   
The exponential and RF spread formulations gave similar results for the fast 
spread cases (Graphs 20 and 22).  Under fast spread scenarios, the economic losses are 
significantly higher than under slow spread.  Moreover, surveillance and testing was 
adopted even for lower levels of probabilities of sabotage.  The losses mainly varied 
according to costs of surveillance and detection programs.  Three levels of variable costs 
were considered in this work.  Hence, three main patterns of monetary losses stand out.  
Increasing effectiveness of response activities has a minor effect on decreasing the 
losses. 
Figures 24 through 27 show expected losses as a percentage of total monetary 
worth of regional Texas cattle industry.  The worth of cattle industry was supposed to 
consist of monetary values of live animals and annual revenues generated by those 
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animals.  Financial losses from a potential FMD outbreak reached almost 2% of total 
cattle industry’s economic worth under extremely high probabilities of outbreak when 
surveillance and detection systems were adopted.   Figures 28 through 31 show 
proportions of cattle industry’s financial worth lost when no surveillance and detection 
strategies were considered.  Response actions, consisting of slaughtering only contact 
herds, were the only mitigation policy behind these graphs.  Losses under these scenarios 
were significantly higher under fast spread in both exponential and RF spread 
formulations.  Comparing figure 24 through 27 to graphs 28 through 31 reveals that 
surveillance and detection programs will reduce the expected costs of potential 
agricultural sabotage in the form of FMD outbreak.   
4.6 Conclusions 
I investigated the relationship between disease/treatment characteristics and the 
optimal allocation of effort between prevention and response in the face of possible 
agricultural sabotage.  A conceptual model was developed that trades off ex ante fixed 
costs of surveillance system and ex-post response costs considering stochastic event 
frequency where outbreaks only occur with a given probability.  Damages considered 
here include loss of cattle values and loss of gross income.  
As a prevention strategy I considered periodic testing and screening of cattle as 
means to detect potential infection before the appearance of clinical signs.  This strategy 
is adopted prior to realization of any outbreak and thus introduces cost that are incurred 
regardless of whether or not an outbreak occurs. 
The empirical part of the analysis was done using data on the case of Foot and 
Mouth disease. The investigation considered optimal allocation and design of the total 
disease management system in the face of varying threat levels and threat management 
cost scenarios.    Testing and screening involves both, fixed and variable costs.  As a 
responsive measure I adopted slaughter of herds in direct contacts as defined in 
Schoenbaum and Disney (2003). 
The model used in this paper is based on minimizing probabilistic weighted costs 
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of potential FMD outbreak and its ex ante prevention.  The results suggest that the 
optimal combination of preventative and responsive strategies depends on such factors 
as disease spread rate, strategy effectiveness, level of FMD threat, and costs of 
strategies.  I find that effort in ex ante surveillance increases with threat probability, cost 
reductions in surveillance, with disease spread rate, lower degree of effectiveness in 
response, and average herd size. 
Overall, the higher the threat the more advantageous it is to invest in preventative 
policies.  Although preventative and responsive measures do not necessarily preclude 
one-another, they are substitutes to a certain degree.  In terms of strategies adopted here, 
this substitution could be explained by the fact that as more animal testing is performed 
the latent period of infected animals is reduced.  Therefore, fewer herds are infected by 
sick herds, which means less herds will have to be slaughtered due to direct contacts 
with infected herds.  On the other hand, at lower probabilities of event occurrence, 
surveillance investment costs are higher than expected costs of FMD outbreak with 
optimal response strategy.  Therefore, as testing frequency decreases at lower 
probabilities of an attack, the level of responsive measures increases in case of an attack.  
This is depicted in Figure 32, which shows the relationship between response and 
surveillance at various degrees of event probability under fast RF spread and minimal 
variable costs of testing.  
These results need to be interpreted with care as outcomes depend on the 
functional formulation of the disease spread and on the parameters assumed in the 
model.  I analyzed two possible functional forms for the disease spread and although the 
general results compatible, the exact numerical results differ.  Moreover, since the exact 
rate of disease spread is not known, I analyzed the model under slow and fast rates based 
on data from Disney (2003) and Bates et al., (2001).  It is possible that the actual rate of 
the disease spread is substantially different from those assumed in this study.  In such 
case the numerical results will differ but general conclusion regarding the relationship 
between prevention and response activities will stay the same.  
The damages considered in this investigation include the lost value of 
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slaughtered cattle and associated gross income.  Losses from trade bans, decreased 
tourism, consumer scare and other consequences of FMD outbreak are not considered in 
this study.  Hence, losses considered here are likely to be lower than actual losses.  
Therefore, preventive strategies may be even more advantageous than reported in this 
study.  Moreover, periodic testing and screening of farm animals has other benefits in 
addition to detection of FMD virus.  Regular animal testing could also help to detect 
other infectious or noninfectious diseases and monitor general animal health.  Testing 
could also facilitate keeping inventory of farm animals in the region, which could be of 
benefit to researchers and policy makers.  These benefits are hard to quantify monetarily, 
therefore they were excluded from this study.   
This paper provided a preliminary analysis of the relationship between ex ante 
cattle screening and ex post responsive slaughter of cattle in case of FMD outbreak in a 
region such as Texas.  Even though the results of this chapter are contingent on the 
assumptions made regarding the spread of FMD and the simplifications made regarding 
the damages of outbreak and benefits of mitigation strategies, the results shed some light 
on broad disease management approaches.   
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5 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE MODEL 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I develop and demonstrate an enhanced theoretical approach to be 
used for evaluation of strategies.  The framework proposed here goes beyond those in 
the earlier chapters in that it relies on an epidemiologic model to be available in the 
future in the context of Texas A&M National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic 
Disease Defense.  
The demonstration work done in this chapter will expand on earlier chapters to 
simultaneously incorporate prevention, detection and response options to FMD 
outbreaks.  Specifically, the model will include spread of the disease under various 
mitigation strategies.  Epidemiologic effects of numerous mitigation strategies will 
explicitly be incorporated to have more detailed input into economic model than that 
used in the previous chapter.  A major difference from previous chapter is that here I will 
consider decision making on a more localized basis as opposed to considering the whole 
region as a following a single strategy.  This will allow adoption of different mitigation 
strategies in different sub-regions.  In addition, disaggregating the region also allows 
incorporation of differences in disease spread due to transportation.  Therefore, it will be 
possible to incorporate animal movement bans as a possible component of responsive 
agricultural terrorism mitigation strategy.  
The optimal mix of prevention and control/repair strategies is heavily affected by the 
stochastic characteristics of the issue and this choice can be influenced by attitudes 
towards risk.  The approach developed here will also incorporate risk attitudes into 
decision making process.  Risk aversion has been shown to be a significant factor in 
determining a portfolio of strategies which affect variance of returns (Brink and McCarl, 
1978).  Incorporation of risk aversion may alter decisions where for example, highly risk 
averse decision makers may be found to be more likely to invest in prevention strategies 
at lower probabilities of an event than would less risk averse decision makers.  
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5.2 Epidemiologic Model 
An epidemiologic model is needed to parameterize the effects of a set of possible 
mitigation strategies that will involve prevention, detection, response and recovery 
measures for input into the economic model.  Previously I used equations from 
epidemiologists to form a very simple epidemiologic model.  However, more complex 
models exist (Bates et al., 2001; Bates et al., February 2003 a; Schoenbaum and Disney, 
2003) and will soon become available.  Such an epidemiologic model can be used to get 
estimates of physical damages under event characteristics under specified mitigation 
strategies.  That information in turn will be integrated with data on costs, market effects 
and probabilities and integrated into an economc systems model of the character of the 
models discussed above.   
As mentioned above, several prevention and response strategies would be 
desirable to be included in this model.  These include but are not limited to increasing 
expenditures on and efficiency of international trade inspection; tightening the control of 
animal feed and medical supplements; upgrading guidelines for production processes 
and quality control measures at central manufacturing as well as storage and 
transportation facilities, removing all affected branches of food supply chain identified 
by enhanced tracing systems.  These options, and their combinations, need to be 
simultaneously considered in order to come up with a set of best strategies against 
agricultural contamination.  As shown in previous chapters, the optimal mix of strategies 
depends on such factors as threat level, event severity, relative costs and effectiveness of 
strategies.   
Use of an epidemiologic model in an integrated epidemiologic and economic 
analysis will allow consideration of the optimal combination of mitigation strategies on a 
localized level.         
5.3 Risk Considerations 
It has previous been shown that the decision makers are concerned not only with 
the maximization of returns but also with variability of returns.  Risk averse decision 
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makers wish to minimize variance of returns and prefer stability.  On the other hand, risk 
loving decision makers would prefer greater return variance with wider spread between 
possible high and low returns.  It is desirable to formulate the model that will incorporate 
not only random variables but also the decision maker’s attitude towards risk.  In other 
words, the model portraying the choice of instituting prevention, detection and response 
strategies against agricultural terrorism must include the probability distribution of 
unknown variables and the farmer’s risk attitude.  However, before discussing the 
stochastic models it is necessary to provide a brief discussion of theoretical concepts of 
decision making under uncertainty.   
5.3.1 Expected Utility 
The most widely used conceptual approach explaining economic behavior under 
risk involves expected utility maximization.  However, it has been argued that the 
expected utility models do not always correctly represent behavior under risk (Machina, 
1994).  Specifically, linearity of the expected utility function with respect to probabilities 
has been questioned.  Nevertheless, this approach provides a practical means for 
evaluating strategies associated with risky outcomes.  Specifically, this approach 
assumes that the decision makers choose among risky strategies according to the income 
and risk preferences reflected in his/her utility function.  Therefore, while recognizing 
the limitations of expected utility models, I rely on this approach to evaluate various 
strategies to battle possible agricultural terrorism acts.  
Expected utility models could be explained as follows.  Suppose the utility 
function under uncertainty is U(w) where w represents wealth.  Under multiple states of 
nature the expected utility function could be represented as a linear sum of utility of 
outcomes and their associated probabilities 
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This utility function, known as the von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) utility 
function, satisfies the axioms posed by economic theory for choice under uncertainty.  
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Namely, it satisfies completeness, transitivity, continuity, monotonicity, substitution, and 
reduction to simple gambles (Jehle and Reny, 2001).  Employing expected utility theory 
will allow taking into account preferences towards risk.   
5.3.2  Risk Aversion 
An expected utility function can depict risk averse, risk loving or risk neutral 
preferences.  Assuming the utility function is continuous and twice differentiable with 
respect to wealth, Pratt (1964) showed that the properties of the utility function will 
indicate risk attitudes.  A positive first derivative U1(w)>0 implies that utility is strictly 
increasing in wealth, exhibiting non satiation, where U1 is the marginal utility of w.  A 
negative second derivative, U2(w)<0, implies that the individual is risk averse.  A 
positive second derivative, U2(w)>0, implies that a decision maker is a risk taker.  If 
U2(w)=0, the individual is indifferent toward risk.   
In terms of this study, risk preferences are relevant because the decision on what 
type of prevention and response measures to adopt depends on attitudes towards 
variability of payoffs.  The farming community has been known to have risk averse 
preferences (Brink and McCarl, 1978).  Therefore, the utility function is presumed to be 
concave, with a second derivative describing the extent of risk aversion, which will 
determine which strategy will be adopted against agricultural sabotage.  It is likely that 
the more risk averse the community the more preventative strategies will be adopted.  
From a producer’s point the goal is to maximize the utility of profits given the 
possibility of agricultural terrorism.  Farmers have certain prevention and response 
options the can employ that would reduce the losses from possible FMD outbreaks.  It is 
critical to recognize at this stage that the farmers are primarily risk averse implying that 
they prefer stable lower income to a higher more variable income with possible high and 
low payoffs.  The premium paid to reduce the risks is the costs of prevention and 
response activities implemented to decrease farmers’ vulnerability towards FMD 
outbreaks.  The magnitude of the premium that they are willing to pay in order to reduce 
the risk depends on probability levels of an outbreak and on risk aversion levels of the 
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farmers.  One of the objectives here is to demonstrate the effects of risk aversion levels 
on the optimal counter terrorism strategy.   
5.3.3 Certainty Equivalence and Risk Premium 
For a given gambling decision over wealth, such as adopting or not adopting 
preventative or response actions, certainty equivalent (CE) is the amount of wealth that 
makes the decision maker indifferent between taking a gamble and accepting CE (Jehle 
and Reny, 2001).  Mathematically, , where g is a given gamble.  Hence, 
the lower the certainty equivalent the more risk averse is the decision maker.   
( ) ( )CEUgU ≡
The monetary value of the difference between CE and the utility of the gamble is 
called the risk premium.  Essentially the risk premium is an amount of wealth necessary 
to make the decision maker indifferent between taking a gamble and accepting 
deterministic level of wealth.  The risk premium could also be thought of as a difference 
between the decision maker’s certainty equivalent and the expected value of the gamble.  
Mathematically (Jehle and Reny, 2001), risk premium is an amount of wealth, P, such 
that . ( ) ( )( )PgEUgU −≡
In terms of analyzing agricultural terrorism, the risk premium corresponds to the 
expenses related to prevention and response strategies.  The more prevention strategies 
are adopted the less vulnerable is the industry to fluctuations in profits and welfare due 
to agricultural terrorism acts.  Based on the above discussion, optimal prevention related 
expenses will equal to the difference between certainty equivalence and expected 
returns, plus possible governmental assistance payments  
5.3.4 Arrow-Pratt Coefficient 
As mentioned above, the shape of the utility function determines the nature of 
decision maker’s risk preferences.  The more concave the utility function, the more risk 
averse the decision maker, and the more convex the utility function the more risk loving 
the decision maker.  Hence, the second derivative, which indicates the rate of change in 
utility as a response to change in wealth, of the utility function gives me an idea about 
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the risk preferences.  However, the second derivative alone can not uniquely measure 
risk preferences because utility function is unique up to a positive linear transformation.  
That is, if, for example, I multiply the utility function by 2 the behavior of the decision 
maker does not change.  But risk aversion measured by second derivative would change.  
In order to have a unique measure of decision maker’s attitude towards risk I could 
divide the second derivative by the first.  This measure is called Arrow-Pratt measure of 
risk aversion. 
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Since the utility function is increasing in wealth the first derivative will be 
positive.  The second derivative can be positive or negative depending on risk attitude.  
If second derivative is positive than Arrow-Pratt coefficient is negative corresponding to 
risk loving decision making.  If second derivative is negative then the Arrow-Pratt 
coefficient is positive corresponding to risk averse decision making.  Zero second 
derivative would indicate linear utility function which implies risk neutral decision 
making.  
In the context of this study risk aversion coefficient (RAC) plays a significant 
role because the decision on which prevention and response activities to adopt will 
depend on the risk averseness of decision maker.  Assuming the decision maker is risk 
averse I know that Arrow-Pratt coefficient will be positive.  However, the question is 
how risk averse is the decision maker, hence what is the magnitude of Arrow-Pratt 
coefficient.  There are a few ways to select a risk aversion coefficient for modeling 
purposes (McCarl and Bessler, 1989).  However, in this study I rely on examining 
implications of varying the magnitude of risk aversion coefficient on optimal strategy 
selection.  As a result of such analysis I will get a relationship between mean returns and 
variance of returns along the spectrum of risk aversion coefficients and corresponding 
optimal prevention and response strategy combinations.    
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5.3.5 E-V Formulation 
Under constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and normality of random variable 
expected utility maximization is equivalent to the Expected value variance (E-V) 
formulation (Degroot, 1970).   The E-V framework will be used herein to address the 
risk aversion issue related to agricultural terrorism.  This method allows derivation of 
optimal decision strategy under multiple states of nature.  In addition, it could easily 
incorporate decision making with recourse.  A three stage model will be developed from 
a standard form of maximizing mean returns while minimizing variability of returns 
shown below 
0
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≥
≤
′×−
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where C is expected return per decision x over all states of nature.  X is a vector of 
decision variables.  S is a variance-covariance matrix of returns per decision over all 
states of nature.  RAP is the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion parameter. 
Under such a formulation, the optimal decision will depend on not only net 
returns under each decision, but also on variability of net returns and degree of decision 
makers risk aversion.   The greater the RAP coefficient the greater the emphasis placed 
on decreasing the variability of returns.  On the other hand, the smaller the RAP 
coefficient the greater the emphasis placed on maximizing expected returns and less 
emphasis on decreasing variability of return over states of nature.   
5.4 Mitigation Options Relevant in This Model 
There are numerous measures that could be implemented against outbreaks of 
FMD.  These include but are not limited to: various levels of vaccination, slaughter, 
detection/surveillance, tracing, movement bans, and import monitoring.  Various 
combinations of these actions could comprise a mitigation strategy.  Here I provide an 
overview of those strategies although empirical demonstration will be based on 
vaccination, slaughter, and detection.  
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Both, preventative and responsive vaccination could be incorporated into my 
analysis.  However, at this point exact effectiveness of either preventative or responsive 
vaccination is unknown.  These issues need to be investigated with the extensive 
epidemiologic level data and are not pursued in this work.  Here I assume that the 
necessary estimates will become available in the future and develop a framework that 
will utilize this information. 
As in the case of vaccination, effectiveness of various slaughter options need to 
be investigated on epidemiologic level to provide the economic model with the estimates 
necessary to evaluate relative economic worth of various slaughter options.  Again, in 
this investigation I will assume that such information will become available in the future 
and develop a framework that relies on this information. 
In order to investigate effects of a transportation ban as a response measure in 
case of an outbreak, cattle transportation routes need to be known.  At this time such 
information is not available.  However, I hope that in the near future this information 
will become available and I will be able to incorporate this aspect into my framework.   
Effectiveness of surveillance and detection systems is currently uncertain.  For 
the purposes of this work I assume that surveillance systems would lead to a 100% 
prevention of FMD outbreak.  I recognize that this assumption is rather restrictive.  
However, I proceed with this assumption with an understanding that this assumption is 
likely to be adjusted in the future as more information becomes available on the 
effectiveness of surveillance systems. 
Although monitoring imports is not accounted for in the model proposed here in 
its current form, it could be incorporated in the future as one of the components of some 
of FMD mitigation strategies.       
Monitoring travel is not currently a part of the model proposed in this study but 
could be incorporated in the future.  One way to do this is to let import and travel 
monitoring affect probability of FMD introduction from outside of U.S.   In other words 
such programs could be modeled to have a decreasing effect on the probability of FMD 
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outbreak in the U.S. 
Tracing systems are technically not a part of my model in its current form.   
However, if information on effectiveness and costs of tracing systems was available the 
model could be adjusted to reflect consideration of tracing systems in mitigating possible 
FMD outbreaks 
5.4.1 Consumer Effects 
Agricultural terrorism act will have a substantial effect on consumer demand.  In 
several observable cases the demand for goods and services related to the commodities 
affected by disease outbreaks has decreased significantly.  For example, under a highly 
infectious animal disease outbreak, such as an outbreak of FMD, the demand for meat 
products and related commodities has been observed to decrease in spite of the fact that 
FMD does not affect humans.  In terms of this research, decreased demand implies that 
the price for agricultural commodities related to contaminated commodities will 
decrease.  Falling prices and demand will impact agricultural producers.  Therefore, 
consumer effects need to be accounted for when considering various prevention and/or 
response strategies.  The conditions, including consumer effects, which may favor 
prevention of outbreaks over response to outbreaks, need to be investigated.  The major 
task in this sense is to arrive at specific quantitative implication of agricultural terrorism 
on consumer behavior.   
From producer’s point of view this means estimating the effects of the event on 
equilibrium price of the commodity.  If the price for commodity is likely to decrease 
drastically it may be more advantageous to invest in preventive strategies in order to 
avoid mass food scares.  However, if the effect on price is not likely to be significant 
than cheaper response strategy may prove to be economically more attractive.     
5.5 Ex Ante Investment    
Both, prevention and response activities may require some fixed costs.  For 
example, in order to be able to vaccinate, either preventatively or responsively, the 
investments may need to be made to ensure availability of vaccines, medical supplies, 
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and practitioners.  A better example of this would be a veterinary laboratory, which 
could be used for either preventative measures or for response actions.  As a prevention 
measure a veterinary laboratory could be used to conduct and record testing for the FMD 
before it occurs.  As a response measure to a reported FMD case(s) in the vicinity, the 
lab could be used to identify animals which are infected but do not yet show the signs of 
infection.  As a result, effectiveness of response measures could be improved from more 
timely actions.  But such benefits are not realized unless the laboratory is built. 
Similarly, it may be necessary to invest in some storage facility for vaccines to be used 
either preventatively or responsively.   
Surveillance and detection is another example for an ex ante investment.  The 
investment made in surveillance and detection could be utilized either for a prevention 
measure or a response action.  As a prevention measure, surveillance and detection 
systems could be used to monitor the farms prior to a possible outbreak.  As a response 
measure it could be used to intensify monitoring of individual farms or other units if 
there is an outbreak in the region. Weather surveillance and detection is used 
preventatively or responsively, the system and equipment for surveillance and detection 
needs to be set up prior to realization of outbreak or no outbreak.  This implies fixed 
investments plus variable operating costs.  The fixed investment could be employed at 
different levels of intensity depending on the probability of outbreak and variable costs 
of operating the system.           
In the model proposed in this work I will use surveillance and detection as an 
example of counter agricultural terrorism measure that requires ex ante investment.  
Other measures, such as vaccination, that may show to require ex ante investment will 
be reflected in the actual model. 
5.6 Model Description 
The model proposed in this chapter is based on a two stage framework depicted 
in Figure 1.  Except in this case I have more than two states of nature.  For illustrative 
purposes I chose to have ten states of nature depending on severity of FMD outbreak.  
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Each state of nature has an associated probability of occurrence.  In the first stage the 
decision could be made to invest in surveillance and detection systems.  If implemented, 
then surveillance systems could detect the outbreak if it occurs and consequently 
facilitate faster control of disease spread.  Regardless of whether an outbreak does or 
does not occur then the investment is a sunk cost.  In stage two there either is an 
outbreak or there is no outbreak.  Therefore the decisions made at this stage are state 
dependent, which reflects the nature of stochastic programming with recourse.   
The two stage nature of this framework could easily be adapted to the three stage 
model above.  At this point the formulation is kept as a two stage model because it is 
currently unclear what type of epidemiologic results will be received from epidemiologic 
model.  The three stage model is in part based on recovery actions.  At this point this is 
not an item of focus and requires market based data.  Therefore, for now the framework 
is two stage.    
5.6.1 States of Nature 
For the purpose of illustration I assume ten states of nature, which vary according 
to severity of possible agricultural terrorist event. State of nature one corresponds to 
situation where there is no agricultural terrorism event and business continues as usual.  
The second state of nature corresponds to a situation where there is a minor outbreak of 
FMD.  Under third state of nature the outbreak is more intense.  The event gets more 
severe for fourth and the most severe in the fifth and subsequent states of nature.  Clearly 
the situation with no event is the most likely state of nature.  
5.6.2 Grids and Cattle Operations  
The region under investigation is subdivided into n grid cells.  Each grid has 
specific attributes, such as the number of roads, vet clinics, population, wildlife density, 
farm operations, etc. which affect the vulnerability of the grid towards FMD infection.  
The number of cattle operations in a cell is thought to be most important characteristic of 
a grid cell in terms of vulnerability towards FMD.  Different strategies could be adopted 
in each of the grid cells depending on their characteristics.  For example, a grid cell with 
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high animal density is likely to adopt a more proactive strategy than a cell grid with low 
animal density.  At this point I use ten cells in the model.  All ten cells are assumed to 
have 100 cows.  
5.6.3 Strategies 
Numerous measures and their combinations could be considered for mitigating 
possible agricultural terrorism event such as intentional FMD spread.  What types of 
measures will be considered in an epidemiologist model is not exactly clear.  However, 
from existing literature I was able to identify several options for preventing and 
responding to FMD outbreaks.  I keep those options in mind to construct preliminary set 
of strategies to combat possible FMD outbreak.  Specifically I consider a set of strategies 
which could involve various combinations of surveillance and detection, vaccination, 
slaughter, etc.   
For the purpose of illustration consider a set of 5 strategies.  These strategies 
differ from one another based on their consequences. Specifically under various states of 
nature, different strategies will result in different numbers of vaccinated, slaughtered, 
infected, and normal cows.  Normal cows are presumed to be cows which are not 
infected and not vaccinated.  Vaccinated cows are divided into cows that are vaccinated 
preventatively in the fist stage and cows that are vaccinated responsively in the second 
stage.      
Strategy one is to do nothing.  Therefore under state of nature 1 nothing happens 
and all of the animals are in their usual healthy conditions.  In the second state of nature 
there is an outbreak and half of animals in this particular grid are infected.  In states of 
nature four and three more of them are infected and in state of nature five all of them are 
infected.  
The second strategy calls for preventative vaccination of all animals.  Therefore 
in all states of nature all cows show up as vaccinated in the first stage. 
The third strategy is state dependent.  Specifically, it calls for no action if there is 
no outbreak and it calls for vaccinating 50 animals in a cell if the outbreak occurs.  As 
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the severity of outbreaks worsens over states of nature, more unvaccinated animals get 
infected.   
The fourth strategy is both state dependent and state independent.  Under this 
strategy 10 animals are vaccinated preventatively no matter what happens.  These could 
be the cows under higher risk of being infected if FMD occurs.  For example, cows that 
are being transported or cows that are located near transportation points.  In the second 
stage, if there is no outbreak, than no further action is taken.  However, if there is an 
outbreak 20 animals are slaughtered as a response.  Again, as the severity of an outbreak 
worsens the number of infected animals increased. 
Strategy five is assumed to be based on complete surveillance and detection.  In 
other words, in the first stage an investment is made in surveillance systems, as a result 
of which any outbreak is assumed to be immediately detected and effectively stopped.  
This assumption is rather restrictive and could be relaxed as needed. 
These strategies are applied in all grid cells.  However, different strategies may 
be applied in different cells based on their characteristics.  Clearly the outcomes of the 
strategies are different for different grid cells under corresponding states of nature.   
The strategies proposed here are presented for illustrative purposes only.  I 
recognize that actual strategies employed later involve more considerations than 
mentioned here.  Actual strategies may also include more measures than assumed here.  
However, the composition of strategies is not the interest of this work.  The main interest 
is the effect of a wide set of strategies.  Therefore I concentrate on constructing an 
economic model that could take the outcomes of those strategies and evaluate their 
economic worth.     
5.7 Formulation 
The proposed model has the following structure:     
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Where:  
s  Corresponds to states of nature under attack and no attack 
g   Denotes grids 
x  A set of considered strategies 
cc  Cattle categories under various states of nature and strategies  
RETs,g   Returns under various states of nature for each grid 
Prs   Probability of state of nature s 
REVac   Revenues per animal under each category 
COSTac  Costs associated with cattle categories due to strategies 
INVCOSTx Investment costs associated with strategy x 
STRGx,g  Binary variables that represent adoption of strategy x in grid g  
Cs,x,ac,g Number of cows in eah grid under each state of nature and 
strategy by cattle categories 
Mean   Corresponds to average returns  
±
gsd ,   Positive and negative deviations from average returns over 
various states of nature. 
RAP   Arrow-Pratt risk aversion parameter. 
In this formulation the mean is calculated over all states of nature and 
corresponding deviations are squared and summed to come up with a variance of returns 
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under the various states of nature.  Returns (RETs,g) are calculated for each of the states 
of nature in each grid with a particular prevention and response strategy.  Under no 
outbreak, and therefore no farm infection, the returns are a function of existing prices 
and a function of prevention strategies adopted in the first stage.  Under the remaining 
nine states of nature, where some level of FMD is present, the profits are a function of 
prevention and response actions.  Returns (RETs,g) in each state of nature are affected by 
the costs of adopted strategies.   Costs include those of slaughter, disposal, disinfection, 
vaccination in either stage, and investment costs made in the first stage.  At this time the 
only strategy that involves investment in the first stage, and thus is not dependent on 
state of nature is surveillance and detection.  Other strategies could also be adjusted to 
reflect at least partial state independence.      
Notice that the probability of FMD outbreak (Pr) in the region is exogenous.  
This essentially corresponds to the assumption that prevention strategies do not alter the 
probability of agricultural terrorism through FMD spread.  This assumption is realistic 
because it is practically impossible to eliminate every possible venue of FMD spread.  
Therefore, if terrorists decided to spread FMD they will find a way to do so.  However, 
the bandwidth of an attack could be reduced by adopting certain prevention and response 
strategies.  In this case bandwidth corresponds to the extent of the spread of the disease.  
As such I can represent the spread of FMD as the probability of the grids being infected.  
In order to decrease the bandwidth, or reduce the probability of surrounding grids being 
infected, I could adopt certain prevention and response strategies.  However, due to 
uncertain nature of epidemiologic effectiveness of decreasing the probability of grid 
infection under various circumstances I treat probability of grid infection as exogenous.   
5.8 Results Discussion 
In its current form the model suggests primarily relying on surveillance and 
detection systems to interrupt the spread of FMD.  This corresponds to about 24 tests per 
year per herd, in this case assumed to be equivalent to a grid.  Chapter 4 results for fast 
spread suggested 12 annual tests.  However, in the previous chapter response activities 
were also adopted, whereas in this model the strategy to do surveillance and screening 
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was constructed to be exclusive.  It would be possible to construct the strategies to 
include both surveillance and response actions.   
Effects of various levels of RAC where investigated under the following 
probability distribution for the occurrence of the states of nature, state one 0.9999, state 
two 0.00001, state three 0.00001, state four 0.00004, state five 0.00004.   RAC was 
varied from 0 to 1.  As a response the optimal strategy choice went from a combination 
of third and fourth strategies to adoption of fifth strategy in all grid cells.  The 
corresponding EV frontier, which shows the relationship between mean returns and 
variance, is shown on Figure 33. 
Increasing the probability of FMD outbreak produced similar results.  
Specifically I increased the probability of the four FMD involving states of nature 
tenfold, relative to the previous case.  Depending on the value of RAC the adopted 
strategies switched from combinations of third and fourth strategy to completely 
adopting fifth strategy.  The corresponding EV frontier is given in Figure 34.  
Conclusions 
In this chapter I outlined a framework that will be used in conjunction with the 
epidemiologic model to be developed at the Veterinary school of Texas A&M 
University to evaluate various FMD mitigation strategies.  The proposed framework 
could be used to evaluate economic attractiveness of various strategies to battle possible 
agricultural terrorism, such as the intentional spread of FMD.  It is argued here that risk 
aversion of decision makers will play a significant role in determining the optimal 
combination of anti-terrorism measures to be adopted.   
Using hypothetical numeric values I investigated how the optimal mix of disease 
management strategies is affected by risk aversion levels.  It is apparent that higher risk 
aversion will result in adopting preventative measures such as surveillance and screening 
rather than responsive slaughter or vaccination.  It was also observed that at higher event 
probabilities preventative measures were favored over responsive measures.  Although, 
this result is consistent with the results of chapter 4, caution needs to be exercised while 
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interpreting these results due to the epidemiologic assumptions used.  It will be more 
appropriate to interpret the results of the model after more realistic estimates of 
epidemiologic model are used.   
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6 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
In the wake of raised awareness of threats to national security, agricultural 
terrorism is considered as an action that could disrupt social, economic and political 
stability (Veneman, 2002).  Several cases of unintentional and some intentional cases 
involving contamination of agricultural product have been observed and have caused 
various degrees of economic damages brought by agricultural contamination.  In the 
animal disease arena, recent outbreaks of BSE and FMD have been observed and reveal 
significant associated economic losses especially in the UK events.  Therefore, 
investigation of options to mitigate possible animal disease outbreaks whether through 
deliberate agricultural terrorism or accidental introduction was deemed to be in order 
and was done in this dissertation.  
To carry out this investigation, a conceptual framework for economic analysis of 
animal disease outbreak management strategies was developed.  Four broad classes of 
possible outbreak related management activities were considered: (1) ex ante prevention, 
(2) ex ante and some ex post detection activities (3) ex post response disease 
management and (4) ex post recovery activities.  Emphasis was placed on the differences 
between ex ante and ex post strategies for minimizing the economic losses from 
potential outbreaks. Specifically, economic tradeoffs were considered between the fixed, 
event independent costs of ex ante actions versus the probabilistic ex post costs 
encountered only when an outbreak occurs.   
Comparative statics and empirical analysis were done to examine the sensitivity 
of the use of ex post versus ex ante actions given changes in the probability of event 
occurrence, disease spread rate, and relative costs.  The comparative statics results 
showed that the optimal combination of strategies to mitigate possible agricultural 
contamination depends on a number of factors.  In particular investments in ex ante 
activities rise with increases in the (a) probability of events, (b) disease spread rates, (c) 
magnitude of costs of an outbreak, (d) relative costs and ineffectiveness of available 
response strategies, (e) severity of contamination, and (f) ineffectiveness of recovery 
actions.   
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Using the analytical framework individual decision maker behavior was also 
examined. In that setting, it was shown that under localized decision making, 
individually optimal levels of surveillance, prevention, response, and recovery actions 
adopted at each site are affected by external benefits that these actions create.  In other 
words, it was recognized that surveillance and response actions of one individual could 
affect the likelihood of another individual being infected.  Similarly, recovery actions 
adopted by one individual could affect magnitude of losses suffered by another 
uninfected individual if there is a disease outbreak.  Therefore, it was recommended that 
externality issues, brought by adoption of mitigation strategies, be included into analysis.  
However, these issues are left out from the empirical investigation carried out in this 
dissertation.  These aspects of agricultural terrorism mitigation could be topics of future 
research.  
The conceptual approach was used in an empirical, relatively simplified, case 
study analysis regarding foot and mouth disease outbreaks in Texas.  An empirical 
version of the model was used to evaluate the economic attractiveness of 
surveillance/detection, as a form of prevention, relative to response actions represented 
by slaughtering of herds with direct contact with those diagnosed as infected.  The 
number of ex ante annual animal health tests was used as a variable describing level of 
intensity of ex ante activity.  In terms of optimal combination of ex ante and ex post 
mitigation activities, it was observed that although ex post activities were always used in 
case of an outbreak, there was some level of substitutability between ex ante and ex post 
mitigation activities.  It was shown numerically that, for fast spread of disease, number 
of annual animal health tests increased while level of ex post response activity decreased 
as probability of an outbreak increased.  The results indicate that utilization of ex ante 
strategies depends on a number of factors.  Specifically, the amount of ex ante activity in 
terms of the frequency of ex ante animal tests increases as the  
• probability of outbreak increases 
• severity of the potential outbreak increases in the form of the number of 
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animals lost, the value of the animals or the rapidity of disease spread  
• the cost of ex ante activities becomes lower 
• the effectiveness of the response activities falls or the costs of response 
activities rise 
• recovery activities that help restore consumer demand to pre event levels 
become less effective or more costly 
• ancillary, non outbreak, related benefits of ext ante animal tests increases. 
A key point of interest in this study was to investigate the relationship between 
the decision to invest in surveillance and detection infrastructure and the probability of 
agricultural terrorism at which this decision is optimal.  It was found that for fast rate of 
disease spread it was optimal to invest in surveillance and detection even for very low 
probabilities of event occurrence.  Even though intensity of optimal surveillance and 
detection depends on various factors, the decision to invest in this strategy was optimal 
across all scenarios for fast spread of the disease.  This was true under both, exponential 
and RF, formulations of disease spread.  However, while ex ante investment in 
surveillance was optimal for all fast spread scenarios, it was not necessarily so for slow 
spread scenarios.  Under slow spread of the disease, investment in surveillance and 
detection was not optimal until probability of an outbreak was as high as around 0.6.  
This implies that optimality of ex ante investment depends on disease spread rate and 
event probability. 
Finally, a richer economic modeling framework was developed that is designed 
to be used in conjunction with an epidemiologic model to evaluate various combinations 
of strategies to mitigate the consequences of disease outbreaks.  This model is based on 
the assumption that an epidemiologic model can be used to simulate the herd 
consequences of various ex ante and ex post prevention, detection, response and some 
subset of the recovery options providing data that can be integrated into the economic 
model.   In turn the linked models can be used to do an integrated epidemiologic and 
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economic evaluation.  Specifically, an epidemiologic model could provide estimates of 
the proportion of the cattle herd that is either 
• healthy,  
• infected,  
• vaccinated, or 
• slaughtered 
under a wide selection of strategies for managing animal disease.   
 This framework, unlike the one used in the empirical case study analysis, 
disaggregates the region under investigation into multiple independent decision making 
units, who choose mitigation strategies appropriate for their particular circumstances.  
For example, this framework will allow relying on prevention and detection in the areas 
with high animal density, while relying on response and recovery in the areas with fewer 
cattle operations.   This framework will also let us incorporate the effects of external 
benefits generated by adoption of mitigation strategies by individual sites.  For example, 
as estimates become available, we will be able to incorporate the fact that surveillance of 
animals adopted by one site will affect the probability of infection of a neighboring site.  
In addition it will be possible to explicitly include the effects of livestock transportation 
on disease spread and on economic losses from a potential disease outbreak.  Hence, it 
will be possible to include mitigation strategies such as transportation bans.     
This final conceptual framework is also expanded so it incorporates decision 
makers risk preferences and an empirical trial indicates that the optimal combination of 
strategies will depend not only on ex ante costs, and expected losses from potential 
outbreaks, but also on degree of variability of losses and the degree of risk aversion.  
The results herein need to be interpreted with care.  Strong assumptions were 
made regarding functional forms of disease spread, rate of disease spread, effectiveness 
and use of response strategies, regional cooperative behavior, and costs of strategy 
implementation.  These assumptions limit the robustness of the results.  Therefore, the 
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results are intended to be interpreted as preliminary descriptions of relative desirability 
of ex ante fixed cost investments and ex post response actions.   
Future research should improve on the assumptions made in this study.  
Specifically use of the final conceptual model with its link to an epidemiologic model 
would permit incorporation of more accurate and epidemiologically sound disease 
spread characteristics and in turn would provide more reliable results than those given in 
this study.  Additionally, sensitivity of demand towards livestock disease outbreak is an 
important omitted factor in this work.  Thus research on the market consequences of 
livestock disease outbreak is needed and would provide better economic input for future 
studies of the type carried out herein.    Furthermore, the effectiveness of a broader 
spectrum of prevention, detection, response and recovery activities needs to be 
investigated.  Future research should also take into account individual non cooperative 
behavior, externalities, and the public good characteristics of counter agricultural 
terrorism measures.    
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Figures 
Figure 1. Stages of decision support tool  
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Figure 7.  Stages in localized decision making 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Optimal number of tests 
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Figure 9. FMD spread under exponential formulation for slow spread   
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Figure 10.  FMD spread under exponential formulation for fast spread    
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Figure 11.  Effectiveness of response strategy 
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Figure 12.  Spread under reed frost formulation and logistic estimation for slow  
   spread 
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Figure 13.  Spread under reed frost formulation and logistic estimation for fast  
                    spread 
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Figure 14. Number of annual tests under slow exponential spread scenarios 
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Figure 15. Number of annual tests under fast exponential spread scenarios 
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Figure 16.  Number of annual tests under slow spread under RF formulation 
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Figure 17. Number of annual tests under fast spread under RF formulation 
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Figure 18.  Number of tests with recovery program in place under fast exponential     
                    spread 
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Figure 19.  Number of tests with recovery program in place under fast RF spread 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 148 
$0
$10,000,000
$20,000,000
$30,000,000
$40,000,000
$50,000,000
$60,000,000
$70,000,000
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
P
i
ii
iii
iv
v
vi
 
 
i – Full Variable Costs (VTC), Response Effectiveness (RE)= 0.17 
ii – VTC, RE=0.3 
iii – 0.1VTC, RE=0.17 
iv – 0.1VTC, RE=0.3 
 v – 0.01VTC, RE=0.17 
vi – 0.01VTC, RE=0.3 
 
Figure 20. Economic losses under slow exponential spread 
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Figure 21.  Economic losses under fast exponential spread 
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Figure 22.  Economic losses under slow RF spread 
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Figure 23  Economic losses under fast RF spread 
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Figure 24  Proportion of cattle industry’s monetary value lost under slow  
                   exponential spread 
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Figure 25  Proportion of cattle industry’s monetary value lost under fast  
                   exponential spread 
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Figure 26  Proportion of cattle industry’s monetary value lost under slow RF 
spread 
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Figure 27.  Proportion of cattle industry’s monetary value lost under fast RF 
spread 
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Figure 28  Proportion of cattle industry’s monetary value lost under slow 
exponential spread with no surveillance and detection 
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Figure 29.  Proportion of cattle industry’s monetary value lost under fast  
exponential spread with no surveillance and detection 
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Figure 30.  Proportion of cattle industry’s monetary value lost under slow RF      
                    spread with no surveillance and detection 
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Figure 31. Proportion of cattle industry’s monetary value lost under fast RF spread 
with no surveillance and detection 
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Figure 32.  Response and number of annual tests under fast RF spread with   
                    minimal variable costs 
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Figure 33.  Combinations of variance and mean profits 
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Graph 34.  Combinations of variance and mean profits under increased threat level 
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Graph 35. Example of total cost minimization under fast RF spread, p=0.2 
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Table 1.  Slow Exponential Spread Scenarios 
Variable Costs (VC) 
of Testing 
Response 
Effectiveness 
Event 
probability 
Number 
of tests 
Response 
level Losses 
VC 0.17 0.001 0 100% 72465.85 
VC 0.17 0.1 0 100% 7246585.40 
VC 0.17 0.2 0 100% 14493170.00 
VC 0.17 0.3 0 100% 21739760.00 
VC 0.17 0.4 0 100% 28986340.00 
VC 0.17 0.5 0 100% 36232930.00 
VC 0.17 0.6 0 100% 43479510.00 
VC 0.17 0.7 0 100% 50726100.00 
VC 0.17 0.8 0 100% 57972680.00 
VC 0.17 0.9 1 85% 59017910.00 
VC 0.3 0.001 0 100% 61135.77 
VC 0.3 0.1 0 100% 6113577.39 
VC 0.3 0.2 0 100% 12227150.00 
VC 0.3 0.3 0 100% 18340730.00 
VC 0.3 0.4 0 100% 24454310.00 
VC 0.3 0.5 0 100% 30567890.00 
VC 0.3 0.6 0 100% 36681460.00 
VC 0.3 0.7 0 100% 42795040.00 
VC 0.3 0.8 0 100% 48908620.00 
VC 0.3 0.9 0 100% 55022200.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.001 0 100% 72465.85 
0.1VC 0.17 0.1 0 100% 7246585.40 
0.1VC 0.17 0.2 0 100% 14493170.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.3 0 100% 21739760.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.4 0 100% 28986340.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.5 0 100% 36232930.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.6 0 100% 43479510.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.7 2 45% 46230220.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.8 2 45% 46295100.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.9 2 45% 46359990.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.001 0 100% 61135.77 
0.1VC 0.3 0.1 0 100% 6113577.39 
0.1VC 0.3 0.2 0 100% 12227150.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.3 0 100% 18340730.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.4 0 100% 24454310.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.5 0 100% 30567890.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.6 0 100% 36681460.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.7 0 100% 42795040.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.8 0 100% 48908620.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.9 2 70% 46295460.00 
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Table 1 Continued 
 
 
Variable Costs (VC) 
of Testing 
Response 
Effectiveness 
Event 
probability 
Number 
of tests 
Response 
level Losses 
 
0.01VC 0.17 0.001 0 100% 72465.85 
0.01VC 0.17 0.1 0 100% 7246585.40 
0.01VC 0.17 0.2 0 100% 14493170.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.3 0 100% 21739760.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.4 0 100% 28986340.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.5 0 100% 36232930.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.6 0 100% 43479510.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.7 2 4500% 43655320.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.8 2 4500% 43720200.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.9 4 0% 43715370.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.001 0 100% 61135.77 
0.01VC 0.3 0.1 0 100% 6113577.39 
0.01VC 0.3 0.2 0 100% 12227150.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.3 0 100% 18340730.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.4 0 100% 24454310.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.5 0 100% 30567890.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.6 0 100% 36681460.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.7 0 100% 42795040.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.8 2 70% 43662840.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.9 2 70% 43720560.00 
 
 
 164 
Table 2. Fast Exponential Spread Scenarios 
Variable Costs (VC) 
of Testing 
Response 
Effectiveness 
Event 
probability 
Number 
of tests 
Response 
level Losses 
VC 0.17 0.001 5 100% 123835900.00 
VC 0.17 0.1 8 100% 173646800.00 
VC 0.17 0.2 9 100% 186153200.00 
VC 0.17 0.3 9 100% 193399800.00 
VC 0.17 0.4 9 100% 200646300.00 
VC 0.17 0.5 10 100% 204655000.00 
VC 0.17 0.6 10 100% 208393000.00 
VC 0.17 0.7 10 100% 212131000.00 
VC 0.17 0.8 10 100% 215869000.00 
VC 0.17 0.9 10 100% 219607000.00 
VC 0.3 0.001 5 100% 122364300.00 
VC 0.3 0.1 8 100% 171097100.00 
VC 0.3 0.2 9 100% 183887200.00 
VC 0.3 0.3 9 100% 190000700.00 
VC 0.3 0.4 9 100% 196114300.00 
VC 0.3 0.5 9 100% 202227900.00 
VC 0.3 0.6 10 100% 204892200.00 
VC 0.3 0.7 10 100% 208046700.00 
VC 0.3 0.8 10 100% 211201300.00 
VC 0.3 0.9 10 100% 214355800.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.001 6 100% 53150430.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.1 11 100% 60806040.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.2 12 100% 62790510.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.3 12 100% 64145260.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.4 13 95% 65156140.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.5 13 95% 66067300.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.6 14 95% 66825050.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.7 14 95% 67472230.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.8 14 95% 68119400.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.9 15 95% 68698130.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.001 6 100% 52891630.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.1 10 100% 60374530.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.2 11 100% 62290350.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.3 12 100% 63514690.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.4 13 100% 64593890.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.5 13 100% 65364490.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.6 13 100% 66135090.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.7 14 95% 66778060.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.8 14 95% 67326070.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.9 14 95% 67874080.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.001 8 100% 44222320.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.1 15 95% 45541380.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.2 17 90% 45935080.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.3 18 85% 46209110.00 
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Table 2 Continued 
 
Variable Costs (VC) 
of Testing 
Response 
Effectiveness 
Event 
probability 
Number 
of tests 
Response 
level Losses 
0.01VC 0.17 0.5 20 80% 46623630.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.6 20 80% 46793150.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.7 21 75% 46942620.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.8 22 75% 47085030.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.9 22 75% 47212890.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.001 8 100% 44196820.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.1 14 95% 45465710.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.2 16 95% 45832620.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.3 17 95% 46097610.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.4 18 90% 46307750.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.5 19 90% 46486630.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.6 20 90 46647970.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.7 20 90 46793300.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.8 21 85 46924950.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.9 21 85 47050690.00 
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Table 3.  Slow RF Spread Scenarios 
Variable Costs 
(VC) of Testing 
Response 
Effectiveness 
Event 
probability 
Number 
of tests 
Response 
level Losses 
VC 0.17 0.001 0 100% 70680.02 
VC 0.17 0.1 0 100% 7068001.90 
VC 0.17 0.2 0 100% 14136000.00 
VC 0.17 0.3 0 100% 21204010.00 
VC 0.17 0.4 0 100% 28272010.00 
VC 0.17 0.5 0 100% 35340010.00 
VC 0.17 0.6 0 100% 42408010.00 
VC 0.17 0.7 0 100% 49476010.00 
VC 0.17 0.8 0 100% 56544020.00 
VC 0.17 0.9 0 100% 63612020.00 
VC 0.3 0.001 0 100% 59629.65 
VC 0.3 0.1 0 100% 5962964.80 
VC 0.3 0.2 0 100% 11925930.00 
VC 0.3 0.3 0 100% 17888890.00 
VC 0.3 0.4 0 100% 23851860.00 
VC 0.3 0.5 0 100% 29814820.00 
VC 0.3 0.6 0 100% 35777790.00 
VC 0.3 0.7 0 100% 41740750.00 
VC 0.3 0.8 0 100% 47703720.00 
VC 0.3 0.9 0 100% 53666680.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.001 0 100% 70680.02 
0.1VC 0.17 0.1 0 100% 7068001.90 
0.1VC 0.17 0.2 0 100% 14136000.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.3 0 100% 21204010.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.4 0 100% 28272010.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.5 0 100% 35340010.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.6 0 100% 42408010.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.7 2 90% 48539330.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.8 2 90% 48934090.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.9 2 90% 49328850.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.001 0 100% 59629.65 
0.1VC 0.3 0.1 0 100% 5962964.80 
0.1VC 0.3 0.2 0 100% 11925930.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.3 0 100% 17888890.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.4 0 100% 23851860.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.5 0 100% 29814820.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.6 0 100% 35777790.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.7 0 100% 41740750.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.8 0 100% 47703720.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.9 2 95% 48791480.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.001 0 100% 70680.02 
0.01VC 0.17 0.1 0 100% 7068001.90 
0.01VC 0.17 0.2 0 100% 14136000.00 
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Table 3 Continued 
 
Variable Costs (VC) 
of Testing 
Response 
Effectiveness 
Event 
probability 
Number 
of tests 
Response 
level Losses 
0.01VC 0.17 0.4 0 100% 28272010.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.5 0 100% 35340010.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.6 0 100% 42408010.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.7 5 85% 45002620.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.8 6 80% 45194670.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.9 6 80% 45372340.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.001 0 100% 59629.65 
0.01VC 0.3 0.1 0 100% 5962964.80 
0.01VC 0.3 0.2 0 100% 11925930.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.3 0 100% 17888890.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.4 0 100% 23851860.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.5 0 100% 29814820.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.6 0 100% 35777790.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.7 0 100% 41740750.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.8 5 90% 44971320.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.9 5 90% 45138950.00 
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Table 4. Fast RF Spread Scenarios 
Variable Costs (VC) 
of Testing 
Response 
Effectiveness 
Event 
probability 
Number 
of tests 
Response 
level Losses 
VC 0.17 0.001 0 100% 12932130.00 
VC 0.17 0.1 12 100% 233891400.00 
VC 0.17 0.2 13 100% 249412600.00 
VC 0.17 0.3 13 100% 259678900.00 
VC 0.17 0.4 14 100% 266873800.00 
VC 0.17 0.5 14 100% 272796000.00 
VC 0.17 0.6 14 100% 278718200.00 
VC 0.17 0.7 15 100% 283089400.00 
VC 0.17 0.8 15 100% 286746400.00 
VC 0.17 0.9 15 100% 290403500.00 
VC 0.3 0.001 0 100% 10906640.00 
VC 0.3 0.1 12 100% 230868000.00 
VC 0.3 0.2 13 100% 246200600.00 
VC 0.3 0.3 13 100% 254860900.00 
VC 0.3 0.4 14 100% 263171500.00 
VC 0.3 0.5 14 100% 268168100.00 
VC 0.3 0.6 14 100% 273164700.00 
VC 0.3 0.7 14 100% 278161300.00 
VC 0.3 0.8 15 100% 282180100.00 
VC 0.3 0.9 15 100% 285266400.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.001 0 100% 12932130.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.1 15 100% 68029550.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.2 17 100% 70511110.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.3 17 100% 72149920.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.4 18 95% 73343930.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.5 19 95% 74417550.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.6 19 95% 75282160.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.7 20 95% 76133190.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.8 20 95% 76791500.00 
0.1VC 0.17 0.9 20 95% 77449810.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.001 0 100% 10906640.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.1 15 100% 67458760.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.2 16 100% 69838870.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.3 17 100% 71385880.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.4 18 100% 72619080.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.5 18 100% 73607850.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.6 19 100% 74482650.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.7 19 100% 75214010.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.8 19 100% 75945370.00 
0.1VC 0.3 0.9 20 95% 76541670.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.001 0 100% 12932130.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.1 21 95% 46433470.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.2 23 90% 46875520.00 
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Table 4 Continued 
 
Variable Costs (VC) 
of Testing 
Response 
Effectiveness 
Event 
probability 
Number 
of tests 
Response 
level Losses 
0.01VC 0.17 0.4 25 85% 47428500.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.5 26 85% 47635120.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.6 27 80% 47815870.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.7 28 80% 47979720.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.8 28 80% 48131050.00 
0.01VC 0.17 0.9 29 75% 48265680.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.001 0 100% 10906640.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.1 20 95% 46333410.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.2 22 95% 46759870.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.3 24 95% 47058480.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.4 25 90% 47290810.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.5 26 90% 47489800.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.6 26 90% 47660900.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.7 27 90% 47815590.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.8 28 85% 47960700.00 
0.01VC 0.3 0.9 28 85% 48090740.00 
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